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ABSTRACT 
 
A novel nuclear weapons proliferation assessment method has been developed to 
determine a state’s Nuclear Weapons Latency, the expected time to be taken by a non-
nuclear weapons state to develop a conventionally deliverable nuclear weapon given the 
state’s position on a path toward or away from a nuclear weapon and accounting for the 
state’s motivations and intentions.  Potential proliferation time is taken as a 
representation of the latent proliferation capacity of a non-nuclear weapons state.  An 
assessment of proliferation time is critical to crafting an effective policy response within 
a useful time frame.  Current proliferation assessments either neglect proliferation time 
or are static case-specific assessments frequently built on restricted information and 
opaque assumptions. 
The Nuclear Weapons Latency computational tool has been developed to 
determine a state’s Nuclear Weapons Latency and embodies a stochastic Petri net 
proliferation simulation.  The tool makes only three simple assumptions: a decision to 
proliferate has been made, the proliferation pathway network is known, and the 
associated pathway activity times are estimable.  Beyond the quantification of a state’s 
latency, the tool provides a transparent, efficient, adaptable, and highly repeatable 
platform which allows for extensive sensitivity analysis to better inform the 
nonproliferation discussion and policy decisions.   
Functionality of the tool was verified and inherent sensitivities determined 
through historical analysis with the U.S. case of proliferation in the Manhattan Project. 
 iii 
 
Network and operational parameters were found that drove expected Latencies high 
while others increased the Latency distribution variance.  Further confidence was built 
with historical analyses of the Pakistani and South African cases of proliferation.  These 
verifications were done in lieu of experimental validation which is impossible for future 
event simulations like the Latency tool.  Analysis revealed that while A.Q. Khan altered 
the Pakistani proliferation pathway, his impact on proliferation time may have been 
minimal.   
A Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) function was implemented for 
proliferation pathway selection.  This function might increase the accuracy of the most-
likely Latency estimate in certain cases.  However, use of MAUA for adversary 
modeling also significantly increased the number of assumptions necessary.   
A Latency investigation of South Korean nuclear fuel cycle facility development, 
a current nonproliferation policy concern, demonstrates how Nuclear Weapons Latency 
can help characterize the proliferation risk of different policy options for decision 
makers.  Analysis showed that development of any one of pyroprocessing, PUREX, or 
especially commercial uranium enrichment technologies reduces South Korean Latency.  
This risk characterization ability through policy option sensitivity enables the Latency 
tool to help fill a void of useful proliferation risk information provided by technical 
assessments to policy makers identified by the 2013 National Academies study 
Improving the Assessment of Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I.A. Motivation 
 
 The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the major threats to the US and 
international security today.1  Substantial attention has also been given to the concept of 
eliminating all nuclear weapons.2,3,4  The (potential) nuclear threats of North Korea and 
Iran regularly grab headlines.5,6  In 2009, President Obama gave a marquee foreign 
policy speech vowing to address proliferation concerns and pursue full nuclear 
disarmament.7  However, in order to best address nuclear weapons proliferation and 
prepare for a world without them, one must fully understand the dynamics of 
proliferation.  Paramount among the characteristics of such proliferation are the time (or 
“latency”) and pathway that a state takes to develop its nuclear weapons given its 
motivations, intentions, and underlying latent capacities.8,9,10,11   
 Nuclear Weapons Latency is defined as “The expected time to be taken by a non-
nuclear weapons state to develop a conventionally deliverable nuclear weapon given the 
state’s position on a path toward or away from a nuclear weapon and accounting for the 
state’s motivations and intentions”.12,13  A conventionally deliverable weapon is defined 
as a weapon deliverable by airdrop, missile, or artillery systems.  Proliferation pathways 
refer to the particular choices, steps, and methods that a state pursues in order to develop 
a nuclear weapon.  In order to deepen the understanding of the dynamics of nuclear 
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weapons proliferation, it is necessary to create a systematic methodology to quantify 
Nuclear Weapons Latency.   
 Fig. 1 depicts a graphical representation of Nuclear Weapons Latency.  Three 
general proliferation pathways are shown as linked nodes.  The nodes represent 
sequential levels of development necessary for successful proliferation.  Time is 
indicated on the horizontal axis to illustrate that the required proliferation time is 
dependent on the path taken.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Graphical Nuclear Weapons Latency representation. 
 
 
I.B. Objective 
 
 The objective of this research is to develop a computational tool to determine a 
state’s Nuclear Weapons Latency given its current condition including available 
U gun weapon 
U implosion 
weapon 
Pu implosion 
weapon 
t 
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resources and motivational environment.  Nuclear Weapons Latency is characterized by 
an expected time to proliferate and the associated proliferation pathway.  Nuclear 
Weapons Latency is not a prediction of proliferation; such predictions are perilous.14  
Nuclear Weapons Latency answers the question: if a decision to proliferate has already 
been made how long is it expected to take and what path should the state be expected to 
follow?   
 The research objective is met by the developed Nuclear Weapons Latency tool 
presented in this dissertation.  The tool makes only three simple assumptions: 1) that a 
proliferation decision has been made, 2) that the network of potential proliferation 
pathways available to the proliferator is known, and 3) that proliferation network activity 
times may be reasonably estimated.  The first assumption is necessary to limit the scope 
of the problem to what is tractable.  A lack of a clear decision in favor of nuclear 
weapons development can only slow proliferation.  Therefore the only consequence of 
this assumption being incorrect is that proliferation times may be underestimated.  
Expecting proliferation sooner than it might actually occur is a safe and conservative 
approximation.  The other two assumptions are entirely testable.  Tool simulations may 
be run ad infinitum, varying the network and activity time assumptions to quantify their 
impact.  The Latency tool thus provides a transparent platform to perform repeatable 
studies using well defined and variable assumptions that allow for complete sensitivity 
analysis of the results.  In this manner intuition building by independent users without 
requiring intensive expert efforts is possible.    
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I.C. Previous Work 
 
 The quantification of Nuclear Weapons Latency as defined above is a type of 
proliferation assessment which focuses on time and the proliferation pathway.  Attempts 
at assessing proliferation were being made before the first nuclear weapon was even 
constructed.15  Modern technical proliferation assessments can be divided into three 
categories: broad methodologies focused on assessing the likelihood of proliferation and 
in some cases predicting proliferation which may be applied to any case, proliferation 
pathway analysis, and specific case based assessments which apply expert analysis.  
Closely related to proliferation assessments are proliferation resistance methodologies, 
and these will also be catalogued. 
 
I.C.1. Proliferation Assessments 
  
The seminal work among broad based quantitative assessments is The Dynamics 
of Nuclear Proliferation by Meyers.9  Meyers developed a technical model to 
characterize a state’s latent capacity for nuclear weapons and then tested three theories 
of proliferation against historical proliferation cases given the data of the technical 
model.  Meyers found support for proliferation as a result of some external or internal 
motivator and no support for the theory of technical inertia or the null hypothesis. 
Other theoretical proliferation assessments attempted to correlate the impact of 
various factors and indicators to proliferation decisions or levels of progress towards a 
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nuclear weapons capability.  Singh & Way developed correlates of proliferation based 
on technological, external, and internal determinants and further deconstructed 
proliferation into three stages: explore, pursue, and acquire.16  They concluded that 
proliferation is generally a result of an appropriate economic development level mixed 
with an externally threatening environment.  This analysis was further developed and 
expanded to include more pertinent nuclear capabilities and agreements by Li, Yim, and 
McNelis.17  A study by Jo & Gartzke reinforced prior conclusions that proliferation 
occurred when there was a combination of determinants from both categories of 
opportunity and willingness.18  Kroenig and Fuhrmann respectively assess the impact of 
foreign assistance to nuclear proliferation.19,20  A unique proliferation assessment was 
presented by Jacque E.C. Hymans which concluded that the psychological disposition 
and associated perceptions of the political leader of the proliferant state has as much, if 
not more, to do with the decision to proliferate as any other indicator.21  Taken together 
these works constitute a rigorous analysis of the drivers for nuclear proliferation.  
However, largely missing from them is any treatment of how such proliferation may 
occur. 
More recent proliferation assessments have focused on proliferation pathway 
analysis.  Ford developed a tool that could be used to assess the most likely path a state 
or sub-state actor would follow to acquire the Special Nuclear Material (SNM) required 
for a nuclear weapon.22  Freeman implemented a Bayesian network to predict the most 
likely path to a nuclear weapon based on available resources, proliferant motivations, 
and existing evidence.23  The Bayes net allows for the model to be updated as new 
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evidence becomes available.  Freeman’s Bayesian network was expanded and refined to 
assess the impact of foreign assistance and technology acquisition by Mella.24  The 
pathway assessment added by these methods was useful but left untreated the time 
associated with proliferation pathway progression. 
Further pathway analysis work has been done from an International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards perspective.  Listner et al. determine the most 
preferred diversion pathway for a state given a specific set of resources and technologies 
in order to more appropriately allocate IAEA safeguarding resources.25  This 
methodology employs software to solve a shortest path algorithm with path length 
characterized with different criteria.  Analysis has also been done to apply game theory 
to Listner’s model to evaluate adversary strategies in response to pathway based 
application of safeguards.26  In a similar vein, Murphy et al. propose a structure for 
IAEA resource allocation based on pathway analysis coupled with available technology, 
resources, and state behavior.27  These methods are really assessments of proliferation 
pathway attractiveness to a proliferator.  While this approach may meet IAEA needs, the 
methods are not a complete assessment of how proliferation might occur. 
Proliferation assessments based on specific cases have frequently been done.  
These assessments are regularly done by intelligence agencies.  Examples of 
proliferation assessments produced by intelligence agencies include any one of the 
multiple U.S. National Intelligence Estimates which have assessed the Iranian nuclear 
weapons program.28  Other analyses that make use of entirely open source information 
are completed by think tanks, such as David Albright’s Institute for Science and 
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International Security (ISIS) which produces regular reports on the capabilities of Iran 
and other suspected and known proliferators.29  Harney et al. analyzed a hypothetical 
case of proliferation from a systems approach using the critical path method to estimate 
the time required for proliferation given certain assumptions.30  Brown et al. explore 
optimal methods for interdicting the proliferation analyzed in Harney et al.31  These 
specific case studies, while usually thorough, are static and require substantial expert 
effort to create and update.      
Proliferation resistance methodologies attempt to assess the proliferation risk of 
specific nuclear materials, technologies, systems, or fuel cycles.  Proliferation resistance 
is determined relative to other similar nuclear materials, technologies, systems, or fuel 
cycles, possibly as part of a holistic evaluation of a particular state given the state’s 
current status.  Proliferation resistance methodologies can be divided into two general 
categories: those employing barrier analysis and those using quantitative risk assessment 
methods.  The barrier analysis methods include the Technological Opportunities to 
increase the Proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power Systems (TOPS) 
method, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) method, the Simplified Approach for 
Proliferation Resistance Assessment (SAPRA), the Texas A&M University (TAMU) 
Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) method, and the International Project on 
Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) method.32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40  
Elements of the SAPRA method were incorporated into the TAMU MAUA.  The 
SAPRA method itself is an extension of the JAEA method, which in turn is an extension 
of the TOPS method.  Quantitative risk analysis based techniques include Proliferation 
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Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP), Risk Informed Proliferation Analysis 
(RIPA), and the BNL Markovian method.41,42,43,44  All of these techniques except the 
BNL method rely on expert elicitation; though RIPA was developed such that the 
elicitation involved could be applied to different scenarios.  While useful from a 
technology and facilities perspective, these methods assess proliferation resistance as 
opposed to state proliferation. 
While there has been much work done in the area of proliferation assessments, it 
is clear that a computational tool to determine a state’s Nuclear Weapons Latency 
represents a novel and significant advancement for this field.  The traditional predictive 
proliferation assessments do not address how proliferation will occur.  More recent 
assessments have investigated the likelihood of various pathways but have not addressed 
the time required by a proliferant to field a deliverable weapon.  Case-based 
assessments, both hypothetical and real, do characterize both the pathway and time 
associated with proliferation.  However, these studies are the product of a concerted 
effort by specific experts using a specific set of assumptions and information which may 
not be known or fully understood to those not involved.  Further, National Intelligence 
Estimates and similar studies are produced in a classified environment.  Such studies 
may be updated but not without concerted expert effort.  These factors limit the 
availability, reproducibility, and applicability of their results.  It is clear that despite the 
substantial contributions of previous assessments more work is needed.  Table I notes 
ideal characteristics possessed by the various proliferation assessment methods. 
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TABLE I 
Ideal Proliferation Assessment Characteristics 
Proliferation 
Assessment types 
Proliferation 
Theory 
Pathway 
Analysis 
Specific/ 
Case-based 
Latency 
Proliferation Likelihood Yes No Yes No 
Pathway Likelihood No Yes Yes Yes 
Proliferation Time No No Yes Yes 
Transparent 
Assumptions 
Yes Yes Some Yes 
Robust Uncertainty & 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Some Yes Some Yes 
Easily Reproducible & 
Widely Applicable 
Yes Yes No Yes 
 
 
Though the Latency method treats the actual proliferation decision as an 
assumption, it does bring distinct advantages.  Policy makers and analysts need a reliable 
method that can promptly provide limits on the window of opportunity they have to 
influence proliferation and pinpoint the pathway aspects that can be influenced to 
generate the greatest increase in latency time.  This method should also be available in 
both classified and unclassified settings, use transparent assumptions which can be easily 
adjusted for sensitivity analysis, and be usable by non-experts to generate valid results.  
The Nuclear Weapons Latency tool satisfies these needs. 
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I.D. Overview 
 
 This dissertation discusses the probabilistic simulation methodology used by the 
Nuclear Weapons Latency tool as well as the associated testing and a current application 
of the latency tool.  The latency tool itself, with the necessary probability modeling 
theory, is described in Section II.  Sections III-VI report latency tool verification, 
sensitivity testing, and historical analysis with the US, Pakistani, and South African 
proliferation cases.  Sections VII-VIII discuss the application of multi-attribute utility 
theory to the latency tool for proliferation pathway selection. Section IX presents a 
current latency analysis which investigates the proposed fuel cycle facility development 
by the Republic of Korea. The dissertation is then concluded in Section X. 
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II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS LATENCY TOOL 
 
 The Nuclear Weapons Latency tool determines a state’s Nuclear Weapons 
Latency by simulating state proliferation through a Petri Net model with the option of 
using Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) for proliferation pathway selection.45,46  
The problem confronting a decided state proliferator is essentially the well-known 
Resource-Constrained Scheduling Problem (RCSP).47  Large scale projects like nuclear 
weapons development rarely go as planned, and simulations of a proliferator’s progress 
are best represented with a stochastic probability model.  Generalized Stochastic Petri 
Nets (GSPNs) have served well as both an RCSP solution method and dynamic 
probability models.48  Petri Nets are highly flexible and also reduce the potential for 
intractable growth of the probabilistic state-space associated with other probability 
modeling techniques which could be problematic given the numerous options for 
proliferation and desired modeling detail.  This section describes Petri Nets and their 
application in the Nuclear Weapons Latency tool along with inputs and outputs from the 
tool.  A discussion of MAUA and its application is left to Section 0. 
 
II.A. Petri Net Theory 
 
 Petri Nets are a simple yet powerful simulation technique for modeling complex 
systems.49,50,51  Petri Nets are directed bi-partite graphs consisting of places and 
transitions represented by circles and bars respectively.  Directional arcs connect places 
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to transitions and transitions to places.  Any number of places may connect to a single 
transition and vice versa.  However, places cannot connect directly to other places and 
transitions cannot connect directly to other transitions.  Dots located within the places 
are called tokens.  The location of these tokens within the network places is known as the 
marking and represents the state or evolution of a Petri Net simulation.  Tokens may 
move from an upstream place to a downstream place as the simulation evolves when the 
transition between the two places fires.  Before firing, a transition must first be enabled.  
A transition is enabled when all places immediately preceding the transition accumulate 
the number of tokens corresponding to the weight of the arc connecting that place to the 
subsequent transition.  When a transition fires, it removes tokens from all its 
immediately preceding places and adds tokens to all the places immediately downstream 
from the transition.  The amount of tokens removed from and added to each place 
corresponds to the weights of the arcs connecting the places and transition.  Fig. 2 
depicts the firing of Transition 4 and the associated transfer of tokens.  Note in Fig. 2 
that Transition 2 is not enabled and cannot fire because the arc weight from Place 2 to 
Transition 2 is equal to 2 tokens.  
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Fig. 2. Simple Petri Net (a) prior to firing of Transition 4, (b) after Transition 4 fires 
 
 Inhibitor arcs can add a further degree of control to a Petri Net.50,51  Inhibitor arcs 
are connected from places to transitions.  When the amount of tokens in place is greater 
than or equal to the weight of a connected inhibitor arc, the associated transition is 
blocked from firing even if the current marking would otherwise enable the transition.  
Fig. 3 shows the net of Fig. 2 with an inhibitor arc added from place 5 to transition 2.  In 
Fig. 3a transition 2 is inhibited from firing as there is one token in place 5.  Once 
transition 4 fires and removes the token from place 5 in Fig. 3b, transition 2 is free to fire 
again.   
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Fig. 3. Simple Petri Net demonstrating an inhibitor arc with (a) transition 2 inhibited and 
(b) transition 2 uninhibited 
  
 The mathematical representation of Petri Nets is straightforward. 49,50,51  A Petri 
Net is defined as the 6-tuple  
𝑃𝑁 = {𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐷−, 𝐷+, 𝐻,𝑀0}  (1) 
where 
𝑃 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑟} 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑟 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠; 
𝑇 = {𝑡1, 𝑡2, … 𝑡𝑠} 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑇 ∩ 𝑃 = ∅; 
𝐷− ⊂ (𝑃 × 𝑇) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑠; 
𝐷+ ⊂ (𝑇 × 𝑃) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑠; 
𝐻 ⊂ (𝑃 × 𝑇) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑠; 
𝑀:𝑃 → ℕ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀0. 
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 Petri Nets are functionally represented through matrices. The input, output, and 
inhibition matrices 𝐷−, 𝐷+, and 𝐻are all 𝑠 × 𝑟 matrices.  The matrix element 𝑑𝑖𝑗
−  is equal 
to the arc weight connecting place pj to transition ti.  The element 𝑑𝑖𝑗
+  is equal to the 
weight of the arc connecting transition ti to place pj.  The element ℎ𝑖𝑗 of inhibition 
matrix 𝐻is equal to the weight of the inhibitor arc connecting place pj to transition ti.  
The incidence matrix is then 𝐷 = 𝐷+ − 𝐷−.  For example, the PN of Fig. 3 is 
represented as 
𝐷− = [
2 0 0
0 2 0
0 0 1
   
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0   2 1 0
], (2) 
𝐷+ = [
0 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
   
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0   0 0 1
], (3) 
𝐻 = [
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
   
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0   0 0 0
], and (4) 
𝐷 = [
−2 1 1
0 −2 0
0 0 −1
   
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0  − 2 −1 1
]. (5) 
The marking in Fig. 3a is 𝑀𝑎 = [0 2 0 2 1 0].  If 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑   is an r-dimensional row vector with 
all elements equal to zero except element 𝑗 = 1, then transition j is enabled to fire when  
𝑀 ≥ 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐷
−. (6) 
Further, for transition j to be enabled it must not be inhibited as  
𝑀 < 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐻 if  𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐻 > 0. (7) 
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When transition j fires the new marking becomes 
𝑀′ = 𝑀 + 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐷  (8) 
for all transitions j to be fired at that moment.  Thus the marking of Fig. 3b after 
transition 4 fires is 
𝑀𝑏 = 𝑀𝑎 + [0 0 0 − 2 − 1 1] = [0 2 0 0 0 1]. 
A PN simulation may end when the marking reaches some desired state as 𝑀 ≥
𝑀𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑. 
 Timed Petri Nets require a specific amount of time to pass before the movement 
of tokens may occur.52,53  Time in Petri nets may be linked to either the transitions, 
places, arcs of the net, or the tokens.  For this research transitions are associated with 
proliferation activities that may occur.  As such, time is associated with the transitions.  
Once a transition is enabled, the transition time begins counting.  Only once the time is 
complete is the transition fired.  The Latency net developed is a stochastic timed PN, as 
the activity times are randomly sampled from user-defined probability density functions 
(pdfs) each time any transition is enabled.  This methodology allows for the dynamic 
fluctuation of activity times as they may be realized in undefined future events. 
 
II.B. Main Petri Net Function 
 
 The Latency tool implements a stochastic timed Petri Net using the MATLAB 
programming language.54  The primary activity of the Petri Net loop is the maintenance 
of three arrays: the marking M, a list of enabled transitions ET (which is reset to zero 
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after each time step), and a list of timing transitions TT (the remaining times before 
previously enabled transitions may fire).  At the beginning of each simulation iteration, 
M is checked and enabled transitions are noted in ET.  ET is then checked for transition 
conflicts and conflicted transitions are de-enabled in random fashion.  Activity 
times are sampled for the remaining enabled transitions and stored in TT.  
Simulation time is advanced by subtracting the time step TS from TT at the end of each 
iteration.  Transition j is fired when −𝑇𝑆 < 𝑇𝑇𝑗 ≤ 0.  The elements of TT are initially 
set to −𝑇𝑆 and reset to this value after firing to prevent extraneous transition firing.  
When the marking is greater than or equal to the user defined deliverable nuclear 
weapon marking, 𝑀𝐷𝑁𝑊, the iteration is complete.  Fig. 4 symbolically illustrates the 
conceptual flow of the Latency Petri Net and maintenance of the three arrays. 
 
 18 
 
 
Fig. 4. Conceptual flow of Latency tool Petri Net simulation. 
 
 Fig. 5 describes the overall flow of the Latency tool.  The proliferation network 
available to the proliferator is defined by the transition input, output, and inhibit (and 
incidence) matrices.  However, there are normally multiple independent paths within the 
full proliferation network from which the proliferator may select a preferred path.  These 
independent paths, defined by the transitions which must fire to complete them, are also 
input by the user.  The Latency tool has a built in sub function to generate all possible 
combinations of the independent paths allowing the simulation to choose from a 
complete range of proliferation pathways through the independent paths defined by the 
user.  Without detailed insight of the motivations and intentions of the proliferator, path 
[𝑀] 
[𝑇𝑇] − [𝑇𝑆] 
 −𝑇𝑆 < 𝑇𝑇𝑗 ≤ 0   𝑀 = 𝑀 + 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐷  
[𝑀 ≥ 𝑀𝐷𝑁𝑊] Iteration Complete 
[𝑇𝑇] [𝐸𝑇] 
𝑀 ≥ 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐷
−, 𝑀 < 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐻 𝑇𝑇𝑗 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗  
𝑇𝑇𝑗 ≤ −𝑇𝑆 
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selection is done randomly at intervals specified by the user. Transitions not on the 
selected path are permanently blocked from being enabled unless those transitions are 
part of a path selected later in the simulation.  Other required inputs are the transition 
activity time pdfs and associated parameters as well as the initial marking and the 
deliverable nuclear weapon marking.  At the time of this publishing, the Latency tool is 
capable of sampling from uniform pdfs and log normal pdfs.  Other pdfs can easily be 
added. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Overall flow of Latency Tool. 
Inputs:  
• Input, Output, Inhibit matrices (proliferation network)  
• Independent path transition lists 
• Transition probability density functions and parameters 
• Initial marking (proliferator status and network progression) 
Pathway Selection 
• Random or biased by Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
• May be re-run at regular intervals (annually, etc.) 
• From initial marking & path 
selection determine enabled 
transitions 
• Resolve any intra-path transition 
conflicts and decisions 
• Disable Transitions as appropriate 
• Sample time pdf of remaining enabled transitions 
• Count time  
• Fire transitions as appropriate 
• Update marking 
• Complete iteration 
when a token arrives 
in a Deliverable 
Nuclear Weapon 
place 
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 The Latency tool required several other features to facilitate its operation.  It is 
possible for intra-path conflicts to occur where two or more transitions are enabled by 
the same tokens in upstream places even though there are not enough tokens for all the 
transitions to fire.  A check for intra-path conflicts is done after the enabled transitions 
are determined.   When conflicts are found a sub-function randomly disables one of the 
conflicted transitions, rechecks for remaining conflicts, and repeats the process until 
there are no remaining conflicts.  The remaining enabled transitions will then receive 
sampled activity times and progress accordingly. 
 A fast-forwarding algorithm was applied which drastically reduced run time.  
Instead of advancing the simulation time by one time step for each loop iteration, 
simulation time was advanced immediately to either the next time a transition would fire 
or the next time of a pathway selection.  This required the inclusion of a separate array to 
track the progression of simulation time.  The savings in run time were well worth the 
effort.  It should be noted that computation time savings from the fast-forwarding 
algorithm may be lost when using short activity times for transitions that repeated often 
during network progression. 
 A moderately detailed pseudo-code is provided in Fig. 6 below.  This pseudo-
code algorithm itself resides within a loop over the number of desired simulation 
iterations.  As individual simulations may take hours to days, a batch calling file was 
also developed. 
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Fig. 6. Latency tool Petri Net pseudo-code 
 
II.C. Batch File 
 
 The batch file allows multiple cases to be queued to run with multiple variations 
of each case.  The input parameters that must be defined or input to the batch file are 
listed in Table II.  The batch file allows the user to vary most of the inputs of Table II 
𝑀 = 𝑀0 
𝑇𝑇 = −𝑇𝑆 
Time = 0 
For i=1:Max simulation time 
 𝐸𝑇 = 0 
 if 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∈ 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 
  randomly select path 
 end 
 𝑀𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 𝑀 − 𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑗 
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑𝐷− ∀ 𝑇𝑇𝑗 > 0  % remove tokens reserved for timing transitions 
 For all j transitions 
  If 𝑀 ≥ 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐻 & 𝑇𝑇𝑗 > 0    % a timing transition is now inhibited 
   𝑀𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 𝑀 + 𝑒 𝑇𝑇𝑗 
⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑𝐷− ∀ 𝑇𝑇𝑗 > 0    % release reserved tokens 
  Else if 𝑀 < 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐻 & 𝑇𝑇𝑗 ≤ −𝑇𝑆 
   𝐸𝑇𝑗 = 1 
  end 
 End 
 Check ET for and resolve intrapath conflicts 
 For all j transitions  
  If ETj = 1 
   𝑇𝑇𝑗 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗) 
  end 
 End 
 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇 − 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
 if −𝑇𝑆 < 𝑇𝑇𝑗 ≤ 0 
  𝑀 = 𝑀 + 𝑒𝑗⃑⃑  𝐷 
 End 
 If 𝑀 ≥ 𝑀𝐷𝑁𝑊  
  𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 End 
End 
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between individual simulations within a single batch call.  Beyond those inputs 
previously defined are the path selection method and frequency bin size.  The path 
selection method may be set to a value of one, two, or three indicating random selection, 
path MAUA weighted probability selection, or maximum path MAUA selection 
respectively.  The frequency bin size is used by the Latency tool to tally iteration latency 
times for subsequent frequency plotting.  As noted in Table II, the source for the PN 
definition is a MS Excel file.  The batch file imports those arrays as specified by the user 
with Excel file names, worksheet names, and cell ranges.  
 
TABLE II 
Inputs for Latency Tool Required in Batch File 
Source MS Excel input file Defined in batch file 
Input array or 
variable 
𝐷− # of iterations 
𝐷+ Time step 
Transition pdf type & 
parameters 
Path selection interval 
𝑀0 Path selection method 
𝑀𝐷𝑁𝑊 Frequency bin size 
 
 
II.D. MS Visio & MS Excel Input File Generation 
 
 The network defining arrays are stored conveniently in an MS Excel file which 
itself is generated from a graphic PN created in MS Visio.  A PN is built in Visio using 
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boxes as transitions, circles as places, rounded rectangles to store arc weights, diamonds 
to store inhibitor arc weights, and directional connectors between the objects.  A basic 
Visio PN is given in Fig. 7.  The token flows between places and transitions, both 
weights and connections, are clearly depicted through the use of Visio.  The information 
contained in this PN is extracted into an Excel workbook via a macro utilizing the 
“vsoshape.ConnectedShapes” command.  The user must specify a name for the Excel 
file in the macro.  If the named Excel file does not exist in the associated directory the 
macro will create a new file.  If the file does exist the macro will append the PN data to 
the existing file.  In this manner separate pathways developed in different Visio sheets 
may be layered into a single PN.  Transitions should not be repeated in separate Visio 
sheets when layering, though places may be repeated in separate sheets or even the same 
sheet to eliminate excessive arc overlap. 
 
2
T
2P2 3 1
T
1 P3P1 1
1
 
Fig. 7. Basic Visio Petri net. 
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 The Visio macro creates an Excel workbook with the PN parameters stored in 
separate sheets. The sheets are labeled ‘Dminus’, ‘Dplus’, ‘H’, ‘Transition Data’, and 
‘Place Data’.  Fig. 8 depicts the workbook and worksheets created from the PN of Fig. 7.  
The input, output, and inhibition matrices are complete with all information in the 
original graphical PN (NOTE: the matrices and relations are still correct even if the 
macro does not order the transitions and places according to name).  The user is left to 
specify the transition pdf type and parameters as well as the marking data in the 
remaining two sheets.  Table III shows the transitions and necessary specifications 
available at the time of publication.  As stated previously the ranges for these worksheets 
along with the file name are specified in the batch file for cases to be run.  Upon 
completion of each simulation a comprehensive output file is generated. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Excel worksheets generated by Visio macro from the PN of Fig. 7. 
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TABLE III 
Probability Density Function Sampling Input Options 
Transition pdf Dtype Par1 Par2 
Uniform 1 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
LogNormal 2 Mu Sigma 
 
 
II.E. Output File 
 
 The outputs from the Latency tool are listed in multiple tables contained in the 
output file.  The first set of tables refers to Latency times determined through the 
simulation.  The column headings (transposed to conserve space) of the first three output 
tables are listed in Table IV.  Discussing the Latency tables in reverse order; the ‘Raw 
Latency’ is an array of all the Latency times determined for each iteration of the 
simulation.  Listed with each iteration time are the ‘FinishChoicePath’ and the 
‘ComboChoicePath’.  The ‘FinishChoicePath’ is the last path chosen or selected before 
reaching a deliverable nuclear weapon marking and completing the iteration.  During the 
iteration there may be multiple different paths selected.  The ‘ComboChoicePath’ is the 
path that contains all of the paths selected during that iteration.  It should be noted that 
the actual proliferation path realized during an iteration may be different than both the 
finishing choice path and combination choice path.  The realized path is simply all the 
transitions that fired during an iteration.  The ‘All Paths Latency’ table reports the mean 
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or expected value, mean standard deviation, minimum, and mode of all the iteration 
latency times and paths.  The ‘Latency’ table lists for each path the number of times a 
path was completed, the probability that the path was selected, the path latency time 
mode, the path latency time mean or expected value, and path latency time mean 
standard deviation.  This data is listed for both the finishing choice path and combination 
choice path.  Additionally, the total number of times a path is selected divided by the 
total number of selections for the entire simulation is given. 
 
TABLE IV 
Column Headings of Output Tables with Latency Time Information 
Output table 1 Output table 2 Output table 3 
Latency All Paths Latency Raw Latency 
#timesF Expected/Mean LatencyTime 
FPProb STD FinishChoicePath 
FPMode Min ComboChoicePath 
FPMean Mode 
 FPMSTD 
  #timesC 
  CPProb 
  CPMode 
  CPMean 
  CPMSTD 
  #timesChosen/Choices 
   
 
 Following those output tables, simulation iteration completion data is recorded in 
two separate elements.  The “Number unfinished iterations” is reported first and counts 
how many, if any, simulation iterations do not finish.  The “unfinished iterations array” 
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follows and is a row vector the length of the number of iterations.  Each array entry 
corresponds to a simulation iteration and has a zero if the iteration finished or a one if 
the iteration did not finish.   
 The next two output tables report transition firing data.  The “Number of Times 
Fired” output table comes first in the output and lists the number of times each transition 
fires for each iteration.  Table V shows that the “Number of Times Fired” output table is 
a total number of transitions T by total number of iterations I matrix with a row 
corresponding to each transition t of the model network and column corresponding to 
each iteration i of the simulation.  Each “Number of Times Fired” entry (t,i) equals the 
number of times transition t fired during iteration i.  The “First Firing Time” output table 
is also a T x I matrix and is demonstrated in Table VI.  In the “First Firing Time” output 
table entry (t,i) is equal to time in days from the beginning of the simulation at which 
transition t first fires during iteration i.  This information is useful for network 
diagnostics as well as analyzing proliferation progression. 
 
TABLE V 
Description of “Number of Times Fired” Output Table 
 Column for 
iteration # 1 
Column for 
iteration # 2 
(continued columns 
for all I iterations) 
Row for transition 
#1 
Output table entry (t,i) = # of times transition t fired 
during iteration i where t ∈ T transitions and i ∈ I 
iterations 
Row for transition 
#2 
(continued rows for 
all T transitions) 
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TABLE VI 
Description of “First Firing Time” Output Table 
 Column for 
iteration # 1 
Column for 
iteration # 2 
(continued columns 
for all I iterations) 
Row for transition 
#1 
Output table entry (t,i) = Time [days] when 
transition t of iteration i first fired where t ∈ T 
transitions and i ∈ I iterations 
Row for transitions 
#2 
(continued rows for 
all T transitions) 
 
 
 Pathway selection data is stored in the next set of tables.  One ‘All Path Data’ 
table exists for each simulation iteration.  Table VII explains the content of the “All Path 
Data” table for a single iteration.  The first column of Table VII describes the data that 
appears in the “All Path Data” table.  The second column of Table VII shows the actual 
text or data that is displayed in the “All Path Data” table.  The first row of the “All Path 
Data” output table is a table heading corresponding to the simulation iteration number.  
The second row is a list of column headings.  The third and all subsequent rows of the 
“All Path Data” output table relate the data for each path selection of the simulation.  
The first column of the remaining rows in the output table lists the time in days of the 
pathway selection.  The second column lists the path selected.  The remaining columns 
display the utility value determined through MAUA for each path (which is discussed 
more in Section 0).    If path selection is being done randomly, the utility values per path 
will be replaced simply by a repetition of the number of the path selected. 
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TABLE VII 
Demonstration of “All Path Data” Table for 1 Iteration 
 Actual ‘Text’ or Data displayed in output table 
Table Heading ‘All Path Data’ # [iteration] 
Heading shown 
for Columns  
‘TimeStep PathSelected Utility-Per-Path’ 
Table Values 
(rows repeated for 
each path selection 
of the iteration) 
Time [d] when 
path selection 
occurs 
# of 
path 
selected 
utility value 
calculated 
for path 1 
utility value 
calculated 
for path 2 
(additional 
columns for utility 
values of 
remaining paths) 
 
 
 The “MAvgMaxMinSum” table relates the marking statistical data average, 
maximum, minimum, and sum of the number of tokens in each place during the entire 
simulation.  Table VIII explains the values given in this output table.  The first two rows 
of Table VIII indicate that for each simulation iteration there are four columns in the 
“MAvgMaxMinSum” output table.  The second row of Table VIII shows that for each 
iteration the quantities listed per iteration time step per place are the average amount of 
tokens, the maximum number of tokens, the minimum number of tokens, and the sum of 
all tokens during that iteration.  The first column of Table VIII shows that each row of 
the “MAvgMaxMinSum” table corresponds to the places of the model network.  Thus 
the “MAvgMaxMinSum” output table is a total places P x J matrix where J is equal four 
times the total iterations I.  In this manner four columns of statistical marking data for 
each place are given for each simulation iteration.  
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TABLE VIII 
Demonstration of Values in “MAvgMaxMinSum” Output Table 
 Columns for Iteration #1 Columns for Iteration #2 Etc. 
Quantity 
per 
iteration 
time step 
Average 
# of 
tokens 
Maximum 
# of tokens 
Minimum 
# of tokens 
Sum of 
all 
tokens 
Average 
# of 
tokens 
Maximum 
# of tokens 
Minimum 
# of tokens 
Sum of 
all 
tokens 
Etc. 
Place #1 
Output table entry (p,j) = quantity for place p of iteration # = j/4 rounded up to the nearest integer where p ∈ P 
places, j ∈ J, i ∈ I iterations, and J = 4I 
Place #2 
Etc. 
 
  
 The remainder of the output file is an echo of the input followed by the Latency 
time frequency data.  Optionally, the entire marking for all iterations may be output and 
will appear at the end of the output file (this should be done only when absolutely 
necessary, as both writing and opening an output file with the full marking is time 
intensive). 
  
  
 31 
 
III. CODE VERIFICATION AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS WITH U.S. CASE 
 
 Before using any newly developed computational tool it is necessary to verify 
and possibly validate its function when applicable.55  Verification is done to ensure that 
the tool functions as designed and expected.  This is accomplished by providing the tool 
with simple inputs for which the expected results are obvious.  Experimental validation 
requires matching tool outputs to results of actual experiments.  The experiment for the 
Latency tool is the future.  The results of the future are by definition, and will always be, 
unknown.  As such, it is impossible to experimentally validate the Latency tool. This 
does not detract from the Latency tool’s value to build intuition, test sensitivities, and 
inform decision makers as will be demonstrated.   
 In the absence of true experimental validation, historical case analysis is done to 
build confidence in the verification.  It should be noted that while history provides a 
useful guide to and may impact the future, future cases of proliferation (and the future in 
general) are new and unique experiments which may vary from history unexpectedly.56  
The best known case of nuclear weapons proliferation is the U.S. Manhattan Project.  
This case is used as an initial historical analysis in order to verify code function and test 
the inherent sensitivities of the Latency tool.57 
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III.A. U.S. Network  
 
 For verification, the U.S. Manhattan Project is broken into four cases of materials 
production which were modeled as Petri Nets and analyzed.  Petri Nets can determine 
passage time to any point in the network for any amount of tokens so analysis can be 
done on portions of a single historical case of nuclear proliferation.  The four cases are 
1) Liquid thermal diffusion uranium enrichment in the S-50 facility, 
2) Gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment in the K-25 facility, 
3) Electromagnetic isotope separation uranium enrichment in the Y-12 facility, and 
4) Plutonium production at the W facility at Hanford (along with its pilot X 
program at the Clinton site).58   
 
The full combined case of U.S. proliferation is also included in the analysis, which 
added a weaponization layer involving weapons and delivery system design and 
production (which involved retrofitting existing B-29 bombers).  The characteristics of 
each case are given in Table IX which lists by column the network material production 
model, the general activities represented by the models, and the target Latency quantity 
desired for simulation completion.  Since the completion goal for these partial 
proliferation cases was not a single deliverable nuclear weapon, substitute Latency 
quantities, established from historical references and given in Table IX, were used as 
simulation endpoints.  Fig. 9 shows the complete Pu production Petri Net with an inset 
zoom.  A historical timeline of U.S. proliferation is given in Appendix A.  Full network 
Petri net matrices and data for the S-50, K-25, Y-12, W&X, weaponization, and the full 
U.S. case are given in Appendices B, C, D, E, F, and G respectively. 
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TABLE IX 
U.S. Case Latency Network Characteristics 
Network 
Model  
Activities Transitions Places 
Latency 
quantity 
Liquid Thermal 
Diffusion S-50 
R&D; LTD facility: 
Lab Scale, Pilot Scale, 
Full Scale 
29 11 
20420 kg 
0.85wt% U-235A 
Gaseous 
Diffusion K-25 
R&D; Barrier Plant: 
Pilot Scale, Full Scale; 
Full Scale GD Plant 
21 22 
210 kg 0.7wt%   
U-235B 
Electromagnetic 
Isotope 
Separation Y-12 
R&D; Lab Scale; Alpha 
Track Facility, Beta 
Track Facility 
21 18 
66 kg 80wt%       
U-235C 
Plutonium 
Production W 
(Hanford) & X 
(Clinton)  
Graphite Reactor: Lab 
Scale, Pilot Scale, Full 
Scale; Separations 
Plant: Pilot Scale, Full 
Scale; Graphite 
Production; Fuel Slug 
Canning 
59 55 19 kg PuD 
US Full 
All including a design 
& weaponization layer 
160 133 
1 Deliverable 
nuclear weapon 
(HEU or PU) 
AS-50 production through July 194559, BDerived from C the approximated Little Boy uranium content60,61, 
Dapproximated plutonium content of 3 Pu cores finished July, 1 1945.60,61  
 
 34 
 
 
Fig. 9. Complete US Pu production Latency PN with zoom inset. 
 
III.B. Verification with Discrete and Stochastic Simulations 
 
 Verification of the Petri Net Latency simulation occurred in two steps.   First 
activity durations were derived from history for the corresponding transitions of the 
developed Petri Nets.  These discrete values were then used as constant transition firing 
times in the Latency simulations.  The resultant Latency time produced for each case 
with constant transition firing times is taken to be the ‘Latency standard’.   
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Fig. 10. US Network pathway historical times compared with Latency standard.  Listed 
to the right the bar graphs are the percent difference between the Latency Standard and 
the historical target as well as the actual historical date for the endpoint. 
 
 Fig. 10 shows historical target dates along with the percent difference of the 
associated Latency standard time.  Dates are taken or derived from references given for 
corresponding Table IX quantities.  The U.S. decision for proliferation is assumed to be 
1/19/1942 when Roosevelt approved the 3rd National Academies Study on the subject.58  
The Little Boy completion date was assumed to be when HEU fabrication was complete 
as the rest of the Little Boy bomb weapon had already been finished. 58  The Fatman 
completion date was assumed to be at the successful Trinity test since the Pu pit and 
explosive lenses required for implosion were already fabricated. 58  The Latency 
Standard times very closely agree with the actual historical targets.  This was expected 
since historically accurate details for the individual steps were inserted and then 
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aggregated by the Petri Net simulation to determine the completion date.  This is a useful 
verification test that demonstrates that when given accurate inputs, the tool will produce 
accurate outputs.  The network models and transition times could be further refined to 
precisely replicate the historical times, but this is not necessary. 
 Discrete transition times were replaced with uniform pdfs with bounds 50% 
above and below the historically derived activity time to complete the verification. Each 
simulation used 1000 iterations.  Each iteration in a simulation produces a Latency time.  
Frequency distributions of single iteration Latency times will subsequently be referred to 
as ‘Latency distributions.’  The single valued Nuclear Weapons Latency results for a 
simulation of importance are the expected value or mean and minimum of the Latency 
distribution.  These values are referred to as the expected Latency (time) and the 
minimum Latency (time).   
   Fig. 11a-d illustrate the resulting Latency distributions using uniform transition 
time pdfs for the S-50, K-25, Y-12, and W&X material production cases respectively.  
The shape of the Latency distributions resulting from the use of uniform transition time 
pdfs consistently appears to be Gaussian.  Both the historical and Latency standard times 
of each material production case fall within the associated Latency distribution.  
However, it is also apparent that all the Latency distributions of Fig. 11 are shifted to the 
right of the reference times.  This shift results in the associated Expected Latency times 
being about 200 days higher than the reference times.  This discrepancy was unexpected 
but can be explained by the activity time pdf bound and time step precision.  This 
precision sensitivity is discussed in Section IV.A. 
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Fig. 11. Latency distributions from simulations using uniform transition time probability 
density functions with bounds +/- 50% of the reference times with historical and Latency 
Standard times shown for the US materials production subcases (a) S-50, (b) K-25, (c) 
Y-12, (d) W & X. 
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 For the simulation of the full U.S. case, all material production cases were 
combined with a weaponization (WP) layer.  The combinations of these components 
resulted in seven optional paths through the U.S. proliferation network: (1) S-50, K-25, 
and WP; (2) Y-12 and WP; (3) S-50, K-25, Y-12, and WP; (4) W&X and WP; (5) S-50, 
K-25, W&X, and WP; (6) Y-12, W&X, and WP; (7) S-50, K-25, Y-12, W&X, and WP.  
Historically, S-50 never produced any uranium above slightly enriched and was used 
only as a feed for either Y-12 or K-25.58 Further K-25 used only the S-50 product as a 
feed until after the war. 58  Thus those two material production options do not appear 
independent of each other as an isolated path for producing an HEU weapon.   
 Fig. 12 shows the Latency distribution for the full U.S. case.  Fig. 12a shows a 
single distribution containing the Latency results for all paths, whereas Fig. 12b shows 
Latency distributions for the seven different paths.  Connecting lines are added in Fig. 
12b so the reader can better see the underlying Latency distributions per path.  Historical 
completion times for Little Boy and Fatman, Latency Standard times for each path, and 
the Expected Latency time including all paths are shown with the Latency distributions 
of Fig. 12.  Fig. 12 illustrates the same effects from Fig. 11: the Latency distributions 
resulting from uniform pdf transition times are mostly Gaussian, the reference times fall 
within the Latency distributions, and the Latency distributions and Expected values are 
shifted above the reference times.   
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Fig. 12. Latency distributions for the full US case compared with historical time, 
pathway Latency Standard (LS) time, and the expected Latency time from all paths for 
(a) all paths and (b) individual paths with lines added for clarity.1 
                                                 
1 Some of the path Latency Standards are obscured in Fig. 12 because they are of equal time.  
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  Together the results of Fig. 10, Fig. 11, and Fig. 12 verify the function of the 
Latency tool.  When given accurate, discrete transition times for an appropriate model, 
the Latency tool gives accurate results.  When transition times are sampled stochastically 
from pdfs based on accurate reference times the Latency tool will simulate results which 
contain the accurate result.  The Expected Latencies shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 do not 
agree well with the reference times, which would be preferred.  However, Section IV.A 
will resolve this issue and demonstrate that with proper input and time step precision, the 
Latency tool with an appropriate model and inputs will generate Expected Latencies that 
agree well with historic data.   
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IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH US CASE 
 In this chapter, sensitivity analysis is used to demonstrate implicit sensitivities 
and biases inherent within the Latency tool and its operation.  Beyond the initial 
proliferation decision, the Latency tool makes only two other assumptions: the structure 
and paths of proliferation pathway network available to the proliferator and the activity 
time pdfs associated with the transitions.  This section will explore sensitivities to both 
as well as operational inputs such as the iteration timestep and path selection interval.  
Discussion focuses on Latency distributions and both the expected Latency and 
minimum Latency times, as these values will be of prime interest to decision makers. 
 
IV.A. Input Precision Sensitivity: Transition Bounds and Timestep 
 
 The shift of the Latency distributions to the right of the latency standard in the 
verification Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 above can be explained by a bias resulting from the 
precision in the transition bounds and tool operation timestep.  It was initially decided 
that using uniform pdf bounds with precision less than 1 day would be impractical for 
approximating multi-year activities, and the input bounds were rounded up to the nearest 
day.  Further it was also judged impractical to operate the tool such that it would track 
time steps of less than one day.  The impact of these assumptions was tested by varying 
the precision of the input transition bounds and allowing a time step of less than 1 day.   
 The results of the input transition bound and timestep precision sensitivity 
analysis for the S-50 subcase are shown in Fig. 13.  Fig. 13a contains the Latency 
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distributions and Expected Latency times determined for S-50 while varying the time 
step from 1 day, 0.5 day, to 0.1 day while rounding the transition time bounds to the 
nearest day and leaving the bounds unrounded.  In Fig. 13a the rounded bound, 1 day 
timestep Latency distribution and associated Expected Latency time are the farthest to 
the right.  Moving from right to left in Fig. 13a, the next Expected Latency time is for 
the rounded bound, 0.5 day timestep simulation.  This is followed by the Expected 
Latency times of the rounded bound, 0.1 day timestep simulation and the unrounded 
bound, 1 day timestep simulation which are nearly the same.  The unrounded bound, 0.5 
day Expected Latency is next followed by the historical time.  The unrounded bound, 0.1 
day timestep Expected Latency is last and agrees very well with the Latency Standard.  
The Latency distributions shift left with the associated Expected Latency times as bound 
and timestep precision is increased. 
 Fig. 13b illustrates the response of the Expected Latency times as expressed by 
percent difference with the Latency Standard for S-50.  Here the percent difference of 
the Expected Latency times with the Latency Standard is plotted as a function of 
timestep for both the rounded and unrounded bound simulations.  The specific difference 
in days and percent is listed in Fig. 13b as labels on the data points.  Fig. 13b shows that 
by increasing the precision of the bounds and timestep the difference between the 
Expected Latency and Latency can be reduced about 200 days or 15%.       
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Fig. 13. Sensitivity to bound and timestep precision for the S-50 subcase showing (a) 
Latency distributions and Expected Latency times compared to the Latency Standard and 
historical time and (b) Expected Latency percent difference with the Latency Standard as 
a function of timestep for rounded and unrounded uniform probability density function 
bound simulations.   
 
 Fig. 13 demonstrates that the precision of the inputs and timestep can bias the 
resulting Latency distributions and expected times high.  Fig. 13a shows how the 
Gaussian Latency distributions and Expected Latencies converge towards the Latency 
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Standard times as the bound and timestep precision is increased.  Fig. 13b shows the 
improved accuracy of the Expected Latencies expressed as percent difference with the 
Latency Standard with increasing precision.  It is clear from the analysis that both input 
precision and timestep size can bias Latency results high.  Simply rounding those 
parameters to the nearest day can be expected to increase Latency as much as 15%. 
 
IV.B. Network Sensitivities 
 
 A complete understanding of the network sensitivities is necessary, as the 
network definition is entirely user dependent.  It is critical to know if certain network 
aspects are preferred to others or if and how specific aspects bias results.  The analysis 
described here investigates the three types of network sensitivities: network structures in 
series and parallel, network detail and resolution, and available network pathways. 
 
IV.B.1. Network Structure 
  
 The analysis begins by examining network structures.  As explained in previous 
sections, Petri nets are simply transitions (bars) and places (circles) connected by 
directed arcs.  The arcs indicate the direction of token flows through the network (and 
proliferation progress).  Different paths, sub-paths, or flows can run in series or parallel 
to each other.  This section explores whether there is an impact of this network flow 
structuring beginning with flows in series.    
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 Fig. 14 illustrates how one transition with a large activity time is split into 
smaller transitions in series with the same total activity time.  Fig. 14a depicts a Petri Net 
flow with one transition T1.  Fig. 14b modifies this flow by splitting T1 into two 
transitions T1a and T1b separated by the new place P3.  T1a and T1b both are half the 
time of transition T1.  Fig. 14c repeats the process and splits T1a and T1b into T1c, T1d, 
T1e, and T1f respectively.  T1c, T1d, T1e, and T1f are all half the time of T1a or T1b 
and a quarter the time of T1. 
 
 
Fig. 14. The expansion of one transition into a series of transitions.  A simple Petri net 
with (a) 1 transition T1, (b) T1 replaced by two transitions in series, T1a and T1b, both 
half as long as T1, and (c) T1a and T1b each replaced by two transitions in series: T1c, 
T1d, T1e, and T1f respectively each half as long as T1a and T1b or one quarter as long 
as T1.  
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 Without using the Latency tool, a simple computational experiment may be 
conducted to simulate the impact of increasing the number of transitions in series 
depicted in Fig. 14.  This experiment uniformly samples a random number from 0 to 1 
for each transition in the flow under consideration and scales that random number by the 
appropriate transition time.  The time of interest is the total time from each transition in 
the flow being considered.  In this experiment, the original activity time is 100 days, the 
number of transitions in a flow is varied from 1-1000, and each flow is simulated with 
1000 iterations.  
 The results are shown in the Fig. 15 below.  Fig. 15a shows the mean time from 
each flow simulation as a function of the number of transitions in a flow.  Since the 
average random number choice is 0.5 and each flow simulation consists of 1000 
iterations, a mean transition time of 50 days is expected regardless of whether the flow 
consists of one large transition or 1000 small transitions.   
 Fig. 15b shows the standard deviation of each iteration per simulation as a 
function of the number of transitions in a flow.  As the number of transitions in a flow 
increase so does the amount of random numbers sampled.  Since the random numbers 
are all being sampled from the same 0 to 1 uniform pdf, it is expected that the standard 
deviation will decrease as the number of transitions in the flow increases.  The 
experiment is in essence averaging a set of random numbers from 0-1.  The increase in 
transitions simply increases the amount of random numbers to be sampled and averaged.  
The more numbers that are sampled the closer the average will get to the mean for each 
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simulation iteration.  Fig. 15b confirms that the standard deviation vanishes with 
increasing transitions in series.   
 
 
Fig. 15. Results of the computational experiment to determine the sensitivity to the 
number of transitions for Petri net simulation (a) mean time, (b) standard deviation, and 
(c) minimum time. 
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 Fig. 15(c) plots the minimum time as a function the number of transitions in 
series.  It is expected that if the standard deviation is reduced with increasing number of 
transitions that the minimum should converge to the mean.  Fig. 15(c) confirms this 
expectation.      
 A similar experiment is done to investigate the impact of parallel flows and is 
illustrated in Fig. 16.  Fig. 16a contains a simple two transition, T1 and T2, flow with 
three places, P1, P2 and P3.  In Fig. 16b transition T1 and place P2 were split into two 
parallel, replicate transition-place pairs: T1a and P2a, and T1b and P2b.  T1, T1a, and 
T1b all represent equal amounts of time.  In this manner the amount of transitions in 
parallel can be increased for an investigation into the impact of network parallelism.   
 
 
Fig. 16. Expansion of one transition into multiple transitions in parallel. 
 
 A computational experiment simulates increasing parallel transitions as described 
in Fig. 16.  For this exercise the time added by the final transition, T2 in Fig. 16, to 
complete the flow is neglected since its impact is known and focus is on the time to 
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enable the final transition.  Enabling the final transition requires all parallel transitions to 
fire.  Thus the time to enable the final transition is equal to the longest parallel transition 
time sampled.  The experiment is then to find the maximum time of all the transitions in 
parallel while varying the number of transitions in parallel.  It is assumed there are 
enough tokens in the place preceding the parallel transitions (place P1 in Fig. 16) to 
enable them all simultaneously.   All parallel transition times are uniformly distributed 
from 0 to 1 day with an average firing time of 0.5 days.  Thus, the shortest possible time 
for any transition to fire is 0 days and the longest is 1.0 day.  For the experiment each the 
number of parallel transitions was varied from 1 to 100 and each flow simulation 
consisted of 1000 iterations.  
 The simulation iteration time is the maximum of all the transitions in parallel.  
Thus as the number of times the random number is uniformly sampled from 0 to 1 days. 
increases so too does the chances of getting a number closer to 1 day.  As such it is 
expected for this experiment that the simulation iteration time will converge to 1 day. 
 The results of the parallel transition computational experiment are shown in Fig. 
17.    Fig. 17a-c plot the simulation iteration mean time, standard deviation, and 
minimum time respectively as a function of the number of transitions in parallel.  The 
plots show that both the mean and minimum times converge to 1 day and the variance 
vanishes.  This confirms the expectation that as the number of transitions in parallel 
increases the simulation iteration time approaches 1 day. 
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Fig. 17. Parallel experiment (a) mean time, (b) mean std., and (c) minimum time. 
 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the series parallel experiment results 
shown in Fig. 15 and Fig. 17.  The introduction of multiple transitions in series into a 
network will cause a reduction in variance from the expected value and an increase in 
minimum time relative to another network modeling the same case with fewer 
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transitions in series.  The mean or expected time is unaffected by the number of 
transitions in series.  Extensive network parallelism will bias Latencies high relative to a 
network with less parallelism modeling the same process.  
 The amount of series and parallel flows used in model networks depends on 
Latency tool user needs.  In some cases a high degree of parallelism may be a more 
appropriate representation of reality compared to a network with less parallelism.  But 
these network structure sensitivities must be accounted for when making comparisons 
and judgments of Latency results. 
 
IV.B.2. Network Resolution or Size 
 
 To assess the impact of network resolution or size, reductions were made to each 
US sub-case.  The original US network was an attempt to capture all significant 
historical events and milestones in the weapons development program.  The utility of 
that effort can be tested by reducing the network, combining various transitions and 
eliminating the places between them, and comparing results.  Reductions were made in 
two levels.  Some sub-cases experienced greater reductions than others.  Transition 
reductions were made only where they would not impact the existing flow of the 
network.  This limited some of the amount of transitions which could be eliminated in 
some networks.  Complete Petri Net matrices defining all these networks and reductions 
for S-50, K-25, Y-12, W&X, weaponization, and the Full U.S. case are given in 
Appendices B, C, D, E, F, and G respectively.  
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 Fig. 18 shows a comparison of the total transitions in each of the different 
resolution levels for each case.  The three levels of network resolution are referred to as 
detailed, medium, and coarse.  The detailed resolution corresponds to the largest 
networks for each case and the coarse resolution corresponds to the smallest network.  
The specific number of transitions in each network is listed as data labels. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Comparison of the number of network transitions for different levels of 
resolution for each case with the total number of transitions given as data labels. 
 
 Fig. 19 illustrates the impact of network resolution on the expected value.  The S-
50 expected Latency times were all about the same at 1463 d, 1470 d, and 1465 d for the 
detailed, medium, and coarse networks respectively.  For K-25 the detailed and medium 
networks had very similar expected Latencies of 1425 d, and 1432 d.  The coarse 
resolution K-25 network had a much lower expected Latency of 1307 d.  The Y-12 
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networks experienced slight increases in expected Latency time from 1374 d, 1393 d, to 
1399 d as network resolution decreased.  For the W&X network the expected Latencies 
for the detailed and coarse networks were both 1616 d while the medium network 
expected Latency time was just 1 day lower at 1615 d.  The U.S.Full case expected 
Latency times were 1598 d, 1614 d, and 1611 d for the detailed, medium, and coarse 
resolution networks respectively. 
 In general the expected Latency time varied less than 25 days or 1-2%.  This 
close agreement is good as regardless of the resolution the networks are modeling the 
same case with the same overall time.  The Y-12 case expected values appear to be 
inversely proportional to network resolution, though this variation is well within the 
standard deviation (shown in Fig. 22 below).  The lone outlier is the K-25 case. 
 
 
Fig. 19. Expected Latency time [days] for U.S. case cases while varying the level of 
network resolution. 
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 Two potential explanations for variation in the the K-25 expected Latency with 
network resolution exist.  The first may be that the detailed and medium resolution 
Latency times are artificially inflated by input rounding and a 1 day timestep as seen 
before.  K-25 expected Latencies with increased precision are compared in Fig. 20.  Fig. 
20 shows that expected Latencies from the simulations with unrounded bounds and 0.1 
day timesteps decreased by 20-31 days relative to the same network simulation results 
with the original rounded bounds and 1 day timestep.  However, the expected Latency 
for the coarse resolution network is still about 113 days lower than the detailed and 
medium resolution networks.  Thus it is concluded that this variation is not due to a 
precision bias. 
  
 
Fig. 20. K-25 expected Latency time [days] for three levels of network resolution while 
varying the rounding of uniform transition time probability density function bounds and 
the simulation timestep from 1 day to 0.1 days.   
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 The other factor shown to bias expected Latencies high is network parallelism.  
The reduced portion of the K-25 network is shown for each of the three resolution levels 
in Fig. 21 (NOTE: Fig. 21  does not show the entire network which continues to the 
right).  As can be seen there is a high degree of parallelism in the K-25 network which is 
eliminated in the coarse variation.  In Fig. 21a there are essentially 5 parallel paths 
through that portion of the detailed resolution K-25 network.  In Fig. 21b there are again 
5 parallel paths through the medium resolution K-25 network.  In Fig. 21c there is only 
one path through the portion of the coarse resolution K-25 network shown.  While some 
of the other networks did have parallel flows, the parallelism was not eliminated during 
the network reductions as it was for K-25.  This was because in the other networks the 
flows from parallel transitions often mixed into other network flows and any parallel 
transition elimination would have caused changes to the overall network flow.    
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Fig. 21. K-25 networks for (a) detailed, (b) medium, (c) coarse resolution cases. 
 
 One might expect that if the parallel flow eliminating reductions had an impact 
on the K-25 expected Latency that a similar impact should be seen in the U.S. Full case 
since K-25 is one piece of that network.  Within the U.S. Full case though K-25 is itself 
sometimes a parallel flow to the other cases.  So it may be that in the coarse U.S. Full 
network that flow moves faster through the K-25 portion of the network but at the same 
speed for the other components of the network and any impact on the final Latency time 
is negated.  Thus it is concluded that elimination of network parallelism is the likely 
cause of the difference in K-25 expected Latencies. 
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Fig. 22. Standard deviation [days] for the U.S. case networks for detailed, medium, and 
coarse network resolution. 
 
 
Fig. 23. Minimum Latency time for the U.S. cases for detailed, medium, and coarse 
network resolution. 
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 The variance of the resulting Latency distributions is inversely proportional to 
network resolution.  An increased variance equates to larger standard deviations and 
lower minimum latencies as network resolution decreases.  These trends are confirmed 
by the expected Latency standard deviation in Fig. 22 and the minimum Latency time in 
Fig. 23.   In general Fig. 22 shows for each case that Latency time standard deviation 
increases with decreasing network resolution.  Correspondingly, Fig. 23 illustrates that 
the minimum Latency time generally decreases with network resolution for each case.  
This is expected and is congruent with the previous discussion of transitions in series.  
More transitions equates to more pdf samplings which reduces the variance.  Fewer pdf 
samplings of larger time range pdfs leads to greater swings in resultant Latency times.   
 
IV.B.3. Network Pathway Options: Y-12 Feed Enrichment 
  
 It is intuitive that any changes to the pathway options available within a network 
may impact the Latency time.  As such, Latency results are sensitive to network pathway 
options.  An example using the Y-12 case to demonstrate this sensitivity is given in 
Appendix H. 
 
IV.C. Transition Time Probability Density Function Sensitivity 
  
 The transition time probability density function sensitivity was examined for two 
pdf types.  Uniform pdfs are used as a simple base case.  Uniform pdfs may also be 
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preferred when no other knowledge is available about the actual activity time pdf.  
Though, it is unlikely that uniform pdfs may be the best representative for all activity 
times.  Activity time pdfs for longer term projects may be expected to have a hard 
minimum below which completion times are unachievable.  The pdf may then 
experience an exponential-like increase to a forward peaked maximum where activity 
completion is most likely followed by a fat tail eventually tapering off towards zero.  A 
lognormal pdf exhibits these features and was the second pdf type examined. 
 The sensitivity analysis applies both uniform and lognormal pdfs to the Y-12 
case while varying the bounds and parameters.  The bounds used for uniform pdfs are 
25%, 50%, and 75% below and above the historical activity time.  Lognormal pdfs take 
the historical activity time as a mean and vary the σ parameter from 0.1, 0.5, to 1.   
 Fig. 24 shows the resultant Latency distribution profiles from the pdf variation 
simulations.  Fig. 24a illustrates that when using uniform transition time pdfs that the 
resulting Latency distribution has very Gaussian profile.  As the uniform pdf bounds are 
widened from 25% to 50% to 75% of the reference time Fig. 24a shows that the Latency 
distributions are broadened.   
 Fig. 24b depicts the resulting Latency distributions from use of LogNormal 
transition time pdfs.  These Latency distributions retain the lognormal shape of the 
transition pdfs in contrast those shown in Fig. 24a.  Though as in Fig. 24a, when the 
transition time pdfs are widened by increasing the σ parameter from 0.1, 0.5, and to 1 the 
resulting Latency distribution is also broadened.  
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Fig. 24. Y-12 Latency time frequency distributions for simulations with transition 
activity times using (a) uniform probability density functions with bounds +/- 25%, 50%, 
and 75 % of the activity reference time and (b) LogNormal probability density functions 
with the pdf expected time equal to the activity reference time and a σ of 0.1, 0.5, and 1.
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 Fig. 25a-c shows the expected Latency time, Latency standard deviation, and 
Latency time minimum respectively for the all the U.S. case transition time pdf variation 
simulations.  In Fig. 25a expected Latencies for S-50 simulations with uniform pdfs are 
within 6 days.  Expected Latencies for S-50 simulations using lognormal pdfs are all 
within 8 days.  S-50 expected Latencies for simulations with uniform pdfs were about 
111 days higher than those with lognormal pdfs.  Expected Latencies for K-25 
simulations with uniform pdfs increase by about 60 days each time the bounds were 
widened.  For K-25 simulations with lognormal pdfs, expected Latencies increased by 
about 200 days with each σ parameter increase.  Y-12 simulations with uniform pdfs had 
expected Latencies within 23 days.  Y-12 simulations with lognormal pdfs and σ equal 
to 0.1 and 0.5 had expected Latencies within 3 days of each.  Y-12 expected Latency 
using lognormal pdfs with σ equal to 1 increased by 35 days from the previous 
lognormal simulation.  W&X expected Latencies using uniform pdfs increased by about 
15 days each time the bounds were widened.  The W&X expected Latencies increased 
by hundreds of days as the σ parameter was increased for simulations with lognormal 
pdfs.  The Full U.S. expected Latencies from simulations using uniform pdfs saw 
increases of 38 days and 92 days when widening the bounds from 25% of the reference 
time to 50% and then 75% respectively.  The expected Latencies for the U.S. Full case 
using lognormal pdfs increased 258 days and 367 days when the σ parameter was 
increased from 0.1 to 0.5 to 1 respectively.   
 Several general trends can be seen from Fig. 25a.  All U.S. case simulation 
expected Latencies appear to increase when the pdf bounds or σ parameters were 
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increased except for the S-50 case.  The S-50 network was entirely serial with no 
parallelism whereas all the other networks had varying degrees of parallelism.  This fact 
leads to the conclusion that wider range transition activity time pdfs are more sensitive 
to the network parallelism bias.     
 The response of the Latency standard deviation to varying transition activity time 
pdf is shown in Fig. 25b.  It was expected that as the transition time pdf ranges were 
widened that the variance of the resulting Latency distributions should increase.  In Fig. 
25b the Latency standard deviations for all the uniform pdf simulations increase on 
average 54 days (ranging from 27 to 79 days) and 65 days (ranging from 49 to 76 days) 
when increasing the bounds from 25% to 50% of the reference time and again from 50% 
to 75% of the reference time respectively.  The Latency standard deviations for all the 
lognormal pdf simulations increase on average 223 days (ranging from 184 to 258 days) 
and 552 days (ranging from 381 to 715 days) when increasing the σ parameter from 0.1 
to 0.5 and from 0.5 to 1 respectively.  This result confirms the expectation for the 
Latency standard deviation.  
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Fig. 25. Impact of transition activity time probability density function variation for U.S. 
cases on (a) expected Latency time, (b) Latency standard deviation, and (c) minimum 
Latency time. 
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Fig. 25. Continued. 
  
 The response of the minimum Latency in Fig. 25c mirrors that of the Latency 
standard deviation.  It was expected that as the underlying pdf variances increase so too 
does the standard deviation while the minimum reaches greater lows and this is 
confirmed in Fig. 25c.  The minimum Latency in Fig. 25c for all the uniform pdf 
simulations decreases on average 153 days (ranging from 27 to 79 days) and 148 days 
(ranging from 53 to 251 days) when increasing the bounds from 25% to 50% of the 
reference time and again from 50% to 75% of the reference time respectively.  The 
minimum Latency for all the lognormal pdf simulations decreases on average 337 days 
(ranging from 244 to 437 days) and 243 days (from 111 to 348 days) when increasing 
the σ parameter from 0.1 to 0.5 and from 0.5 to 1 respectively. 
 The pdf sensitivity analysis presented here is a useful baseline but should 
continue to be developed as the Latency tool is used.  Other pdfs may be desired and the 
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user should repeat this analysis with any new pdf.  Further, this analysis used only one 
pdf type and parameter for each simulation.  Simulations using mixed transition activity 
time pdfs may have different sensitivities. 
 
IV.D. Path Selection Interval Sensitivity 
  
 The frequency of pathway selection during the course of a simulation may also 
impact the Latency results.  The Latency tool allows for random path selection or path 
selection with the MAUA function.  The MAUA application is discussed later, and this 
analysis focuses on random path selection.  Path selection intervals used for the U.S. Full 
case are 0.5 year, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and 10 years (the component cases were not 
used as those cases had only one path).  In the 10 year selection interval all cases 
finished within just over six years.  Thus the ten year selection interval reflects a single 
path selection at the initiation of a state’s nuclear weapons program.   
 The Latency values for the U.S. Full case resulting from the path selection 
interval (PSI) variation are shown in Fig. 26.  The expected Latency slightly increases by 
27 days when the PSI is increased from 0.5 years to 1 year.  Then the expected Latency 
drops successively by 96 days, 298 days, and 63 days as the PSI is further increased.   
 The Latency standard deviation displays a parabolic shape as a function of path 
selection interval in Fig. 26.  It increases by 108 days then again by 93 days as PSI 
increases from 0.5 years to 1 year to 2 years respectively.  Then Latency standard 
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deviation decreases by 76 days and 258 days as PSI is further increased to 5 years and 10 
years. 
 The minimum Latency times as well as maximum Latency times given on a 
secondary axis for varying PSI are both shown in Fig. 26 for completeness.  The 
minimum Latencies are within a range of 135 days possibly displaying a decrease as PSI 
increases.  Though, this trend is not clear.  The maximum Latency times exhibit a 
parabolic shape as function of PSI similar to the standard deviation with a range of 3404 
days from shortest to the longest maximum Latency.      
 
 
Fig. 26. Impact of path selection interval variation on the U.S. expected Latency, 
Latency standard deviation, minimum Latency, and maximum Latency (included for 
completeness). 
  
 Three possible trends appear for the Full U.S. case Latency statistics shown in 
Fig. 26.  The first is a clear drop in the statistical values for the longer selection intervals.  
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This finding agrees with intuition, as a consistent pursuit avoids abandoning previous 
work and starting a different path anew (or at least further back than the abandoned 
path).  This result is especially true for the short duration U.S. proliferation case. 
 The remaining two potential trends are alternative interpretations of the same 
data as the path selection interval decreases.  For the standard deviation and maximum, it 
is clear these values experience a maximum and then decrease as path selection interval 
decreases.  The mean and minimum also appear to experience a maximum before the 
respective Latency times decrease at the shortest path selection interval, but this final 
decrease is within the standard deviation and may actually represent an asymptote.  Both 
interpretations may be explained by there being a point where the rate of progress 
achieved by constantly changing paths becomes no less, and possibly more, than the rate 
of progression at the path selection interval inflection point which appears to be 
approximately 1-2 years. 
 The needs of the analyst or user define Latency modelling requirements.  This 
sensitivity study should provide a baseline for users.  It details the features implicit in the 
tool that influence results and quantifies the impacts.  This sensitivity analysis is done to 
help the user to build better models more appropriately suited to their needs, or as a basis 
to extending further sensitivity analyses as necessary.  Extending the sensitivity analysis 
may be critical to analyses where the U.S. case does not apply. 
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V. LATENCY CASE STUDIES: PAKISTAN & SOUTH AFRICA 
  
 Additional historical case analysis can provide further confidence in the Nuclear 
Weapons Latency Tool while adding insight to the cases of proliferation analyzed.  
Historical case studies of Pakistani and South African proliferation were completed and 
Latency analyses conducted.  The results of the analyses are presented here.   
 
V.A. Pakistan Case Study 
 
 Pakistan and its nuclear weapons program have been a constant international 
security concern since the program began.62   Thus the program has been well studied; 
while Pakistan’s enduring nuclear rivalry with India and A.Q. Khan based proliferation 
concerns continue to make Pakistan a useful and interesting historical case analysis for 
the Latency tool.  With the Pakistani case, the Latency tool is also used to assess the 
impact of (or sensitivity to) the Indian nuclear weapons program and its 1974 peaceful 
nuclear explosion (PNE).62 
 
V.A.1. Pakistan Network 
  
 Though its progress was slow, Pakistan developed a robust nuclear weapons 
complex with mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle.  This accomplishment 
translated into a Pakistani Latency network with 8 potential independent pathways which 
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included HEU and Pu weapons, hot and cold tested weapons, and Pu produced in 
Pakistan’s Khushab production reactor or diverted from the safeguarded Karachi 
Nuclear Power Plant KANUPP.  A hot test involves a full nuclear explosion, while a 
cold test may be identical but conducted with materials such as depleted uranium which 
will not create a nuclear explosion.  Pakistan had delivery systems ready and available in 
the form of F-16s and Mirage fighter/bombers. The full Pakistani network has 67 
transitions and 80 places.  Complete lists, network matrices, transition time pdfs, and 
initial markings are provided in Appendix I. 
 
V.A.2. Latency Analysis of Pakistani Proliferation  
 
 The Latency tool was used to simulate Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation, 
and the results are compared against historical data.  The initial proliferation decision 
was assumed to be on January 20, 1972 at the Multan conference. 62  The date of 
achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon is assumed to be at the end of October 1995.  
This date represents an approximately 180 day weapons manufacturing time after a 
successful cold testing campaign in May 1995.62  (The weapons manufacturing time is 
derived from the South African case study below.  The South African gun weapon was 
simpler than the Pakistani implosion weapon, and South Africa is assumed to be at least 
as technically competent as Pakistan.  So this weapons production time is assumed as a 
conservative minimum that it would take for Pakistani weapons production.)   U.S. 
political pressure prevented Pakistan from conducting a full hot nuclear test until May 
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1998, when Pakistan did so as a political response to Indian nuclear tests earlier that 
month.62 
 Fig. 27 presents the results of discrete transition time simulations with the 
Pakistani network.  Pakistani pathway Latency Standard times are shown, with 
completion dates, in Fig. 27.  The Historical Pakistani proliferation reference time, 
shown at the top of Fig. 27, is almost perfectly matched by the HEU cold tested 
implosion weapon path, which was the historically correct path.  The cold tested HEU 
gun path was 707 days shorter than cold tested HEU implosion weapon path.  This 
duration was exactly the difference for implosion and gun weapon design reference 
times used in the model.  Historically, Pakistan initially chose to pursue a Pu weapon 
which required an implosion design.62  Pakistan maintained the implosion design choice 
even after it switched to an HEU path to facilitate incorporation of any future Pu 
production capability.62    
 The next two paths listed in Fig. 27 are the hot tested HEU weapons paths, both 
implosion and gun.  The Latency Standards for both of these paths were 3316 days 
shorter than the cold tested HEU implosion Latency Standard.  As modeled, the hot tests 
allow Pakistan to avoid about a 4400 day cold testing phase and produce a weapon as 
soon as the materials were available.  As mentioned previously, Pakistan abstained from 
a hot test due to pressure from the U.S.62 
 The diversion of spent KANUPP fuel provides another option for a weapon 
sooner than the historical time.  The hot tested KANUPP diversion path could have 
provided a weapon 2415 days earlier than the historically correct Latency Standard. 
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However, the cold tested KANUPP diversion path latency standard was the same 
duration as the historically correct Latency Standard. 
 The final option for Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was Pu production from the 
indigenously built Khushab production reactor.  The Latency Standard for the hot tested 
Pu weapon from Khushab (not diverted from KANUPP) was 630 days less than the 
historically correct path Latency Standard.  The Latency Standard for the cold tested 
Khushab Pu weapon was equal to the historically correct path Latency Standard.  This 
result is surprising because, historically, it took Pakistan much longer to develop Pu 
weapons than suggested by the Latency Standards of those paths.     
 
 
Fig. 27. Pakistani pathway Latency standard times with strict historical activity times 
and Latency standard time with the Pu production path times adjusted to account for the 
~10 year break in Pu production development that occurred when A.Q. Khan brought 
centrifuge technology to Pakistan.  
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  These historically early Khushab Pu weapon Latency Standards can be 
explained by the Pakistani pathway shift in response to the centrifuge technology made 
available by A.Q. Khan.  A.Q. Khan, having been motivated by the Indian peaceful 
nuclear explosion of May 1974, began providing Pakistan with advanced centrifuge 
design information and technology later that same year.62  In response, Pakistan invested 
heavily in a new centrifuge based uranium enrichment path at the expense of the 
previous Pu production path which was shutdown.  Development of Pu production was 
not restarted until almost ten years later.62  From this point forward, including the 
previous development time, Pakistani proliferation through Pu production required the 
same amount of time.  Thus, the Latency tool analysis suggests that A.Q. Khan had little 
impact on the Latency time for Pakistan; that Pakistan would have acquired a weapon in 
1995 with or without the intervention of A.Q. Khan.  The only substantial change was 
whether that weapon was HEU or Pu based (i.e. the pathway chosen).  This analysis may 
neglect possibly necessary technological maturation, which may have occurred in 
Pakistan during the decade long Pu production pause from 1974 to 1983. 
 The orange bars in Fig. 27 reproduces the Pu production pause and shows those 
results for the Khushab produced Pu paths.  These results more closely agree with 
history.  The hot testing path actually takes 635 days longer than the cold testing option.  
For the Pakistani model, this delay is due to the time required to create another bomb’s 
worth of Pu after the hot test.  One might expect that Pakistan, or any other state, would 
wait until at least 2 weapons worth of material were available before conducting any hot 
test.   
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V.A.3. Sensitivity to Indian Test (and A.Q. Khan) 
 
 The Latency tool provides a simple vehicle to investigate the impact of the 1974 
Indian ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ by analyzing the hypothetical situation where it does 
not occur.  The Indian PNE directly spurred the Pakistani program, even though Pakistan 
had already made a positive proliferation decision.  The immediately linked events were 
A.Q. Khan’s personal proliferation decision and Bhutto’s demand for the establishment 
of a Pakistani test site.62  The Pakistani Latency network was constructed such that these 
event transitions are downstream of the Indian test place.  Thus in order for those 
transitions to fire, the initial marking must include a token in the Indian test place.  In the 
absence of an Indian test, centrifuge development and the decision to build a test site 
must flow through alternate network transitions which have much longer activity time 
pdfs.  All other transition time pdfs remain the same. 
 Fig. 28 compares the Latency standard times for the Pakistani network paths with 
an Indian nuclear test to those without one.  Fig. 28 shows the Latency standards with 
the Indian nuclear test as blue bars and Latency standards without the Indian nuclear test 
with orange bars.  The Latency standard in days is shown for both sets of data.  The 
difference between the Latency standards with and without the test is shown preceding 
the Latency standards value without the test.  The HEU paths are all drastically 
lengthened, as is expected without the presence of A.Q. Khan.  The KANUPP material 
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hot tested weapon is also delayed.  This delay is a result of the lengthened time to decide 
to prepare a nuclear weapons test site.  The remaining Pu paths are unaffected.   
 
 
Fig. 28. Pakistani pathway Latency standard times without an Indian nuclear test. 
  
 This analysis suggests that the Indian PNE, like A.Q. Khan, also had limited 
impact on the Pakistani program.  The two events, the Indian test and A.Q. Khan’s 
centrifuge espionage, were of course linked.  Both events were preceded by the Pakistani 
proliferation decision.62  This fact confirms that Pakistani proliferation would likely have 
occurred without both the Indian PNE and A.Q. Khan’s centrifuge espionage.  The 
Latency analysis adds that proliferation may have occurred in the same time.  The 
impact of the Indian PNE and A.Q. Khan appear to have been only to bring centrifuge 
technology to Pakistan and elsewhere.   
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 A stochastic analysis of the impact of the Indian PNE on Pakistani expected 
Latency is given in Appendix J.  The analysis shows that when considering all paths 
together, the expected Latency increases when there is no Indian PNE.  This increase is a 
result of the much longer HEU paths shown in Fig. 28.  It should be obvious that when 
averaging all the path Latencies of a simulation, including the longer HEU paths without 
an Indian PNE, that the expected Latency would be larger than an average of Latencies 
with the much shorter PNE HEU paths. 
 
V.B. South African Case Study 
 
 The South African nuclear weapons proliferation program provides an interesting 
case for analysis.  The case is simple and reasonably well known.  While South Africa 
was and is an economic leader in the region, its resources both financial and human were 
limited.  Further, in some respects, South Africa during the time of its proliferation fits 
the profile of an aspiring rogue nation challenging the superpower status quo.  For these 
reasons, the South African case may have bearing on proliferation concerns of today.   
 
V.B.1. South African Proliferation Network 
 
 South African proliferation was simple and straightforward.  The program 
developed an HEU gun bomb to be delivered with existing aircraft.63,64  Enriched 
uranium was provided by an indigenously developed technique.  Clear indications 
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existed that South Africa was preparing for a weapons test (either hot or cold) with a 
fully developed test site.65  Also, historical evidence demonstrates that South Africa 
investigated Pu production in nuclear reactors at different times.66,67 South Africa is 
assumed to be at least as capable as Pakistan, so the South African Pu pathways are 
modeled after those in the Pakistani network.  The South African Latency model 
consisted of 46 transitions and 62 places.  The proliferation decision date used is March 
1971, when the South African Minister of Mines approved an Atomic Energy Board 
proposal to develop gun, implosion, boosted, and thermonuclear peaceful nuclear 
explosive designs.63,65  The data for completion of the first South African deliverable 
nuclear weapon was assumed to be December 1, 1982.67  In 1991 South Africa acceded 
to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and began a nuclear 
disarmament process. 67,68   A complete timeline and Petri net data for the South African 
model is provided in Appendix K.  
 
V.B.2. Latency Analysis of South African Proliferation 
 
  Latency standard times for each South African path are generated with discrete 
transition time simulations, and the results are illustrated in Fig. 29.  The Latency tool 
provides a Latency standard time for the Gun cold path that agrees to within 0.35 % or 
15 days of the historical time.   Gun cold and hot paths yield the same Latency standard 
because both paths require subsequent weaponization by the South African weapons 
producer ARMSCOR.  One could argue that if South Africa had continued unabated by 
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foreign powers and conducted a hot test during the summer of 1977, it may have taken 
longer to weaponize without the external drivers which prompted the decision turn the 
nuclear explosive project over to ARMSCOR.  
 
 
Fig. 29. South African pathway Latency Standard times for the different independent 
paths of the South African proliferation network. 
 
 Both the hot and cold tested Pu weapon paths were much longer than the HEU 
paths.  The hot tested Pu path was 3409 days longer than the HEU path Latency 
Standard, while the cold tested path was 5914 days longer.  South Africa did have two 
research reactors that were shutdown prior to the 1971 Minister of Mines decision.64  It 
was not until 1981 that South Africa restarted development of their Pu production 
program and after four years of research discontinued the program.63,67  It was assumed 
that this additional four year research period would be a necessary precursor to the 
construction of any potential South African Pu production reactor.  This four year 
research period, in addition to the 12 year Pu production reactor construction adapted 
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from the Pakistani case, accounts for the delay in the hot tested Pu weapon path.  The 
cold testing path required additional time for a cold implosion testing program, also 
adapted from the Pakistani case history.  Both Pu production paths appear that they 
would have been overtaken by the government’s desire to disarm and accept the NPT. 
 
V.C. Conclusion: Pakistan & South Africa Latency Analyses 
  
 The Pakistani and South African Latency analyses provide further confidence in 
the Latency tool while adding useful insight into relevant cases of proliferation.  The 
Pakistani analysis as modeled demonstrated that while the Indian PNE and A.Q. Khan 
may have impacted the Pakistani proliferation pathway, neither may have impacted 
Pakistani proliferation time.  The South African analysis highlighted the dependence of 
the HEU paths on ARMSCOR weaponization.  The investigation further revealed that 
South African proliferation may have been overtaken by events had it been shifted onto 
the Pu production path.  Development of such proliferation delaying strategies would be 
a useful application of the Latency tool.     
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VI. MODELING VARIATIONS & APPLICATIONS WITH THE PAKISTANI & 
SOUTH AFRICAN CASES 
 
 The Latency analyses of both Pakistan and South Africa highlight the impact of 
the proliferation pathway choices those countries made on their respective Latency 
times.  The Latency tool controls path selection on a global level by permanently 
disabling non-pathway transitions as a result of deliberate pathway selection.  It is 
possible though to design networks and operate the Latency tool such that path selection 
is made at a local level.  This section examines some of the modeling features of the 
Pakistani and South African networks that allow for pathway control internally in 
addition to tracing South Africa’s proliferation evolution with the Latency tool. 
 
VI.A. Internal Pathway Selection by Network Design 
 
 With appropriate modeling, pathway control and selection can be built into a 
network model without needing the global Latency tool pathway selection function.  
This internal pathway selection control can be implemented by placing multiple 
transitions on different pathways downstream of a single place representing some form 
of resources.  If the amount of those resources is constrained by limiting the amount of 
tokens available to the resource place, then the downstream transitions will be in conflict 
and a choice must be made between them.  The Latency tool can then be run by 
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specifying all transitions on a single path so that no global choices are made, allowing 
the pathway selection to occur organically as the simulation evolves.  
 
VI.A.1. Financial Control & Sensitivity in the Pakistani Network 
  
 By modeling the Pakistani network with financial resource control, it is possible 
to test Pakistani sensitivity to financial resources.  Financial constraints limited 
Pakistan’s ability to pursue multiple paths in parallel.  Even though global path selection 
control is built into the Latency tool, pathway decisions can also be forced locally by 
intentionally using conflicted places: places with multiple transitions immediately 
downstream.  In this manner overarching financial control was added to the Pakistani 
network and is shown in Fig. 30.  The immediately downstream transitions from the 
‘Nuclear Program Funds’ place are ‘Develop centrifuge technology indigenously’ (this 
transition is inhibited in the presence of an Indian nuclear test), ‘Bhutto approves A.Q. 
Khan centrifuge program’, ‘Initiate program to copy Indian CIRUS production reactor’, 
and ‘pursue Pu production R&D’.  Thus if all these transitions were enabled but there 
were not enough nuclear program funds (tokens) for them all to fire, a local intra-path 
choice must be made.  As discussed previously the Latency tool does this choosing 
through a random process.  
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Fig. 30. Overarching financial control of the Pakistani Latency network. 
 
 To test the impact of financial resources, simulations were run with the historical 
constrained Pakistani funds and with excess funds.   The simulations assumed an Indian 
nuclear test and were run for only the combined path of all independent paths such that 
no transitions (or pathways) were ever permanently disabled by a path selection.  In this 
manner a transition choice was forced only when finances were constrained.  50% bound 
uniform transition pdfs were used for the simulations.  Fig. 31 shows the resulting 
expected and minimum Latency times for the excess finances and historically limited 
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finances cases.  The specific Latency times are listed as data labels and the standard 
deviation is shown as error bars in Fig. 31. 
 
 
Fig. 31. Impact of financial resources on Pakistani Expected and Minimum Latency 
times. 
 
 The Pakistani financial sensitivity results agree with intuition.  The shortest path 
always gets completed with excess finances instead of forcing the option of a longer 
path.  This constant shortest path completion lowers the expected Latency of the case 
with excess finances.  However, since it is still the same path with the same transition 
time pdfs in both cases, the minimum Latencies are about the same.  This circumstance 
may not be entirely realistic, as one might expect unlimited funds to decrease activity 
times.  To properly model the situation, it may be necessary to add new transitions with 
shorter activity time pdfs that require more financial tokens to fire.  From that 
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perspective it may be useful in the future to develop “crashing” paths that are identical to 
the normal path but with shorter transition time pdfs that are more resource intensive. 
 
VI.A.2. Financial & Human Capital Control & Sensitivity in the South African 
Network 
 
 In the same fashion that intra-path financial constraints were placed on the 
Pakistani network, both financial and personnel constraints were placed on the South 
African model.  Such constraints were experience by the South African program.63  The 
results of varying these constraints are shown in Fig. 32 for simulations with 50% 
uniform transition bounds.  Fig. 32 gives the expected and minimum Latencies for the 
cases varying the amount of funds and personnel available.  The expected Latency time 
and its standard deviation both decrease in the presence of excess resources.  This 
decrease is expected, as in this case the shortest path is always available.  The minimum 
Latencies are basically the same, as again the shortest path is always experienced during 
the course of the simulation. 
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Fig. 32. Impact of financial and personnel constraints on South African Expected and 
Minimum Latency times. 
 
VI.A.3. Tracing the South African Program Historically 
 
 There is some debate surrounding the actual date of the South African 
proliferation decision, and possible alternative dates have been suggested.    After the 
1971 Minister of Mines decision, the next cited decision occurred in May 1974 when 
PM Vorster authorized funding for the development of a device and test site after a 
successful South African gun type cold test.63,69,70  In early August 1977, South Africa 
was discovered to be preparing for a weapons test in the Kalahari Desert.  The next 
possible proliferation decision occurred: "soon after the Kalahari episode, Vorster 
ordered the AEB to cancel the PNE program, to close down the test site, and to develop 
a secret nuclear deterrent."65  This decision is assumed to coincide with the French 
Foreign Minister’s August 22, 1977, announcement of “grave consequences” for South 
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Africa should they test.63  This debate presents a useful opportunity for Latency analysis, 
and simulations are run on the same South African network while varying the initial 
marking (proliferation network progress).  The simulation involved only the historically 
accurate HEU cold gun path.   
 Fig. 33 shows the discrete transition time results when using original transition 
times corresponding to the 1971 proliferation decision and updated transition times 
corresponding to the 1974 or 1977 transition times, while varying the different initial 
markings corresponding to the different proliferation decision dates.  Initiating 
simulations at the later start dates meant that some transition activities should have 
already started but could not.  The user must either use the artificially long transition 
times or update the transition times to reflect the new proliferation progression.   As is 
illustrated, failure to update partially completed transition times after actual proliferation 
progression could lead to artificially long times.   
 
 
Fig. 33. Impact of initial marking and updated transition times on South African HEU 
cold tested Latency standard time. 
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Fig. 34. South African Latency times from varying proliferation decision dates. 
 
 Fig. 34 shows the results of stochastic simulations from each proliferation 
decision date with appropriate transition times.  Proliferation assessments tracing the 
South African program at the time likely showed similar progress as the South African 
program advanced.   The expected and minimum Latency times shown in Fig. 34 are 
clearly trending down (and eventually reach zero).   
 The conclusion for a policymaker in the late 1970s is that South Africa was 
making steady and significant progress toward a deliverable nuclear weapon, and the 
window to stop South African proliferation was closing.  Given the network 
assumptions, the analysis indicates that in 1977, South Africa could have developed a 
weapon in as little as ~3.5 years while proliferation was expected in ~5.5 years.  It 
 87 
 
remains debatable whether any timely policy action could have stopped South African 
proliferation.  Regardless, the situation rectified itself when South Africa de-proliferated 
in the 1990s.67  
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VII. MULTI ATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS PATHWAY SELECTION 
 
 As seen in the Pakistani case, a state may choose a proliferation pathway based 
on factors other than the fastest proliferation time.  For Latency simulations in the 
previous sections, the Latency tool selected proliferation pathways during simulations at 
random.  Proliferators are not randomly making pathway choices.  Their decisions are 
based on multiple criteria driven by nuclear weapons program intentions derived from 
proliferation motivations.23,71  The previous sections demonstrated that the choice of 
proliferation pathway taken influences proliferation time and Latency.  Thus, a method 
capable of accurately simulating proliferator pathway decision making during the 
Latency simulation might improve the expected Latency results generated by the 
Latency tool.  Such a functionality could be built to allow for dynamic path selection 
response during the stochastic evolution of the Petri net based Latency simulations.  
Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) is a well-known method for simulating 
multiple criteria based decision making.46  An MAUA capability for biasing pathway 
decisions was built and implemented as an option in the Latency tool. 
 
VII.A. MAUA Theory 
 
 MAUA is an extension of Utility theory. 46,72,73  Utility can be thought of as one’s 
happiness or satisfaction with a specific item such as money or an attribute such as color 
and is defined as  
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𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑥),  (9) 
 
where 𝑈 is the utility value, 𝑢(𝑥) is the utility function of 𝑥 or utility for 𝑥, and x is the 
value of the item considered.72  When utility values are uncertain expected utility theory 
may be applied to determine the expected utility 
 
𝐸[𝑈(𝐹𝑎)] = ∫𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐹𝑎(𝑥), (10) 
 
where 𝐹𝑎(𝑥) is the cumulative probability distribution of item x from the outcome of 
selection of option a where a is one option of the decision set A.73  Use of expected 
utility theory requires preservation of three normative axioms: weak preference ordering 
(completeness and transitivity), continuity, and independence.  
 MAUA is a method of aggregating independent utility factors for decision 
making and will be applied to simulate proliferation pathway decision making by the 
proliferating state.  MAUA is used to rank order pathways based on proliferator 
preferences for attributes.  Assuming the conditions of mutual utility independence and 
the more restrictive additive independence allows use of the additive form of the Multi-
Attribute Utility Equation: 
 
𝑈𝑝 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑢𝑖 𝑥𝑖,𝑝 𝑖 ,  (11) 
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where Up is the utility of path p, ki is the normalized weight ascribed to the value of 
attribute i where ∑𝑘𝑖 = 1,  ui is the utility equation of attribute i, and xi,p is the value of 
attribute i for path p.  The utility value is evaluated for all events on path p. Additive 
independence requires that the preference for values of one attribute is not affected by 
variation of the values of another attribute.  It is believed that additive independence may 
be safely assumed for the attributes to be discussed.  However, it has been shown that 
even when additive independence fails, the additive utility equation approximates the 
results of more complex utility equation forms well and thus may still be used with 
confidence.74  If it is later proven that additive independence does not hold, a sensitivity 
analysis may be performed that repeats the decision simulation with a more complex 
utility equation form.   
 
VII.B. Proliferation Pathway Preference Attribute Development 
 
 Attributes influencing proliferator pathway decisions were developed through an 
historical case analysis and characterized with expert elicitation.  All cases of successful 
nuclear weapons proliferation and some cases of nearly successful proliferation were 
analyzed.  A gap analysis was performed with the case data to determine general 
attributes that impact proliferation pathway choices.  A survey was then prepared to gain 
expert opinion to determine appropriate weights.   
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VII.B.1. Attribute Development and Gap Analysis 
 
 In order to select the suitable attributes, it is important to understand the function 
of the attributes within the applied MAUA model.  The MAUA model is used to select 
between different proliferation pathways.  Thus, the attributes must represent 
characteristics that would lead a proliferator to choose one pathway over another.  For 
example, a proliferator may choose to follow one pathway because it may lead to a 
nuclear weapon faster than another pathway.  Another pathway choice may be made 
because the state has access to a specific proliferation technology.  Table X lists 
potential attributes that may impact proliferator choices.  It should be noted that in Table 
X, concealability and survivability refer to proliferation pathway facilities.  This is a 
large list of potential attributes (15 attributes total).  For preservation of MAUA attribute 
independence relations and overall functionality, it is desirable to use a smaller number 
of attributes. 
 
TABLE X  
Potential Proliferation Pathway Preference Attributes 
Number of weapons Industrial capacity 
Delivery method Technical knowledge 
Sustainability Technical human capital 
Reliability Non-nuclear materials 
Time to 1st weapon Nuclear materials 
Concealability Fissile material production  
technology availability Survivability 
Financial resources other 
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 To confirm the influence and possibly reduce the number of the potential 
attributes in Table X, an historical gap analysis was performed.  The gap analysis 
examined the historical record of ten known cases of proliferation and several cases of 
attempted proliferation and is shown in Table XI.  Table XI displays a green box where 
there is strong historical evidence that the corresponding attribute impacted the 
proliferation decisions of that state in some way.  A yellow box indicates that the 
attribute may have impacted the state’s decisions, but the available evidence is not 
conclusive.  The columns of Table XI correspond to the different potential attributes, and 
each row is for a different case of successful or nearly successful proliferation.  Table XI 
shows that each of the attributes impacted the decisions of at least one proliferator.  
Further, the decisions of all states have been impacted by at least one attribute. 
 The results of the gap analysis are explored in greater detail in Fig. 35 and Fig. 
36.  Fig. 35 shows the number of impacting attributes for the different proliferation cases 
studied.  In Fig. 35 the vertical axis corresponds to the total number of attributes that 
affected proliferation pathway choices of proliferation cases which are listed by country 
with proliferation program dates on the horizontal axis.  Specific attribute total numbers 
are listed as data labels on Fig. 35.  The proliferation cases are loosely grouped into three 
categories: successful proliferation by global powers, successful proliferation by 
regional powers and aspirants, and nearly successful proliferation (Note: these groupings 
were based on the proliferating country at the time of the proliferation program).      
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TABLE XI  
Historical Gap Analysis for Potential Proliferation Pathway Preference Attributes  
(Notes in the table refer to source reference and page numbers)2 
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2A-Size of initial U.S. and Soviet facilities are judged indicative of the desire for a large number of weapons altering the path.  B-Size 
of DPRK 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors are judged indicative of the desire for a large number of weapons altering the path. 
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Fig. 35. Impacting attribute totals for historical cases of successful proliferation and near 
successful proliferation. 
 
 A few conclusions may be drawn from Fig. 35.  It appears that proliferation by 
the global powers was generally less impacted by potential pathway attributes than 
proliferation by regional powers or aspirants.  This may be a result of varying levels of 
capabilities and resources between the two groups.  Nearly successful cases of 
proliferation display a broad range of impacting pathway attribute totals.  Some cases 
proceeded farther than others and at least one case has not yet concluded.  So the breadth 
of results may be expected. 
 Fig. 36 examines the gap analysis results by attribute.  The vertical axis in both 
Fig. 36a and b is the total number of cases impacted by each potential attribute in Fig. 
36a and by the attribute group category in Fig. 36b.  The number of weapons, delivery 
method, and reliability attributes were grouped together as deterrent goals.  The time to 
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first weapon, survivability, and concealability were grouped as program goals.  Financial 
resources, industrial capacity, technical knowledge, technical human capital, non-nuclear 
materials, and nuclear materials were grouped as resources.  Fissile material production 
technology availability was labeled as a more specific program resource.  The number of 
times a potential attribute or attribute group, as a percentage of the total number of times 
all attributes impact proliferation, was listed on Fig. 36 as data labels with the associated 
attribute or attribute group.  
 The results shown in Fig. 36 carry several implications.  In Fig. 36a, technical 
knowledge stands out as the single attribute that affected the most nuclear weapons 
programs with 13 cases impacted.   This result is followed by fissile material production 
technology availability and the other category, impacting 9 cases of proliferation.  
Concealability and technical human capital also stand out with 8 and 7 cases impacted 
respectively.  This result suggests that states may bias their pathway selection on specific 
knowledge (possibly contained by specific persons) or technology, such as centrifuges, 
that may be immediately available and/or easily concealed.  Fig. 36(b) also reveals that 
resources have shaped programs more often than goals.  The significance of the ‘other’ 
category, which impacted at least 9 cases of proliferation, suggests that while there are 
some general factors that influence pathway decisions, very often decisions may be 
made on factors unique to that particular proliferator.  Since it was impossible to 
characterize, ‘other’ was dropped from attribute consideration. 
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Fig. 36. Proliferation pathway attribute gap analysis results showing the total number of 
historical proliferation cases impacted by a) each potential attribute and b) each attribute 
group category. 
 
 The gap analysis confirmed the impact of the proposed proliferation pathway 
attributes.  However, the use of fifteen attributes could have compromised the initial 
additive independence assumption while making the overall analysis cumbersome.  To 
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reduce the number of attributes, it was assumed that a state will make pathway decisions 
based on goals and the likelihood of achieving success for those goal-driven pathways.  
The resources of a state determine those likelihoods of success.  This assumption 
reduced the list of attributes by half. 
 
 
Fig. 37. Proliferation pathway attribute mapping from the goal attributes of the gap 
analysis. 
 
 Fig. 37 shows a mapping of the reduced goal attribute list to the final simplified 
attribute list.  The nuclear weapons production rate is used as a representative metric for 
the final deterrent size goal.  Nuclear weapon reliability refers to both reliable delivery 
and reliable explosive function at the intended target.  Program sustainability refers to 
the ability to sustain the weapons producing program of the selected pathway after the 
first weapon has been produced.  Concealment and survival probabilities are combined 
due to lack of complete independence.  However, to allow for a focus on the application 
of safeguards, non-detection probability of materials diversion is drawn out from the 
more general concealability.  Independence from concealment and survival probability is 
maintained by noting that not declaring a facility to the IAEA for safeguards application 
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is different than concealing a facility from international detection.  Table XII gives 
complete attribute definitions.   
 
TABLE XII  
Proliferation Pathway Attribute Definitions 
Attribute Definition 
Time to 1st 
Nuclear 
Weapon 
Time required to acquire the first deliverable weapon on a 
particular pathway 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Production 
Rate 
Annual nuclear weapons production rate expected from a 
particular pathway (a metric related to the total number of 
weapons or deterrent size desired by the proliferator) 
Concealment 
& Survival 
Probability 
The probability of undeclared facilities of a particular 
pathway being concealed from foreign detection or of 
facilities of a particular pathway surviving conventional 
foreign attack 
Non-
Detection 
Probability 
The combined probability of failing to detect the diversion 
of a significant quantity of nuclear material to a nuclear 
weapons program from the facilities of a particular 
pathway. The non-detection probability of an undeclared 
facility is 100%. 
Nuclear 
Weapon 
Reliability 
The probability of the nuclear weapon produced by a 
particular path to detonate on target at the designated 
yield. This accounts for expected adversary 
countermeasures.3 
Program 
Sustainability 
The ability of the state to independently maintain and 
supply the weapon producing program (and weapons) of a 
particular pathway after the 1st weapon is produced 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This is similar to the weapons reliability measures discussed in Appendix F of the ref. 94 the Nuclear Matters Handbook.  
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VII.B.2. Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Pathway Utility Attribute Weighting Survey 
 
 The Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Pathway Utility Attribute Weighting Survey 
(NWPPUAWS) was developed as an efficient method to obtain expert opinion on 
appropriate attribute weights.95  Expert elicitation is a frequently used technique when 
the actual decision makers are unavailable or the appropriate weights are not known a 
priori.96,97,98  The survey was administered online.  The method of the survey was to find 
when a user is indifferent between two options with varying values of two attributes and 
all other attribute values being equal.   
 
VII.B.2.a. NWPPUAWS Description 
 
 Specifically, the survey operates in the following manner.  The survey begins by 
presenting the user two options comparing the values of two attributes.   The first option 
contains the best value of the first attribute and the worst value of the second attribute, 
while the second option contains the worst value of the first attribute and the best value 
of the second attribute.  Based on the user preference of the two options, the worst value 
of the non-preferred option is made incrementally better until the user is indifferent 
between the two options.  The values of the attributes at the indifference point are 
logged, and the user is presented with two new options.   
 The ranges of attributes used in the survey are listed in Table XIII.  The first 
column of Table XIII notes each attribute.  Next the table gives the range of attribute 
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values considered from the worst value in the second column to the best value in the 
third column.  The units of the values for each attribute are given in the last column of 
Table XIII. 
 
TABLE XIII  
Attribute Ranges Used in NWPPUAWS 
Attribute 
Range 
Units 
Worst Best 
Time to 1st Nuclear Weapon 20 1 Years 
Nuclear Weapons Production Rate 5 50 Weapons/ year 
Concealment & Survival Probability 20 80 % C&S Probability 
Non-Detection Probability 20 80 % Non-Detection Probability 
Nuclear Weapon Reliability 20 80 % Reliability 
Program Sustainability 20 80 % Sustainability 
  
 
 The survey response is illustrated in Fig. 38 and Fig. 39.  The user is initially 
presented with the comparison of Fig. 38.  Assuming the user prefers option 1, the 
survey responds by adjusting option 2 as shown in Fig. 39.  The survey proceeds in this 
manner until the user is indifferent.  At this point the survey presents a new comparison 
involving different attributes.  Based on the attribute values at indifference, ratios of the 
attributes may be derived which lead to values of the attribute weights. 
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Fig. 38. Initial comparison presented to the user by the NWPPUAWS. 
 
 
Fig. 39. NWPPUAWS response to selection of option (1) during the initial comparison. 
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 For this survey each attribute is compared in options with the first attribute, time 
to first nuclear weapon.  This was done for two reasons.  It was expected that time is 
always a critical factor (if not the most important factor), and time is a readily 
quantifiable attribute that is likely easier to understand for users than some of the other 
attributes.  It should also be noted that linear utility functions were assumed for each 
attribute when determining the attribute weights from the indifference point attribute 
values.  
 
VII.B.2.b. NWPPUAWS Results 
 
 The NWPPUAWS participation was specifically solicited from known experts in 
addition to being available to the public.  These experts were broken into groups based 
on their expertise shown in Table XIV and given an anonymous code to track their 
survey results as a group.  Additional information requested included education level: 
professional degree, undergraduate degree, or high school; employment sector: 
academic, government, industry, or other; and professional discipline: technical, social 
science, or other.  Obviously it was possible that respondents may not report any or all 
supplemental information including the group code given to the solicited experts.  
Solicited experts were also divided between two provided country profiles which were 
denoted in their given code: 
 Regional Power – characterized as facing a persistent, elevated (though not 
immediate) threat from an adversary with an overwhelming military advantage.  
A regional power may be able to project power beyond its own region and may 
have global economic impact.  A regional power can generally resist all but 
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unanimous foreign non-military pressure, unless the pressure comes directly 
from a superpower patron to which the regional power is economically and/or 
strategically bound.  A regional power has ample though not unlimited resources 
available for proliferation.   
 Regional Aspirant – characterized as facing a persistent, elevated (though not 
immediate) threat from an adversary with an overwhelming military advantage.  
A regional aspirant may be able to project power within its own region though it 
is not the dominant regional power.  It can resist significant foreign non-military 
pressure, though its response to such pressure may depend on the support or 
ambivalence of specific permanent members of the UNSC.  The resources of a 
regional aspirant may be limited but such resources are adequate to proliferate. 
 
 
TABLE XIV  
Solicited Expert Groups and Participation 
Group 
Proliferation 
Experts 
Intelligence 
Analysts 
Technical 
Nuclear 
Experts 
Nuclear Policy 
Experts 
Solicited 31 11 10 22 
Responded 8 4 4 4 
Response Rate 
[%] 
25.81 36.36 40.00 18.18 
Total Expert 
Participants 
20 
Group 
Texas A&M University Students* 
Undergraduate 
Nuclear 
Engineering 
Masters Nuclear 
Engineering 
PhD Nuclear 
Engineering 
Masters Gov't 
& Policy 
Students 
Solicited 4 18 8 7 
Responded 2 14 8 2 
Response Rate 
[%] 
50.00 77.78 100.00 28.57 
Total Student 
Participants 
26 
Total Survey 
Participants** 
57 
*All student participants are associated with the Nuclear Science & Security Policy Institute through 
research activities or coursework.  **Includes additional participants who either did not report a group 
code or were not directly solicited.  
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 Table XV shows the mean attribute weights with associated standard deviations 
determined from the responses of all participants.  The first column of Table XV 
identifies the attribute by name.  The second and third columns relate the associated 
mean and standard deviation respectively for each attribute.  The Time to First Weapon 
(TTFW) was clearly the most preferred attribute, while the Nuclear Weapons Production 
Rate (NWPR) was the least preferred.  The remaining attributes were similarly preferred, 
with possibly a slight preference for concealment & survival probability (C&S) and non-
detection probability (NDP) over reliability (Rel) and sustainability (Sus), but such 
distinction may not be justified given the standard deviations.  Numerical data for all the 
mean attribute weights and corresponding standard deviations in all possible grouping 
breakdowns are given in Appendix L in Table L.1.  Specific illustrative plots of the data 
for selected attributes and groupings are discussed below. 
  
TABLE XV  
Mean Attribute Weights and Standard Deviations from All Survey Participants 
Attribute Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
W(TTFW) 0.3 0.27 
W(NWPR) 0.05 0.06 
W(C&S) 0.18 0.15 
W(NDP) 0.18 0.13 
W(Rel) 0.15 0.13 
W(Sus) 0.14 0.12 
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 Fig. 40 and Fig. 41 illustrate the combined results with more detail than Table 
XV.  Fig. 40a relates the resultant attribute weights derived from all survey responses 
with the attribute as the vertical axis.  Fig. 40b relates the same data excluding the 
student results.  The data for each attribute is plotted in the order of weight(TTFW), 
weight(NWPR), weight(C&S), weight(NDP), weight(Rel), and weight(Sus) with the 
associated mean following each attribute data set.  The standard deviation for each 
attribute data set is shown as error bars on the associated mean.   
  
 
Fig. 40. Preferences for each attribute from (a) all survey results (b) survey results 
excluding student responses. 
 
 Fig. 41 plots the frequency on the vertical axis as function of attribute weight for 
each attribute.  Again, all data is included in Fig. 41a while Fig. 41b excludes the student 
results.   
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Fig. 41. Frequency of relative attribute weights derived from (a) all survey results and 
(b) survey results excluding students. 
 
 Fig. 40 and Fig. 41 present interesting expert insight.  The preference for TTFW 
appears to have a bimodal (or perhaps trimodal) distribution with peaks at approximately 
0.1 and 0.45 (and possibly 0.7) with a long tail extending to a weight of 1.  NWPR also 
appears to be bimodal even in its lack of preference.  One group has a very strong 
distaste for NWPR giving it a weight below 0.05 and the other mode prefers it in almost 
Gaussian fashion about a peak weight of 0.15.  The preference for C&S, NDP, Rel, and 
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Sus all appear to be a single distribution with a peak around 0.1 and long tail above 
~0.20. 
 Fig. 40b and Fig. 41b also reveal the influence of the surveyed students as a 
group.  From the shifts in distributions and means, it is clear the students had less 
preference for TTFW than the other participants and greater preference for the fuzzier 
probabilistic attributes than the other participants.  It was expected that the more easily 
quantifiable attributes would be preferred over the probabilistic attributes.  Thus a lack 
of student group bias towards TTFW was somewhat surprising.  As is shown in Table 
N.1, the students actually prefer all attributes about the same except NWPR, which they 
prefer less than the others.  The removal of the students also reveals a gap in the 
preference for NWPR by the professionals, emphasizing the bimodality between those 
that find a modest value in NWPR and those who find it totally irrelevant.  Further, some 
bimodality may exist for the professionals in their preference for C&S, NDP, Rel, and 
Sus.  Secondary peaks may exist at 0.25 for NDP and Rel and at 0.3 for C&S and Sus. 
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Fig. 42. Attribute weights per expert group for (a) TTFW and (b) Rel. 
 
 Fig. 42 shows the attribute weights by group for TTFW and Rel.  The vertical 
axis charts the relative attribute weight, and each expert group is listed on the horizontal 
axis in the order of proliferation experts, intelligence analysts, technical nuclear experts, 
nuclear policy experts, Master’s nuclear engineering students, Ph.D. nuclear engineering 
students, undergraduate nuclear engineering students, Master’s policy students, and 
those that did not identify.  The associated mean attribute weight with the standard 
deviation as error bars is shown after each corresponding data set.   
 As discussed above, the students prefer TTFW less than the other groups and 
about equally to the probabilistic attributes, such as Rel.  All the student results appear to 
have a bimodal distribution with a tight cluster below ~0.20.  This is true for the other 
attributes as well, indicating that even though all the students do not necessarily think 
alike there may be a few groups of students that are like minded.   
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 There may also be small groups of like-minded thinkers within the Academia 
profession as shown in Fig. 43.  Fig. 43 depicts the attribute weights for TTFW and NDP 
from each employment sector shown in the order academia, government, industry and 
those that did not report.  The means of Fig. 43a show that government employees have 
greater affinity for TTFW than those employed in academia, who seem to prefer other 
attributes equally to TTFW, such as NDP in Fig. 43b.  This finding may indicate a more 
realistic view of government employees relative to academics.  It should be noted though 
that the students may have also reported themselves working in academia and may thus 
be responsible for the skew. 
 
 
Fig. 43. Attribute weights per employment sector for (a) TTFW and (b) NDP. 
 
 Fig. 44 and Fig. 45 depict attribute weights for TTFW and C&S per professional 
discipline and attribute weights for TTFW and Rel per country profile (regional power or 
regional aspirant) respectively.  Together Fig. 44 and Fig. 45 show that there is generally 
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little difference when dividing between the technical and social scientists or when 
dividing between regional power or regional aspirant country profiles.  The only possible 
exception is illustrated in Fig. 44b with a higher preference for C&S by social scientists 
than technical scientists.  This result could indicate greater faith of social scientists in the 
international community’s ability to detect nuclear proliferation than technical scientists 
and thus a greater desire to be able to hide proliferation.  Such an explanation is one of 
many though that could explain a difference that is within a standard deviation from both 
means.  The bimodal distribution of TTFW is clear in both Fig. 44a and Fig. 45a.  That 
there is little difference between the preferences of technical and social scientists and 
those with different country profiles is somewhat surprising.  Perhaps the two 
professional disciplines think more alike than is commonly believed.  The indifference 
between country profiles means specific countries should not be stereotyped by their 
profiles. 
 
 
Fig. 44. Attribute weights per professional discipline for (a) TTFW and (b) C&S. 
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Fig. 45. Attribute weights per country profile for (a) TTFW and (b) Rel. 
 
 
Fig. 46. Attribute weights per education level for (a) TTFW and (b) Sus. 
 
 Fig. 46 illustrates the TTFW and Sus attribute weights per education level.  Little 
difference between mean attribute weights exists for different education levels except for 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 W
e
ig
h
t
(a)
W(TTFW)
mean
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 W
e
ig
h
t
(b)
W(Rel)
mean
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 W
e
ig
h
t
(a)
W(TTFW)
mean
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
 W
e
ig
h
t
(b)
W(Sus)
mean
 112 
 
TTFW.  It should be noted education level basically separates out the Masters level 
students, which could explain the lower mean value of the TTFW weight.  
 
VII.B.2.c. NWPPUAWS Conclusions  
 
 There were several overarching conclusions that may be drawn from this survey.  
The focus of the overall Latency project on the time to acquire a first deliverable nuclear 
weapon was validated by the preference of survey participants for TTFW.  The impact of 
the NSSPI students should not be disregarded.  Participation of a more diverse set of 
students would be useful. The lack of impact of the country profiles was noteworthy.  If 
insights about preferences cannot be gleaned from country profiles, then such insights 
may only be gained through a deeper understanding of the decision makers governing 
those states. 
 This survey may have also had some flaws.  At least one participant reported 
being confused by the survey, and it is possible the results of that participant and others 
did not reflect their true preferences due to such confusion.  It is possible participants 
that were given a country profile did not actually incorporate the profile into their 
thinking.  The survey did not apply any techniques for judging participants use of the 
provided data. 
 The data from four respondents was deemed unusable. Those respondents had at 
least one attribute they preferred regardless of time.  Their results thus weighted time as 
insignificant compared to at least one other attribute.  In one case, time was insignificant 
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to only NWPR.  In this case it may be possible to infer that the respondent viewed 
NWPR as the only significant attribute (i.e. a weight of one) since NWPR dominated 
TTFW but TTFW was proportional the other attributes.  However, this inference is weak 
without a direct comparison of NWPR to the other attributes, and even if it were true, a 
NWPR weight of one would clearly have been an outlier given the other participants 
survey data.  In the three other disregarded cases, the respondents weighted time as 
insignificant to multiple other attributes.  In these cases even weak inferences were 
impossible.   
 Potential survey changes may alleviate some of the difficulties.  Avoiding 
unusable results may be possible if the ranges of the attributes were extended.  For 
example, a NWPR of 50 weapons/year may not be absolutely preferred if it involved a 
TTFW of 40 years as opposed to the 20 years that was used.  Though, it may be hard for 
respondents to accurately assess larger ranges than were used.  Even if respondents 
could think in a time frame longer than 20 years it is hard to imagine a government being 
able to embark on and sustain a research and development project that is expected to last 
longer than thirty years.  Changing the survey so that time is not the only basis for 
comparison may also help.  However, in almost all cases, time was an appropriate basis 
for comparison, and in most cases time was the best basis for comparison as it was the 
most important attribute.  One other obvious place for improvement is the participants.  
While all were clearly experts in their fields, none were actual or aspiring proliferators 
themselves.  The responses of nascent or experienced proliferators would be ideal, 
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though obtaining such participation would likely prove elusive.  With fully characterized 
attributes, the proliferation pathway MAUA may now be applied to the Latency tool. 
 
VII.C. Petri Net MAUA Function 
 
 MAUA was applied and built as a plug-in function to the existing Latency tool 
which may be either turned on or off.  A different MATLAB sub-function was coded for 
each of the six proliferation pathway utility attributes.  The six attribute sub-functions 
are called from a higher-level MAU function which aggregates the independent utilities 
of each path.  The MAU function was plugged into the main Petri Net loop of the 
Latency tool where it can be optionally utilized in place of the random path selection.  
Each of the six utility sub-functions, the utility aggregation function, and the additional 
inputs necessary are discussed here in reverse order.  
 
VII.C.1. Additional MAUA Excel Inputs 
 
 Four new excel sheets were developed to incorporate the MAUA capability into 
the latency tool: ‘MAUA Data’, ‘Red-Flow’, ‘Red-CS’, and ‘ProlifData’.  The column 
headings for the input data in the ‘MAUA Data’ Excel sheet are given in Table XVI 
(transposed to conserve space).  The first row of Table XVI, which refers to the first 
column in the MAUA Data Excel sheet, denotes a row in the Excel sheet for every 
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transition.  Transitions that do not require values for any of the MAUA parameters may 
be left as zero in the Excel sheets. 
  
TABLE XVI 
MAUA Data Excel Sheet Column Headings 
Transitions 
NWPR: Facility Outflow [SQ/yr] 
C&S = .25/.5/.75 (Low/Med/High) for 
Facility Transitions 
NDP (IAEA) 
R-NeDesign =.25/.5/.75 
(Low/Med/High) for weapon transition 
R-DS-Range [km] 
R-DS-Type 
Technical Challenge to Sustain facility 
[3=Significant,1=Moderate,0=No 
Challenge] 
Sustainability: U or Pu Inflow [kg/yr] 
(IGNORE USource) 
Sus: facility lifetime [yr] 
 
 
 The first three rows of Table XVI (or MAUA Data Excel sheet columns) are self-
explanatory.  These values are attached to transitions representing either facility 
construction or facility operation.  As long as a single facility does not get marked twice 
(e.g. for both construction and operation), the computation is indifferent.  NWPR utility 
calculation requires facility outflow in IAEA significant quantities per year.99  For each 
facility, C&S needs the user to assign one of the three probability rankings: high (0.75), 
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medium (0.5), low (0.25).  This coarse ranking is sufficient for the ordinal, as opposed to 
cardinal, attribute utility calculation.  NDP calculation uses the IAEA non-detection 
probability for each pathway facility. 
 The next three rows of Table XVI (or MAUA Data Excel sheet columns) 
designated ‘R-’ refer to reliability parameters.  ‘R-NE’ refers to the reliability of the 
nuclear explosive design and type of testing.  Table XVII shows the suggested nuclear 
explosive (NE) reliabilities as low (0.25), medium (0.5), high (0.75).  ‘R-DS-Range’ is 
simply the range in km of delivery system attached to single delivery system transition.  
‘R-DS-Type’ is simply a value 1-3 denoting the type of delivery system: 1=Airdrop, 2 = 
Missile, 3=Artillery.     
   
Table XVII 
Suggested Nuclear Explosive Reliabilities 
Weapon Type 
Reliability rating by test type 
None Cold Hot 
Gun 0.5 0.75 0.75 
Implosion 0.25 0.5 0.75 
Boosted 0.25 0.25 0.75 
Thermo-nuclear 0.25 0.25 0.5 
 
 The final three rows of Table XVI (or MAUA Data Excel sheet columns) deal 
with the Sustainability attribute.  The first is a measure of how technically challenging a 
facility is to maintain relative to the capabilities of the state.  Technical challenge may be 
rated as follows with the corresponding value: 3-significant challenge, 1-moderate 
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challenge, and 0-no challenge.  The second row is simply the facility inflow in kg U (or 
Pu).  The final row (Excel sheet column) is expected facility lifetime in years. 
 The Excel sheets ‘Red-flow’ and ‘Red-CS’ deal with pathway facility 
redundancy.  Redundancy refers to facilities that repeat the same capability.  The two 
redundancies can be different.  The flow itself is measured in units of IAEA significant 
quantities for use by the NWPR function.  This unit of measure is used so that total 
weapon production may be counted regardless of the weapon material HEU or Pu.  As 
such HEU enrichment and Pu production facilities are flow redundant.  This flow 
redundancy is in contrast to C&S redundancy where a plutonium production facility 
cannot replace the pathway and material specific capability of an HEU production 
facility.  Of course, the user may have a different interpretation and can define the sheets 
the same if desired. 
 Both redundancy sheets have the same format.  The input data table is a 
transition by transition matrix, with transition names listed in the first column and first 
row of the Excel sheets.  If two transitions Tj and Tk are redundant then a value of 1 is 
placed in both matrix elements (j,k) and (k,j).  All other matrix elements are zero. 
 The ‘ProlifData’ sheet has one table specifying additional information about the 
proliferator.  The input table is repeated below in Table XVIII.  The first column of 
Table XVIII gives the row headings found in the ProlifData sheet.  The second column 
is a description of the table value for that row.  The user may need to update Excel sheet 
cell references in the Latency tool batch input file depending on how many adversary 
 118 
 
targets are listed.  Additional input parameters specified in the batch file are discussed 
with the attribute functions for which they apply. 
  
Table XVIII 
ProlifData Excel Sheet Table and Values 
Row heading ProlifData table value description 
Range To Adversary Targets [km] RAT1 RAT2 Etc. 
Adversary Defense Rank 
1=Superior, 2=Comparable, 
3=Inferior -- -- 
Uranium Data (reserves stocks) [MT] reserves stocks -- 
 
 
VII.C.2. PetriPathMAUA 
 
 The independent utilities are aggregated through a separate MAUA function.  
This function begins by generating an empty (𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠) × (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) matrix.  This 
matrix is filled with attribute utility values by iterating through each path calling each 
attribute utility function.  These attribute utilities are normalized among paths by the 
maximum utility for each attribute from all paths.  Pathway utilities are then summed 
according to Equation (11).  At this point, the previous path utility is multiplied by the 
user defined current path weight as input in the batch file.  This approach can help 
account for any previous choice commitment biases the user feels may exist within the 
proliferating state.  The path may then be selected either with path probabilities weighted 
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by the determined utilities or simply by the maximum utility as specified in the batch 
file. 
   
VII.C.3. Independent Attribute Utility Determination 
 
 Separate MATLAB functions were developed for each of the six pathway 
attributes.  Appropriate utility equations would likely be difficult to elicit from potential 
proliferators.  Therefore the simplest form, linear attribute utility equations, were 
assumed.  All attribute utility equations were positive linear with the exception of TTFW 
which was negative linear for increasing time.  The attribute functions are discussed in 
order TTFW, NWPR, C&S, NDP, Rel, and Sus. 
 It is expected that states have sophisticated means of estimating project time, and 
the TTFW should share this sophistication.  The Latency tool already has a sophisticated 
Petri Net simulation built and this is re-used.  Future time is an uncertain value, so 
expected utility is taken with a Latency time distribution generated by a separate Petri 
Net sub-function.  This TTFW simulation uses the existing transition data set.  The user 
inputs the number of iterations for TTFW simulations in the batch file.  To save on 
computational time, the default is one iteration while taking the mean of the transition 
time pdfs for time sampling. 
 An interesting analysis could be done if the TTFW simulation was run with a 
different transition data set than the main Petri Net.  This approach could provide 
analysis of a situation where a proliferator’s expectations are different than reality and 
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would be straightforward to implement with a separate Excel input sheet.  One could 
even imagine a dynamic algorithm where the proliferator’s perceived activity time pdfs 
are updated as the simulation evolves and the proliferator learns.  Though, this analysis 
using different sets of activity times is left for future consideration. 
 NWPR assesses pathway weapons production capability from the data specified 
in the Excel ‘MAUA Data’ sheet.  Each path production rate is limited by the minimum 
facility flow.  The NWPR function uses the path minimum as representative of the full 
path.  Any redundant facility flows along a pathway according to the flow redundancy 
Excel sheet are summed for those facilities.  The path with the greatest minimum flow 
will have the highest NWPR utility. 
 Pathway C&S and NDP are aggregated in similar fashion.  For both, the user has 
the option of specifying that the path probabilities be determined by the familiar product 
of facility probabilities or by simply taking the minimum value (zero values listed in the 
Excel input for transitions are neglected for the calculation).  These options simulate the 
proliferator’s choice of deciding between the technically correct result and judging the 
entire path by its weak point.  Additionally, pathway C&S has a third option of being 
determined by the product augmented for C&S facility redundancy as 
 
𝑃𝐶&𝑆 𝑥𝑝 =  ∏ (𝑃𝐶&𝑆(𝑓𝑖))
𝑖  ∏ [1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐶&𝑆(𝑓𝑟))
𝑟 ]𝑅 , (12) 
 
where 𝑓𝑖 ∈ of non-redundant facilities, 𝑓𝑟 ∈ of redundant facilities for capability 𝑅, 𝑅 ∈ 
of pathway capabilities (such as uranium enrichment) for which facilities with the same 
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redundant capability exist.  Use of this C&S calculation method allows the proliferator 
to prefer pathways that may still function with the detection or loss of a redundant 
facility.  The method for each attribute calculation is specified in the batch file.    
 Pathway Reliability is determined through a combination of the reliability 
parameters specified relative to the proliferator adversary parameters.  It is possible for 
one pathway to have different designs, with different levels of testing, and different 
delivery systems with different ranges.  During utility calculation for each path, the Rel 
function decomposes the path into any unique independent paths.  This step keeps the 
data for different weapons systems separate.  Then three component Rel values are 
determined for each independent path of the current utility calculation path.  The first 
value is the ‘NE-Rel’ value taken directly from the ‘MAUA Data’ input sheet.  Next a 
range factor equal to the weapon system delivery range divided by the average range to 
adversary target, taken from the ‘ProlifData’ Excel sheet, is determined.  The range 
factor is then coarsened into a high (0.75), medium (0.5), or low (0.25) probability of the 
weapon system being able to reach the intended target.  Lastly, a penetration probability 
is assigned to the independent path with the weapon system type from the ‘MAUA Data’ 
sheet and the adversary air defense rank from the ‘ProlifData’ sheet according to Table 
XIX.  The adversary air defense rank is a measure of the capability of the adversary air 
defenses relative to the proliferator’s air power.  The adversary air defense rank is 
basically an indication of whether the proliferator can reliably deliver a weapon to an 
adversary target with its military aircraft, or whether the proliferator needs missile or 
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artillery systems to do so.  The maximum product of the three determined reliability 
parameters for each independent path is taken as the pathway reliability utility. 
 
Table XIX 
Adversary Defense Penetration Probability Matrix 
Adversary Air Defense Rank 
Reliability rating for proliferator 
delivery method 
Gravity Bomb Missile Artillery 
Superior 1 0.25 0.75 0.75 
Comparable 2 0.5 0.75 0.75 
Inferior 3 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
 
 Sustainability is a combination of the technical challenge to sustain and facility 
lifetime parameters relative to uranium reserve data.  The function first determines a 
lifetime facility uranium flow expectancy by multiplying the facility uranium inflow and 
expected lifetime values from the ‘MAUA Data’ Excel sheet.  It then takes a ratio of the 
lifetime flow to the sum of the uranium reserves and stocks input in the ‘ProlifData’ 
Sheet.  The uranium reserve ratio is coarsened into a high (0.75), medium, (0.5), or low 
(0.25) rating.  A technical challenge factor is then determined from the ratio of the sum 
of the technical challenge ratings for the current path listed in the ‘MAUA Data’ sheet to 
the sum of the technical challenge ratings of all facilities from all paths.  The 
sustainability utility is then either the product of uranium flow and technical challenge 
ratings or the minimum as specified by the user in the batch file.  With the MAUA path 
selection fully developed, the remaining task prior to its use was to verify its function. 
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VII.D. MAUA Function Verification 
 
 Verification of the Latency tool MAUA path selection function proceeded in a 
straightforward fashion.  A simple Latency network was developed with enough 
pathway variation to test each of the attribute utility functions.  All associated MAUA 
verification network data is given in Appendix M.  The network consisted of four 
pathways detailed in Table XX.  The first column of Table XX lists the path number and 
the second column describes the path features.  The overall network consisted of 19 
transitions and 19 places.  Financial control was added through a funding choice 
between each of the three possible special nuclear material (SNM) production facilities.  
 
Table XX 
MAUA Verification Network Pathways  
Path Path features 
1 
Cold Tested HEU Gun Gravity Bomb, 1 
Enrichment Facility 
2 
Cold Tested HEU Gun Gravity Bomb, 2 
Enrichment Facilities 
3 Cold Tested Pu Implosion Missile 
4 Hot Tested Pu Implosion Missile 
 
 
 Table XXI ranks the independent pathways for each attribute according to the 
pathway features as defined in the verification network Excel.  The first column of Table 
XXI lists the attribute and any network or MAUA parameter variations.  The remaining 
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columns list the ranking of each path as preferred by the attribute (with parameter 
variation) listed in the first column.   
  
Table XXI 
MAUA Verification Test Path Rankings by Attribute with Parameter Variation 
Attribute with parameter 
variation 
Path rank by attribute with parameter variation 
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 
TTFW-limited funds 1 1 2 3 
TTFW-excess funds 2 1 3 4 
NWPR 3 1 2 2 
C&S 1 2 3 4 
C&S-Redundant 2 1 3 4 
NDP 2 3 1 1 
Rel-adversary air defense=3, 
range to adversary target=long 
1 1 3 2 
Rel-adversary air defense =3, 
range to adversary target=short 
1 1 2 1 
Rel-adversary air defense =1, 
range to adversary target=long 
1 1 2 1 
Rel-adversary air defense =1, 
range to adversary target=short 
3 3 2 1 
Sus-excess uranium 1 2 1 1 
Sus-limited uranium 2 3 1 1 
 
 
 The rankings Table XXI were based on the variable features defined for the 
pathways.  The time was shorter to develop and produce HEU than it was for Pu.  The 
SNM production rate of a single HEU enrichment facility was less than that of the Pu 
production facility which was less than the rate of the two HEU enrichment facilities 
together.  All SNM production facilities were considered flow-redundant while only the 
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enrichment facilities were C&S-redundant. The enrichment facilities individually were 
assigned a high probability of concealment and survival while the Pu production facility 
received a medium probability.  The hot test of Pu weapon was given a low probability 
of concealment and survival.  The Pu production facility complex was assigned a higher 
IAEA non-detection probability than the uranium enrichment facilities, which had the 
same NDP.  The nuclear explosive reliability of the hot tested Pu implosion weapon and 
the cold tested HEU gun weapon were both ranked as high, whereas the cold tested Pu 
implosion weapon was rated with medium reliability.  The missile delivery system was 
given a shorter range than the gravity bomb delivery system.  The Pu production facility 
was deemed a significant technical challenge to sustain, while the enrichment facilities 
each were only a moderate challenge.  A single enrichment facility had greater Uranium 
demands than the Pu production facility, while all facilities had a 20 year lifetime. 
 Other network parameters and definitions were varied during the verification 
study.  The financial resource production rate was varied for cases of limited and excess 
funds.  A lower financial resources production rate forced the proliferator to choose 
between SNM production facilities. With the higher resources production rate the 
proliferator was able to build all three simultaneously.  The state adversary profile was 
varied between inferior and superior air defenses (adversary air defense (AAD) = 3 and 
AAD = 1, respectively) and the range of adversary targets (RAT) from short to long.  
One final variation included defining national uranium availability in excess or as 
limited relative to the potential pathway lifetime requirements.  Verification can be done 
by simulating the verification network and sequentially setting each attribute weight 
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equal to one while the others remain zero.  If the pathway utility values determined 
through simulation match the rankings of Table XXI, verification can be confirmed. 
 Verification is demonstrated by the pathway utility values determined during 
verification simulation shown in Fig. 47.  Fig. 47 gives the normalized utility value on 
the vertical axis.  The simulation preferred attribute (set to 1) and any pertinent 
simulation parameters are noted along the horizontal axis.  Fig. 47 presents utility values 
for all combination paths based on the independent paths from Table XX. 
 Fig. 47a shows the desired response that when the amount of available finances 
was increased, the time of the dual enrichment facility path was shorter than the single 
enrichment facility path.  This was not the case when finances were constrained and 
parallel construction could not be afforded.  Fig. 47a further illustrates the NWPR utility 
preference for paths with all three SNM production methods. 
 Fig. 47b displays the C&S and NDP results. Without accounting for redundancy, 
the single enrichment facility is the least detectable pathway.  Further drops in the C&S 
utility occur for Pu production and hot testing.  The dual enrichment facility path 
obtained a higher utility when pathway redundancy was taken into account.  As expected 
the NDP utility is greatest for pathways with only the Pu production facility. 
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Fig. 47. Verification simulation results for (a) TTFW, (b) C&S and NDP, (c) Rel, (d) 
Sus.4 
                                                 
4 The astute reader will notice the paths shown do not include all possible combinations of the independent path numbers.  This is 
because combination paths (1,2), (2,3), (2,4), and (2,3,4) are redundant by transition with paths (2), (1,2,3),(1,2,4), and (1,2,3,4) 
respectively. 
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Fig. 47. Continued. 
 
 Rel utilities are illustrated in Fig. 47c.  When adversary air defense are weak and 
ranges long, pathways with gravity bomb delivery systems were Rel preferred.  When 
the range was decreased, all pathways were equally good with the exception of the cold 
tested Pu weapon which had a less reliable nuclear explosive.  When adversary air power 
was superior and ranges long, all paths were equally bad, again with the exception of the 
cold tested Pu weapon being worse.  When ranges were again shortened, the missile 
system is preferred. 
 Fig. 47d contains the Sus utility results.  When uranium was in excess, the single 
enrichment facility path was most favorable due to the reduced technical challenge.  If 
uranium was limited though, the more technically challenging Pu paths had greater Sus 
utility.  With the MAUA Latency function verified, it is now possible to assess its utility 
for Latency determination and characterize the impact of its use.  
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VIII. MAUA CASE STUDY SENSITIVITIES  
 
 MAUA was developed and applied in order to model proliferator pathway 
decisions to increase the accuracy of the expected Latency time by biasing the 
potentially more proliferator preferred paths and to additionally generate associated 
pathway probabilities.  To test the impact of the MAUA function, simulations were run 
while varying path selection interval, the path selection method, and the attribute 
weights.  The variations performed are described in Table XXII.  Table XXII lists for 
each Latency case the path selection intervals, selection methods, and weights used by 
the simulations.  Path selection methods include utility weighted probability selection 
and selection strictly by the maximum utility, in addition to the original fully random 
selection.  The weights were varied as equally divided between those influencing 
attributes as determined from the gap analysis for that state, equally divided among all 
six attributes, or taken as the mean attribute values from the NWPPUAWS.  Simulation 
results were investigated for path selection probability and Latency statistical results. 
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TABLE XXII 
MAUA Simulation Variations 
Case 
Path selection 
Weights 
 Interval Method 
U.S. 1 yr, 5 yr, Once 
Random, Weighted 
Utility probability, 
Maximum Utility 
Gap analysis-
equal, all-equal 
South Africa 1 yr, 5 yr, Once 
Random, Weighted 
Utility probability, 
Maximum Utility 
Gap analysis-
equal, 
NWPPUAWS 
Pakistan 1 yr, 5 yr, Once 
Random, Weighted 
Utility probability 
All-equal 
 
 
VIII.A. Influence on Path Selection 
 
 As previously discussed, path probabilities were calculated for two quantities by 
the Latency tool.  One was the combination path probability, which is the path that 
contains all paths chosen at least once during the simulation iteration.  The other was the 
finishing path probability, which is the path being pursued at the time of path 
completion.  Probabilities are obtained by taking the number of times a combined path or 
finishing path was tallied divided by the total number of simulation iterations.  The cases 
considered were the same U.S., South African, and Pakistani proliferation programs 
from before. 
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VIII.A.1. U.S.  
 
 The combination path probabilities for the U.S. case are shown in Fig. 48.  Fig. 
48 gives the simulation path selection probability for each path for each simulation 
varying the selection method, weights, and C&S determination method.  The maximum 
utility selection methods have a clear impact.  For maximum utility selection with equal 
attribute weights, path 3, the plutonium path, is preferred.  When the attribute weight is 
equally divided between the TTFW, NWPR, and Rel attributes as identified by the gap 
analysis, the pathway probability is equal for path 4, which includes all enrichment 
options, and path 7, which is path 4 with plutonium production added.  Path 7 recreates 
the actual historical path. 
     
 
Fig. 48. U.S. combination path probabilities for path selection intervals of (a) 1 year, (b) 
5 years, and (c) once during the simulation iteration. 
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Fig. 48. Continued. 
 
 Fig. 48 shows that utility weighted probability selection is not that much different 
than the original random path selection.  For each path selection interval, utility 
weighted probabilities per path were very close to the random probability.  One does 
notice when progressing through Fig. 48a-c, that for more frequent path selection with 
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essentially random path selection probability, it becomes highly likely that all paths will 
be selected at least once.  This higher likelihood of all paths being selected at shorter 
path selection intervals results in the increased probability for combination path 7 in Fig. 
48a.  One explanation for the very random-like selection when using the utility 
probabilities is that the determined utility values per path were all about equal.  This 
utility invariance was confirmed by extracting the first path selection utility results from 
the output files shown in Fig. 49.  Fig. 49 relates the utility value calculated for each 
path at the time of the first path selection given for the corresponding weights used.      
 
 
Fig. 49. Initial utility values determined at first path selection for the U.S. 
 
 Finishing path probabilities for the U.S. simulation are illustrated in Fig. 50.  Fig. 
50 shows the resulting finishing path selection probability for each path for each MAUA 
simulation variation.  The same dynamics from Fig. 48 are seen without the path 
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combination effect of Fig. 48a.  There may be a slight trend of increasing preference for 
path 7 in Fig. 50 as the path selection frequency increases.  This preference increase 
could be the result of the slightly higher utility value seen in Fig. 49 for the gap analysis 
attribute weights.  However the potential preference increase with increasing path 
selection frequency may just be noise.   
 
 
Fig. 50. U.S. finishing path probabilities for path selection intervals of (a) 1 year, (b) 5 
years, and (c) once during the simulation iteration. 
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Fig. 50. Continued. 
 
 The clear take away from Fig. 48 and Fig. 50 was that use of the maximum 
utility selection method will clearly influence pathway probability, whereas the influence 
of the utility weighted probability selection method may be more subtle for the U.S. 
case.  Further, it appears that gap analysis confirmed attributes were suitable for 
 136 
 
modeling U.S. proliferation pathway selection, whereas the complete attribute set 
equally weighted was not when using the maximum utility selection method.  It should 
be noted that the U.S. case of proliferation was very quick, shortening the window for 
the utility weighted probabilities to have an effect. 
 
VIII.A.2. South Africa  
 
 The finishing path probabilities for the South African case simulations are shown 
in Fig. 51.  Finishing path probability is illustrated for each path and for each MAUA 
variation described in Table XXII.  Path selection for South Africa was done with mean 
NWPPUAW Survey attribute weights and for gap analysis attributes with equal weights.  
The South African gap analysis confirmed attributes were C&S and Rel.  Simulations 
that used the maximum determined utility clearly preferred path 1, which avoided the 
less concealable hot test and plutonium production infrastructure.  
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Fig. 51. South Africa finishing path probabilities for path selection intervals of (a) 1 
year, (b) 5 years, and (c) once during the simulation iteration. 
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Fig. 51. Continued. 
 
 Paths 3, 4, and 9, the paths without any uranium enrichment, appear to lose favor 
with more path selections.  This effect may be a result of slightly lower determined 
utility for these paths.  Fig. 52 shows the determined utility per path for the first 
simulation path selection for both weight sets used.  Fig. 52 demonstrates that aside from 
the enrichment-only paths 1 and 2, the initial utility values for the remaining paths are 
about the same and not any lower as previously suspected.  The reason for decreased 
finishing probability is evident though when one considers the South African Latency 
standards for the plutonium paths are over twice as long (~5000 days) as the standards 
for the uranium paths.   Use of both NWPPUAW Survey and gap analysis confirmed 
attributes were suitable to model South African proliferation pathway decision making 
when using the maximum utility selection method. 
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Fig. 52. Initial utility values determined at first path selection for South Africa. 
 
VIII.B. Influence on Latency Statistical Results 
 
 If pathway selection becomes more attune with actual proliferator decision 
making, then the results should provide more accurate Latency results.  By avoiding the 
less preferred paths, the simulation results reflect only variation within the preferred 
path(s) instead of including the non-preferred paths.  Latency statistics for MAUA 
selection methods are given and compared to those generated with random selection for 
the U.S., South African, and Pakistani cases. 
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VIII.B.1. U.S. 
 
 Fig. 53 illustrates the impact of path selection method on U.S. Latency time 
statistics.  Fig. 53a depicts the expected Latency for different path selection intervals 
with Latency Standard times for Little Boy and Fatman added.  Fig. 53a shows the 
expected Latency simulated with selection by maximum utility based on gap analysis 
attributes is closer to reference results.  The maximum utility selection method results, in 
general, also appear to be invariant to the path selection interval for all the Latency 
statistical measures.  This result is in contrast to the random or weighted probability 
selection methods where the expected Latency and variance increase with selection 
interval. 
 Fig. 53b and c show the Latency standard deviation and minimum Latency time 
as a result of the path selection interval variation respectively.  It indicates that the 
variance is reduced even in the event of a single path selection.  Though in the case of 
the complete attribute set with equal weights, the results may be converging on the 
wrong answer.  It should also be noted that expected Latency for complete attribute set 
simulations are longer than the reference values, a risky, non-conservative result.   
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Fig. 53. Impact of path selection method on U.S. (a) expected Latency with historical 
and Latency standard times added, (b) Latency standard deviation, and (c) minimum 
Latency. 
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  Fig. 53. Continued. 
 
VIII.B.2. South Africa 
 
 The South African expected Latency, Latency standard deviation, and minimum 
Latency, with varying path selection method for stochastic simulations using mean 
NWPPUAW Survey weights and equal gap analysis derived weights, are depicted in 
Fig. 54.  Previously, Fig. 51 proved that both the attribute sets used adequately modeled 
the historical path selection.  As a result the expected Latency and standard deviation for 
both maximum utility selection simulations tightened around the reference values. This 
finding supports use of the maximum utility selection method when attribute values are 
appropriate. 
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Fig. 54. Impact of path selection method on South African (a) expected Latency with 
historical and Latency standard times added, (b) Latency standard deviation, and (c) 
minimum Latency. 
 144 
 
 
Fig. 54. Continued. 
 
VIII.B.3. Pakistan 
 
 Fig. 55 shows the expected Latency, Latency standard deviation, and minimum 
Latency for the Pakistani case using stochastic simulations with random path selection.   
Fig. 55 compares the results of a simulation using utility weighted probability path 
selection to a simulation using the complete set of attributes with equal weights.  As 
expected from the prior analysis, the utility weighted probability selection results vary 
little from the fully random selection results.  The expected Latencies for both are well 
below the reference values.  This result is due to the inclusion of hot testing and 
safeguarded plutonium diversion paths which were drastically shorter than what actually 
occurred. Fortunately, underestimating Latency time, the time it takes a state to 
proliferate, is a conservative error.   
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Fig. 55. Impact of path selection with utility weighted probabilities and equal utility 
attribute weights on Pakistani (a) expected Latency with Latency standard time added, 
(b) Latency standard deviation, and (c) minimum Latency. 
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Fig. 55. Continued.   
 
VIII.C. MAUA Analysis Conclusions 
 
 The analysis shows advantages and disadvantages of using the MAUA path 
selection function in the Latency.  Expected Latencies and associated variances can be 
brought closer to reference values when appropriate attributes and weights are used.  
However, with inappropriate parameters the results may be led astray possibly in a non-
conservative fashion.  Further the gap analysis showed a high frequency impact of 
‘other’, case-specific non-generalizable factors.  This poses a direct challenge to 
applying MAUA when detailed insights into proliferator decision making is difficult to 
obtain.  Further, people and potentially proliferators frequently make non-utility 
maximizing decisions.  
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IX. PRESENT CASE STUDY – ROK FUEL CYCLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 South Korea, also known as the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the U.S. have a 
long history of nuclear cooperation that currently faces a significant hurdle.100,101,102  The 
countries have divergent views on ROK development of nuclear fuel cycle facilities.  
The ROK is interested in developing spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
capabilities.  This development would be contrary to standing U.S. non-proliferation 
policies which discourage the development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies 
in states that don’t already have them. However, the U.S. and ROK are strong allies with 
close military and economic ties.  Thus, the ROK is seeking a shift in U.S. policy for 
what it sees as a benefit to ROK social and economic interests.  Latency analysis of 
potential ROK fuel cycle facility options was performed to inform the policy discussion 
on this issue. 
 
IX.A. ROK-U.S. Nuclear Background 
 
 The ROK has a significant and growing domestic nuclear industry that is 
expanding to include nuclear export.100,101,102  The ROK currently operates twenty 
nuclear power reactors supplying 40% of its electricity. With six reactors under 
construction and orders for four more, the nuclear power energy share is projected to 
expand to 60% by 2030.  The ROK became an international nuclear player when a 
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consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Company won a 2009 bid to supply four 
nuclear reactors to the United Arab Emirates.   
 The ROK desire for nuclear fuel cycle facilities rises from both spent nuclear fuel 
management needs and economic business interests.  By 2008, the ROK had already 
produced 10,083 metric tons of spent fuel.  This stockpile may reach 100,000 metric tons 
by 2100.  Current on-site spent fuel storage is set to reach its capacity by 2016, 
underscoring the need for a permanent long term and likely high capacity spent fuel 
repository.  With a population of 50 million wedged into a country the size of the state of 
Virginia, finding space for the projected 20 square km repository has proven difficult, 
especially given the current public resistance.  In addition to significantly reducing the 
repository burden, reprocessing could also play a role in the development of next 
generation reactor fuels enhancing long-term ROK energy sustainability concerns. 
 In addition to reprocessing capability, Uranium enrichment could greatly benefit 
the ROK’s economy.  The ROK spends over $300 million each year to import enriched 
fuel for its domestic reactor fleet.  Further, the ROK would greatly enhance its nuclear 
export portfolio by adding fuel cycle services, both enrichment and reprocessing.  
Having these fuel cycle services would bring the ROK to the same level as its nuclear 
export competitors, France and Japan, which already possess these capabilities.   
 The ROK plans to meet its spent nuclear fuel reduction and economic desires by 
developing pyroprocessing and centrifuge enrichment facilities.  Pyroprocessing is a 
form of spent fuel reprocessing that separates uranium from a combined stream of 
plutonium, other transuranics, and some fission products.  Retaining the other elements 
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with the plutonium is seen as a proliferation resistance increase over the traditional 
PUREX reprocessing technique which produces completely separated plutonium.103  The 
ROK has developed a lab scale pyroprocessing facility, built an inactive pilot 
demonstration facility, and has plans for both an active pilot demonstration and 
commercial facilities by 2030.104,105 
 ROK nuclear fuel cycle development currently is constrained by its 123 
agreement with the U.S.102  A 123 agreement refers to section 123 of the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Act which requires a 123 agreement for U.S. nuclear cooperation with a foreign 
state.  The previous agreement with the ROK, signed in 1973, was extended for 2 years 
in March 2014, and currently is set to expire in March 2016.106  This agreement requires 
specific consent from the U.S. for the ROK to alter or reprocess U.S. origin spent fuel.  
Almost 60% of current ROK spent fuel is U.S. origin, which would require such 
consent.  The ROK is seeking advanced consent for reprocessing of U.S. origin material 
in the new agreement.  This prospect raises significant non-proliferation concerns for the 
U.S. given the North Korean nuclear situation, the ROK’s spotted non-proliferation track 
record, and global non-proliferation policy consistency.100,101,102  The current two-year 
123 agreement extension was done specifically to allow more time for policymakers in 
both countries to resolve their differences of opinion prior to enacting a new agreement.   
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IX.B. ROK Latency Network 
 
 A Latency analysis was performed considering three scenarios of ROK fuel cycle 
development.  Complete ROK network specifications are given in Appendix N.  The 
first fuel cycle facility option considered was a 10 MT/yr pilot pyroprocessing facility as 
planned by the ROK.  Associated network activity time pdfs and network flows were 
adapted from existing papers and presentations from ROK establishments.104,105,107,108  
An additional plutonium purification step would be required to weaponize the proposed 
pyroprocessing facility product.  Facility requirements for this step would be greatly 
reduced, as the majority of the uranium and the highly radioactive cesium and strontium 
fission products have already been removed.  Reference activity times for the highly 
capable ROK to design and construct such a facility were assumed to be one year each.  
The ROK pyroprocessing facility uranium/transuranic metal product was estimated to 
contain 4 kg of plutonium.  The product was produced from a reprocessing campaign 
with an estimated reference activity time of 16 days.104,107 (For this simulation, operation 
of the facility was maximized assuming constant operation 365 days per year.  At this 
operation rate, expected throughput of the facility became approximately 11.4 MT/yr).       
 A complete PUREX path was considered as an alternative reprocessing path for 
the ROK.  The PUREX path involved additional PUREX specific research and 
development, PUREX chemicals acquisition, and a pilot 10 MT/yr PUREX facility 
analogous to the proposed pilot pyroprocessing facility (to correspond to the maximized 
flow of the pyroprocessing simulation this facility was also simulated with an expected 
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facility throughput of approximately 11.4 MT/yr assuming constant operation 365 days 
per year).  Given historical PUREX facility development and ROK’s level of capability, 
design and construction of the PUREX facility were estimated at 1 year and 3 years 
respectively.109  The plutonium production rate was matched to the pyroprocessing plant 
such that the facilities considered had equal capacity.  Inclusion of the PUREX 
development path provides a baseline reprocessing option for comparison with the 
proposed pyroprocessing facility. 
 Uranium enrichment, desired for primarily economic interests, was considered on 
a much larger scale.  This pathway option was based on the 3000 MTSWU/yr 
URENCO-USA centrifuge enrichment facility.110  The proposed enrichment facility was 
expected as a turn-key import with an assumed 180-day design and nearly four year 
construction time corresponding to U.S. plant construction.111  Reconfiguration of the 
plant from low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade uranium production was assumed to 
take 60 days.  Both uranium and plutonium materials production paths required 
subsequent weaponization. 
 Weaponization was based on historical weapon examples using existing ROK 
delivery systems.  The ROK was assumed at least as capable as the U.S. in 1950.  The 
second generation Mark-7 plutonium implosion weapon and Mark-8 HEU gun weapon 
developed from 1949-1952 and 1950-1951, respectively, were taken as references.  
Pertinent weapon characteristics for delivery are given in Table XXIII.112,113  Currently 
available ROK delivery systems capable of delivering such weapons are F-15 and F-16 
aircraft for both plutonium and HEU gravity bombs and Hyunmoo missiles (both 
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ballistic and cruise) for the lighter plutonium explosives.114,115,116 The plutonium 
weaponization could occur with or without a ‘hot’ nuclear test.  Validation of the 
plutonium weapon was assumed to take 180 days with a nuclear test and four times as 
long with sub-critical testing.  Though, the ROK was assumed to stockpile 5 weapons 
worth of plutonium prior to a full nuclear test. 
 
TABLE XXIII 
U.S. Reference Weapons Characteristics 
Weapon Mk-7 Mk-8 
Type Pu implosion HEU Gun 
Diameter [m] .775 .368 
Length [m] 1.42 3.35 
Weight [kg] 498 1488 
 
 
IX.C. ROK Latency Results  
 
 The results of Latency simulations for each fuel cycle facility option for both 
present undeveloped paths and future developed paths with complete facilities are shown 
in Fig. 56 and Fig. 57.  Fig. 56 shows the expected and minimum Latencies for both the 
present case of undeveloped fuel cycle facilities and the future case with complete 
facilities.  Fig. 56 gives the specific Latency times as data labels.  Fig. 57 depicts the 
difference in days of the Latencies, both expected and minimum, between the present 
case of undeveloped fuel cycle facilities and the future case with complete facilities 
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Fig. 56.  Expected and minimum Latency times for ROK fuel cycle options both without 
and with completed facilities. 
 
 
Fig. 57. Difference between present, undeveloped facility and future, complete facilities 
for the expected and minimum Latencies 
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 The reduction in Latency time with ROK fuel cycle development is clear.  The 
expected Latencies for the fuel cycle facility options descend in order of the 
pyroprocessing path, the PUREX path, to the uranium enrichment path having the 
shortest Latency.  Further, the expected latency with a complete centrifuge enrichment 
plant is less than one third of the expected latencies of the other two options.  This large 
difference is a result of the much higher operational capacity of the commercial 
enrichment facility compared to the pilot reprocessing facilities.  Given the analysis 
assumptions, Fig. 56 shows that Latency is longer for the pyroprocessing path than the 
PUREX path by 900 days for the present, undeveloped facility case and 473 days longer 
for the future, complete facility case. 
 
IX.D. ROK Conclusions 
 
 Nuclear weapons latency is just one factor for U.S. policy consideration on ROK 
fuel cycle development.  The Latency analysis demonstrates fuel cycle development will 
reduce the time necessary for potential ROK proliferation should the ROK reconsider its 
non-proliferation commitment.  This increased risk could be offset by the societal benefit 
of reduced long term spent fuel repository requirements or the economic benefit from 
enrichment.  Given the region, any ROK developments will have to account for the 
impact on and possible reaction of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
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Korea).  It is believed that this Latency analysis will better inform and prepare U.S. 
policy makers for their decision. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
 
 A new computational proliferation assessment methodology has been developed 
called the Nuclear Weapons Latency tool.  Given three basic assumptions, the tool 
determines a state’s nuclear weapons Latency, the expected time to be taken by a non-
nuclear weapons state to develop a conventionally deliverable nuclear weapon given the 
state’s position on a path toward or away from a nuclear weapon and accounting for the 
state’s motivations and intentions.  Beyond the Latency time result, the tool provides a 
transparent, efficient, and highly repeatable platform which allows for extensive 
sensitivity analysis to better inform the nonproliferation discussion.   
 Sensitivity analysis can determine the impact of varying assumptions, including 
the nuclear fuel cycle technology available to the potential proliferator.  As such, the 
Latency tool can provide a characterization of proliferation risk due to the acquisition of 
different technology to policy makers.  This enables the Latency tool to help fill a void 
in quantifying proliferation, identified by the 2013 National Academies study Improving 
the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles.  The Latency tool also 
serves as a foundation for future development that may lead to a more complete 
characterization of proliferation risk to better support nuclear non-proliferation policy 
making. 
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X.A. Latency Tool Summation 
 
 Three simple assumptions are made by the Latency tool.  The first is that a state 
has made the decision to proliferate.  Whether a state will proliferate is a difficult 
question to answer and is better left to future consideration.  The absence of a 
commitment to a decision in favor of proliferation can serve only to slow proliferation.  
Thus this assumption is safely conservative, leading to an overestimate of potential 
proliferator capability or resolve.  This result is preferable to underestimating the 
adversary.  The other assumptions made are the proliferation pathway network available 
to the proliferator and the associated pathway activity time pdfs.  Both these assumptions 
may be tested through sensitivity analysis. 
 The Latency tool is a stochastic Petri net simulation which has been verified and 
historically benchmarked.  The U.S. case was used for initial verification and to reveal 
several inherent sensitivities.  Large timesteps, rounded pdf bounds, increased network 
parallelism, and greater network resolution (dividing activities into sub-activities) can 
drive expected latency times high.  Smaller networks with coarse resolution show greater 
variance.  Further, the type of pdfs used to represent activity times and the available 
network pathways will influence latency results. Given these sensitivities, it is up to the 
user of the Latency tool to develop the appropriate network model and associated 
activity times. 
 Pakistan and South Africa provided interesting proliferation cases for 
investigation.  The Pakistani analysis brought into to question the actual impact of A.Q. 
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Khan.  It is possible that while the Pakistani pathway definitely changed, the actual 
proliferation time may have been similar had Pakistan simply remained focused on the 
plutonium path the entire time.  The South African analysis demonstrated how Latency 
time can effectively portray the evolution of a nuclear weapons program towards 
complete proliferation. 
 The MAUA pathway selection function may or may not produce increased 
accuracy in results.  MAUA was applied to the Latency tool as a dynamic pathway 
selection function to determine pathway probabilities and effectively weight certain 
pathways and proliferation times during the course of a Latency simulation.  Using 
MAUA in this fashion adds three layers of additional assumptions: that the axioms of 
expected utility are preserved; that attribute independence relations are preserved; and 
that the attributes, the attribute utility equations, the attribute values, and the associated 
attribute value uncertainties accurately represent proliferator preferences.  If any of these 
assumptions fail, then the MAUA Latency simulations will produce incorrectly skewed 
results.  For this reason, it is important that the analyst or user fully understand this 
Latency tool feature before utilizing.  Other proliferator modeling methods, like 
Bayesian analysis, should be studied for this type of adversary modeling.   
 Regardless, any proliferator decision modeling technique will always run the risk 
of driving results away from the actual proliferator decisions with inaccurate information 
and assumptions.  Operating the Latency tool with the original random path selection 
technique, however, will always include the correct result.  This fact simply reinforces 
the utility of the Latency tool for sensitivity analyses, including for path selection 
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methods.  For this reason, it may be useful to develop a path weighting algorithm that 
could be applied in a post-processing step using previous random path selection Latency 
results.  Further, where utility analysis fails in capturing adversary preferences, it shines 
for evaluating a decision maker’s own policy options.   
 The Latency tool produced clear results for future ROK fuel cycle development.  
A full scale commercial centrifuge uranium enrichment facility represented a much more 
significant Latency time reduction than either a pilot PUREX or pilot pyroprocessing 
facility.  However, any ROK fuel cycle facility development would shorten their Nuclear 
Weapons Latency.  Latency is just one factor of several for US policy makers to 
consider when evaluating options for ROK. 
 The Nuclear Weapons Latency tool provides clear and expressive results for 
policy makers.  The ROK analysis demonstrates how the Latency tool bounds expected 
proliferation. The results establish a window of time for policy action should ROK 
reconsider its non-proliferation commitments both before and after fuel cycle facility 
development.  The Latency results further create a baseline for IAEA safeguards 
timeliness goals based on the capabilities of the ROK.  As expected, the ROK Latency is 
clearly sensitive to the fuel cycle facilities.  As a result any such future facilities should 
be the focus of US non-proliferation policy in the ROK. 
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X.B. Future Work 
 
 Future development in the area of Nuclear Weapons Latency includes both 
further development of the Latency tool as well as extension of the application of 
Latency results and concepts to further characterize nuclear proliferation risk.  
Computational efficiency of the Latency tool would be improved by fully parallelizing 
the main Petri net function.  Implementation of a parallelized Latency tool on a multi-
processor cluster or supercomputer would greatly reduce computation time and enhance 
the ability of the tool to model greater proliferation detail.  It would also be beneficial to 
convert the Latency tool code from MATLAB to a stand-alone executable.  This step 
would eliminate any dependence on MATLAB for potential users and increase the tools 
portability.  Within the Petri net function of the tool, it may be beneficial to implement a 
permanent transition priority option for certain transitions over others, in addition to the 
existing random transition conflict resolution. 
 Further case studies of both historical and current proliferation are expected.  
Iranian proliferation activity and nuclear interest elsewhere in the Middle East provide 
relevant opportunities for analysis in an area of continued strategic importance.  Latency 
analyses can also be applied to analysis of vertical proliferation.  The networks simply 
need to be extended and the simulation ending marking altered.  Additionally, the 
Latency networks considered were highly specific.  It may be beneficial to create and 
analyze more general networks which would have broader application. 
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X.C. Policymaker Utility for Nuclear Weapons Latency, Nuclear Proliferation 
Risk, and Nuclear Proliferation Policy Decision Consequences 
 
 As opposed to proliferator pathway utility, decision maker utility for Latency 
time is something that can be readily evaluated.  Surveys could be developed and 
administered to policy makers to develop policy maker utility equations for proliferator 
latency.  Given this data, expected utilities determined for the nuclear weapons latency 
of different policy options could easily be determined.  This approach would serve as a 
technical support to the intuition of policy makers based on Latency. 
 An underlying motivation of latency development has been to further 
characterize proliferation risk.  Proliferation risk has been defined as  
 
𝑅 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑃𝑖𝐶𝑖𝐼𝑖=1  (12) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖 is the probability that a proliferator may choose to proliferate along path i, 𝑃𝑖 is 
the probability that the adversary will succeed to proliferate along the path i, and 𝐶𝑖 is 
the consequence of adversary proliferation from path i.117  Latency is a probability of a 
consequence.  Specifically, the cumulative Latency distribution is the conditional 
probability of the consequence, proliferation in 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, given a proliferation decision.  
From this interpretation, Latency could be directly applied or incorporated into a 
formulation of proliferation risk R. 
 162 
 
 If policy makers are choosing between two or more policy options, it may be 
easier to compare the decision makers’ expected utility for consequences of their policy 
choices, such as Latency, directly.  A specific state Latency that results from a policy 
decision is one of several consequences of policy options that may be of importance to 
policy makers.  Other consequences (some analogous to the previously developed 
pathway attributes) could include resultant deterrent composition (survivability, 
production rate, etc.), pathway safeguardability or proliferation resistance, economic 
benefits, and societal or cultural benefits.  It would be possible to characterize the 
probability of these policy option consequences just as the Latency tool characterized the 
proliferation time consequence.  It is likely that, at least initially, these probabilities 
should be left conditional on a proliferation decision.   
 Policy maker utility equations for all of these consequences, including latency, 
could be developed and aggregated through MAUA.  Alternatively all parameter 
quantities could be converted to U.S. dollars spent on U.S. foreign policy responses or 
gained from revenues generated.  Expanding and incorporating the Latency analysis and 
utility theory in this fashion could lead to an effective method for evaluating U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation policy options based on probability of nuclear proliferation 
consequences (akin to nuclear proliferation risk).  
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APPENDIX A: U.S. MANHATTAN PROJECT TIMELINE DATA 
 
Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
General      
Sachs delivers Einstein letter to 
Roosevelt 10/11/1939         
Roosevelt creates Advisory 
Committee on Uranium (Dr. 
Lyman Briggs, director Bureau 
of Standards, Lt. Col Adamson 
Army, Commander Hoover, 
Navy) 10/11/1939         
1st meeting of Advisory 
Committee on Uranium 10/21/1939         
U committee delivers 1st 
report 11/1/1939         
1st separation of U235/U238 2/28/1940 2/29/1940 1     
U-235 confirmed responsible 
for slow neutron fission at 
columbia cyclotron 3/1/1940         
Vannevar Bush/FDR create 
National Defense Research 
Council which absorbs 
Uranium Committee 6/12/1940         
Bush moves up to head new 
umbrella agency OSRD, Conant 
replaces him as head of NDRC 6/28/1941         
Bush recieves draft MAUD 
committee final report 7/15/1941         
MAUD report officially 
transmitted to Conant/OSRD 10/3/1941       Rhodes, p377 
Bush briefs Roosevelt on 
MAUD report (and US 
scientists opinions), Roosevelt 
directs Bush to "exploring 
thoroughly" if a bomb could be 
built 10/9/1941       Rhodes, p377 
3rd National Academies Report 11/1/1941         
Roosevelt approves 3rd NAS 
report, given to him by Bush 
on 11/27 11/27/1941 1/19/1942 53   Rhodes, p388 
Bomb program now Section-1 
of OSRD (research involvment 
of NDRC was over) 12/6/1941       Rhodes, p398 
Bush Report to Roosevelt ranks 
prospects for producing bomb: 
(1)EMIS, (2)Centrifuge, 
(3)Diffusion 3/9/1942       Rhodes, p406 
Roosevelt replies with support 
emphasizing time overr money 3/11/1942       Rhodes, p406 
Conant decides to pursue all: 
centrifuge, gdiff, EMIS, 
graphite, heavy water in the 
interest of time 5/23/1942       Rhodes, p406 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Bush/Roosevelt give 
production responsibilities 
jointly to Army & OSRD, 
Colonel James Marshall given 
responsibility, Marshall creates 
Manhattan Engineering District 6/27/1942       Rhodes, p412 
Bush reports to Sec of War 
that super is possible 8/29/1942       Rhodes p421 
Groves appointed run MED 
and given full control of 
project, bomb project 
consolidated under Army Corp 
of Engineers 9/17/1942       Rhodes p424 
Groves purchases 1250 tons of 
belgian Uoxide (65%) stored in 
NY 9/18/1942       Rhodes p427 
Groves acquires AAA priority 
rating from War Production 
Board 9/19/1942       Rhodes p427 
Groves purchases site X in 
Tennessee, 52,000 acres 9/19/1942       Rhodes p427 
Construction begins at Oak 
Ridge Jan-43       Rhodes p486 
Army accumulates 3700 tons 
of Uoxide from Congo Dec-44       Hewlett 291 
Army orders 700 tons Uoxide 
from US producer Dec-42       Hewlett 291 
Army accumulates 400 tons of 
U oxide from US & Canada Dec-44       Hewlett 291 
Total Army accumulation of 
almost 6000 tons Uoxide Dec-44       Hewlett 292 
Army has 3 U refineries for U 
purification 
summer 
1943         
Instead of more alpha tracks, 
Groves decides to build a 4th 
beta plant (higher enr) and a 
2nd gas diff plant (more lower 
enr stages) 3/15/1945       Rhodes 602 
Oak Ridge began sending HEU 
to LA early 1945         
            
            
            
            
            
            
          52.631579 
            
            
            
            
LTD Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Research 7/1/1940         
Design 7/1/1940 7/1/1941 365   Reed 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
UF6 prod method   10/1/1940 92     
Build mini-Lab Facility (12' 
columns) 
7/1/1940 6/1/1941 335     
Build Lab Facility (36' columns) 6/1/1941 9/1/1942 457     
Build Pilot Plant (14 48' col) july 1942 11/15/1942 137 
Label NRL/Anacostia 
48' columns as (full 
scale) lab facility 
 Groves vist NRL 9/21/1942         
Begin Pilot Operation 12/1/1942         
Groves vist NRL/Anacostia 12/10/1942         
Murphree letter to briggs, LTD 
as feeder for Gdiff idea 
1/25/1943         
Build 18 48' LTD col feb 1943 july 1943 150     
Operate 48' LTD col     1000 days     
column operation intervals 
(500 hrs = 21 days) 
    21   Reed 171 
Send 236 lbs of slightly enr UF6 
to metlab 
sept 1943         
Decision to build Phili 
pilot/small Plant (300 48' col, 
initially 100) 
11/17/1943     Phili plant sent 5000 lbs .86 wt % UF6 to 
Oak Ridge during war 
Build Phili pilot/small Plant 1/1/1944 7/15/1944 196 
Operate phili pilot plant 7/15/1944 8/1/1945 382 
Phili plant operated for another year, but 
this is end of war operation 
Oppenheimer 'alerts' Groves of 
LTD work 
4/28/1944     
Groves decides to build S-50 
plant 
6/24/1944     
Build S-50 (break ground) in 21 
racks of 102 columns 
7/6/1944 10/11/1944 97 Probably begin "build" phase with decision 
and not ground breaking 
1 rack completed   10/18/1944   
S-50/1 rack operation 10/18/1944 9/9/1945 326 
S-50 personell were trained at Phili 
10 racks completed   1/15/1945   
Operate S-50   9/9/1945       
10.5 lbs U @ .85 wt% 10/18/1944 10/31/1944 13     
K-25 starts producing 1.1wt%, 
so LTD sends all its product to 
feed K-25 instead of to Alpha I 
tracks 
4/1/1945       Jones 169 
12,730 lbs U .85 wt% 6/1/1945 6/30/1945 29     
45000 lbs U .85 wt% 10/18/1944 7/31/1945       
56,500 lbs U .85 wt% 10/18/1944 9/9/1945 326     
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
all 21 racks S-50 enriching 3/15/1945 9/9/1945 178   
Rhodes 602, Reed 
178 
  
from Jones 
182 
        
            
.852 wt% U-235 
Production 
[lbs] 
kg Month     
  10.5 4.762716 October     
  171.8 77.9271056 November     
  20 9.07184 December     
0 765 346.99788 January 
there was some production in Jan (Jones 
182), value shown is extrapolated down 
from feb/June 
assume linear ramp up 3158 1432.443536 February   Jones 182 
2 5551 2517.889192 March     
3 7944 3603.334848 April     
4 10337 4688.780504 May 
 
  
  12,730 5774.22616 June 
 
  
390 11,500 5216.308 July     
m b   August     
2393 765         
sum 52187.3 23671.74178       
sum to july 40687.3 18455.43378       
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
Gas Diffusion           
Dunning begins research on 
Gas Diffusion Nov 1940       Rhodes, p380 
Dunning enriched a 
measurable amount of U 
w/Gas Diff Nov 1941       Rhodes, p381 
Detailed K-25 plant design 
estimates   Dec-42     
Hewlett p123, says 
"by the end of 
1942, Cohen had 
completed more 
detailed 
calculations" 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Norris-Adler most promising 
type of barrier   Dec-42     Hewlett 126 
Kellex completed plot plan of 
K-25   Mar-43     Hewlett p123 
Build Barrier production pilot 
plant  Jan-43 Jul-43 181   
Hewlett p127, 
Rhodes 494 
Build full scale barrier 
production plant Apr-43 Oct-43 
guesstimate 
on end   Rhodes 494 
Survey party arrives to Build 
coal-fired power plant to run 
K-25 gas diffusion plant 5/31/1943       Hewlett 130 
Ground grading for power 
plant 6/2/1943       Hewlett 130 
            
Groves cut plans for K-25, limit 
to production of .50 U-235, 
eliminate top portion of 
production cascade, ASSUME 
this finishes design of K-25 8/13/1943       Hewlett 129 
Break ground for main K-25 
process buildings Sep-43       Hewlett 130 
New sufficient barrier design 
finished (kellex) Oct-43       Hewlett 133 
Groves decides to strip old 
process from barrier 
production plant and install 
new kellex barrier production 
system 1/16/1944       Hewlett 138 
Setup a new (and retask old) 
pilot nickel(kellex) barrier 
production plants, significant 
production of kellex barriers 
from pilot plants began in May Jan-44 Apr-44 91   Hewlett 139 
Convert H&H barrier 
production plant to 
kellex/nickel method Feb-44 Jun-44 121   hewlett 140 
Satisfactory barriers start 
arriving at K-25 Jan-45       Rhodes 601 
First stage of K-25 charge with 
UF6 1/20/1945       Rhodes 602 
First operation of units on 
regular process gas Feb-45       Jones 168 
Case 1 finished   3/24/1945     Jones 169 
Case 2 Finished   4/24/1945     
USDoI 
p10???(checkagain) 
K-25/Case 1(inferred from 
source) begins producing 1.1% 
U-235 which is sent Alpha 
tracks for further ENR Apr-45       Jones 169 
Cases I&II yielding product @ 
1% U-235   5/1/1945     Jones 169 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Case 3 finished   5/24/1945   
Cases 2-4 added at ~ 
a case per month   
Case 4 Finished   6/24/1945       
Case 5 Finished   7/24/1945       
link full plant cascade    8/15/1945   
23%: after full plant 
cascade went on 
stream product 
concentration 
increased to 23% Jones 169 
K-25 has 100,000 kg SWU/year   
End of War 
1945     Laughter 5 
k-25 delivers product at 30 wt 
% U-235 to Beta Tracks   Aug-45   
DO NOT USE, USE 
Jones above DoI p10 
K-25=2892 converter stages, 
~6 converter stages/cell, cell = 
basic process unit         Jones 158 
482 cells in K-25         
207.4688797 SWU/cell/yr         
Case 1 = 402 Stages 67 cells     Jones 164 
assume Case 2 = 4*Case1, 
Case3=1.5*Case1, Case 
4=0.5*Case1           
Plan: Case 1 = .9 wt %, Case 2 = 
5 wt %, Case            
            
Centrifuge           
Urey (isotope separation head 
for S-1 Ur Com) contracts 
Westinghouse to build 
prototype Centrifuge Oct 1941       Rhodes, p 380 
Westinghouse/Beam(UVA) 
build prototypes   Aug-43     Kemp 2 
Urey terminates Centrifuge 
program after failed testing 12/31/1943       Kemp 2 
Zippe leaves USSR with 
knowledge of working 
centrifuge design    Jul-56     Kemp3 
            
EMIS           
Lawrence installs 180 degree 
mass spec in Berkeley 37" 
cyclotron Late 1941 12/1/1941       
Lawrence operates initial mass 
spec to produce 100 ug of U-
235 
a month 
later       Rhodes p487 
Calutron design spring 1942 
summer 
1942 90   Rhodes p488 
  Mar-42 Aug-42       
Build 1st alpha race track (5 
alpha tracks approved to be 
built) 2/18/1943 10/25/1943 249   Rhodes p490-491 
Groves authorizes 2 beta 
tracks, beta design finalized & 
alpha 1 design finalized 3/17/1943       
Rhodes p490 , 
Hewlett 151 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Groves authorizes 4 more 
alpha tracks & corresponding 
beta tracks Aug-43       Rhodes p491 
Complete 2nd alpha race track   1/15/1944     Rhodes p492 
Start up Betas 5 & 6 5/22/1944 11/22/1944     Hewlett 299 
1st 5 alpha tracks in op & 1st 2 
betas in op Jun-44       Jones 142 
2 beta tracks complete Jul-44       Jones 142 
four alpha tracks in operation Jul-44       Hewlett 167 
100g/day of 10% U-235 from 
alpha tracks Sep-44       Rhodes 600 
Beta Output 40 g/day Nov-44       Rhodes 601 
Beta Output 90 g/day Dec-44       Rhodes 601 
All 9 Alphas & 3 Beta Tracks in 
production (Betas 4-6 in 
operation, but not production) 12/15/1944       Hewlett 299 
85% of 864 Alpha Tanks => 258 
g/day 10% U-235, 36 Beta 
Tanks => 204 g/day 80 % U-235 Jan-45       Rhodes 601 
Training of operators (mostly 
from unskilled background) Aug-43       Jones 141 
1800 operator trainees   Sep-43     Jones 142 
2500 operators necessary for 5 
Alpha 1 racetracks         Jones 142 
Tennessee Eastman (operating 
firm) payroll 10,000 employees   early 1944     Jones 142 
Tennessee Eastman (operating 
firm) payroll 25,000 employees   mid-1945     Jones 142 
Alpha track shutdown: 88 kgs 
84.5 % U-235 from Alpha 
racetracks (shutdown early 
sept 1945)   Sep-45     Jones 148 
Beta Tracks shutdown: 
additonal 953 kgs 95% U-235 
produced   Dec-45     Jones 148 
last 2 beta tracks went into 
operation in Nov & Dec         Hewlett 625 
USE FOR BETA (BELOW)           
Bring Beta 1 into Operation 487         
Bring Beta 2 into Operation 517         
Bring Beta 3 into Operation 731         
Bring Beta 4 into Operation 761         
Bring Beta 5 into Operation 791         
Bring Beta 6 into Operation 821         
            
Reliable U metal fab Process 1941       Hewlett 209 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
            
Pu           
Seaborg begins experiments to 
find Pu 9/1/1940         
Seaborg isolates Pu 2/24/1941         
Seaborg discovers Pu is 
fissionable with slow neutrons 3/28/1941         
Washington U. begins 
cyclotron irradiation of 300 lbs 
of U-nitrate-hexahydrate 6/17/1942 7/27/1942 40   Rhodes, p410 
300 lbs of UNH arrive in 
Chicago for Seaborg 7/27/1942       Rhodes p 413 
Chemists under Seaborg 
isolate pure Pu for first time 8/20/1942       Rhodes p414 
Design PhosphateBismuth 
extraction method, greenewalt 
picked PhBis on this date   May-43     Gosling 35 
Remote operators train at 
DuPont, Oak Ridge & mokcups 
at Hanford Fall 1944         
install process equipment in 
221 buildings Oct-44 Dec-44 61   Rhodes 604 
Build 221T Jan-44 9/15/1944 258   Hewlett 220,221 
install eq in 221 T     47     
installation complete, begin 
testing in 221T   11/1/1944     Hewlett 309 
Testing in 221T     55     
Build 221U Jan-44 Dec-44 335   Hewlett221 
Build 221B Apr-44 Mar-45 334   Hewlett221 
Build Concetration Building 
(224 T,U,B) Feb-44       Hewlett221 
224 T & U Finished   10/8/1944 250   Hewlett222 
224 B finished   2/10/1945 375   Hewlett222 
1st processing of irradiated 
slugs at 221-T sept Plant (-pile 
slugs)  12/26/1944 1/5/1945 10   
Rhodes 
604/Hewlett 309 
221 T & 221 U complete   12/15/1944     Gosling 76 
Build Isolation building 231W 4/8/1944 12/20/1944     Hewlett 222  
eq installation in isolation 
building 231 complete   1/20/1945     hewlett 309 
1st purified Pu produced at 
hanford   1/31/1945     hewlett 309 
221-T Pu recovery rates 
improved to 90% from initial 
runs at 60-70% feb-1945       rhodes 604  
1st small sample of hanford Pu 
arrives at LA 2/2/1945       hewlett 310 
221 B Complete   Spring 1945     Gosling 76 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
enough Pu for trinity & fatman 
are sent from hanford 6/15/1945       Thayer, 141 
            
Graphite Reactor           
$6K to fermi for graphite 2/1/1940         
Fermi conducts graphite 
absorption experiments april 1940         
Fermi's 1st pile, k=.87 Sept 1941       Rhodes, p400 
Fermi's 2nd pile,k= .918, 
Allison Chicago pile k=.94 April 1942       Rhodes, p401 
Decision to build experimental 
pile in Oak Ridge & pilot 
separation facility 1/15/1943       Hewlett 207 
Design experimental pile   4/27/1943 102   Hewlett 208 
            
            
Engineering council for 
reactors discusses full scale 
pile cooling options June 1942       Rhodes p411 
Fermi begins planning full 
chain reacting pile, CP-1 
Chicago Pile 1 may 1942       Rhodes p428 
Groves has DuPont take over 
contract for full scale 
production 11/11/1942       Rhodes p432 
Build CP-1 11/16/1942 12/1/1942 15   Rhodes p433 
CP-1 goes critical 12/2/1942       Rhodes p436 
Groves decides reactor 
location can't be at Oak Ridge 12/14/1942       Rhodes p496 
Groves buys Hanford site for 
Pu production 1/21/1943       Rhodes 497 
Dupont starts CX on 1st 
buildings for x-10/Clinton 2/2/1943       Hewlett 207 
Design Choice for production 
plant (water cooled) made, 
decides for 3 water cooled 
piles at Hanford, Construction 
can now begin 2/15/1943       Rhodes 498 
decision to build water cooled 
piles allowed to reduce # of 
piles to 3 and general Hanford 
arrangement emerged 3/30/1943       hewlett 215 
Build x-10 pilot separation 
plant 3/7/1943 8/1/1943     Hewlett 208 
Begin Stacking Graphite in x-10 
building   9/1/1943     Hewlett 208 
Build graphite fab plant (x-10) 3/25/1943 5/25/1943 61   Hewlett 208 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Dupont begins Hanford CX, 
USE THIS as when design initial 
hanford fires/build initial 
hanford is enabled 4/1/1943       hewlett 215 
Build x-10 facility pilot reactor 4/27/1943 10/25/1943 181   Hewlett 208/211 
Alcoa begins fuel fabrication 
(slug canning) for x-10, without 
refined process slug canning is 
substandard 6/14/1943       Hewlett 209 
Refined x-10 slug canning 
process equipment installed in 
Alcoa canning plant, x-10 slug 
canning begins in ernest 10/15/1943       hewlett 210 
1st engineering drawings for 
hanford piles released by 
dupont   10/4/1943     Hewlett 216 
Build Hanford slug production 
facility 313 5/1/1943 1/1/1944     Hewlett 224 
Dupont begins Hanford slug 
canning research 10/17/1943       Hewlett 223 
Build 1st pile 100-B 10/10/1943 9/13/1944 339   
Rhodes 499/557, 
hewlett 216 
begin loading slugs into x-10 11/3/1943       hewlett 211 
Initial operation of x-10 11/4/1943 Mar-44 118     
pilot separation plant 
operation (test) dec 1943 12/30/1943 29 
first small sample of 
Pu sent to chicago 
for analysis Hewlett 211 
second loading of x-10 3/1/1944         
Transfer all Hanford-pile slug 
canning research/operations 
to Hanford march 1944       Hewlett 225 
1st experimental canning 
operation started at hanford 
building 313 3/20/1944       hewlett 225 
1st true slug canning 
production line started in 313 5/11/1944       hewlett 226 
Build D-pile Nov-43 Dec-44 396   
DOE/RL-97-1047 
p2-3.5 
Build F-pile Dec-43 Feb-45 428   
DOE/RL-97-1047 
p2-3.5 
produce 1st core load of pile 
slugs     125     
Load B-pile 9/13/1944 9/26/1944 13   Rhodes 557 
B-pile goes critical/begins 
operation 9/26/1944 9/29/1944 3   Rhodes 559 
Xenon FP poison 
discovery/redesign of reactors 9/29/1944 10/2/1944 3   Rhodes 559 
Dpile goes critical/begins 
operation 12/17/1944       Rhodes 560 
B-pile restarted after redesign 12/28/1944       Rhodes 560 
F-pile startup/goes critical 2/25/1945       Thayer 141 
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Weapon Design           
Oppenheimer gathered the 
"luminaries" together at 
berkeley 7/1/1942 7/31/1942   summer(july) 1942 Rhodes p415-16 
Teller/Bethe state 'super' 
fusion bomb is possible, begin 
theoretical work july 1942       Rhodes p417 
Groves Appoints Oppenheimer 
as head of central weapons 
design lab 10/15/1942       Rhodes p449 
Los Alamos purchased as lab 
site 11/21/1942       Rhodes p451 
Introductory lectures at Los 
Alamos(sante fe) Apr-43       Rhodes p460 
Most of technical staff had 
arrived at Los Alamos 
mid-april 
1943       Rhodes p465 
Los Alamos review committee 
recommends: investigate 
thermonuclear bomb with 
secondary priority, 
subordinate to fission bomb, 
work on chemical purification 
of Pu, begin ordnance work 
immediately before nuclear 
physics work is complete 5/10/1943       Rhodes p476 
Implosion work begins-
Neddermeyer 7/4/1943       Rhodes p479 
Modifications/retrofit/redesign 
of B-29 for thin man & fat man 11/29/1943         
Gun-1st gun test shot 9/17/1943       Rhodes p541 
Weapon Test planning Mar-44       Rhodes 571 
Implosion lense development 
winter 
1943-1944       Rhodes 575 
            
Selected initiator design 5/1/1945       Rhodes 580 
Experimental implosion agrees 
with theory 4/11/1945         
Frisch reports U-235 criticality 
(Dragon) exp results to 
Oppenheimer, mass of little 
boy known, assume little boy 
design complete 4/13/1945       Rhodes 614 
iniator design finalized 5/1/1945       Rhodes 580 
Pu criticality experiments begin 5/31/1945       Rhodes 654 
Core design (Christy gadget) 6/24/1945       Rhodes 654 
Fabrication of explosive lenses Jun-45 7/10/1945 39   Rhodes 655-656 
Assembly of Trinity and cold 
mockup explosives 7/12/1945 7/12/1945 0   Rhodes 658 
mating of trinity with core 7/13/1945       Rhodes 659 
Creutz cold test 7/14/1945         
Trinity Test 7/16/1945       Rhodes 
            
Delivery           
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Begin  End Time [d] Notes Source 
Delivery-Navy Captain William 
S. Parsons arrives to head 
Ordnance Division at Los 
Alamos Jun-43       Rhodes p477 
Delivery-Ramsey (group leader 
delivery) contacts USAF about 
delivery with potential bomb 
specs, learns B-29 is only 
aircraft that can carry Jun-43       Rhodes p478 
Delivery-scaled flight tests 
begin with a bomb mockup 8/13/1943       Rhodes p479 
1st full dummy (thin man) test 
drop 3/3/1944       Rhodes 582 
Modifications on 17 more B-29 Aug-44       Rhodes 582 
Pumpkin/Blockbuster fat man 
training program Dec-44 7/1/1945     Rhodes 590 
            
Test           
Site Selection Mar-44 May-44     Rhodes 652 
Site planning & preparation 
"end of Feb", "bomb physics 
well in hand by then" 2/28/1945       Rhodes 652 
diagnostics check, practice 
chemical explosion w/hot 
hanford slugs 5/6/1945 5/7/1945     Rhodes 654 
            
Little boy minus core sent from 
ABQ 7/14/1945       Rhodes 662 
            
Finish (re)processing metal for 
part of target and almost all of 
projectile (U-235) 7/1/1945       hewlett 375 
about 50 kgs U-235 
reprocessed & cast 7/1/1945       LAMS-266 
Finish casting U metal (rings) 
completing fabrication of 
Littleboy 7/24/1945       
Rhodes 691, 
hewlett 380 
Mass LB = 64.15 kg         
Coster-Mullen 
(Sublette) 
Mass Pu FM = 6.2kg (pu 
gallium alloy, 3 % molar 
gallium or .8% by weight)         
Coster-Mullen 
(Sublette) 
            
3 pairs of hemispheres 
fabricated out of delta phas 
alloys 7/1/1945       LAMS-266 p18 
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APPENDIX B: U.S. S-50 LIQUID THERMAL DIFFUSION PETRI NET DATA 
Detailed 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate S-50 Rack 21 1 
2 Operate S-50 Rack 20 1 
3 Operate S-50 Rack 19 1 
4 Operate S-50 Rack 18 1 
5 Operate S-50 Rack 17 1 
6 Operate S-50 Rack 16 1 
7 Operate S-50 Rack 15 1 
8 Operate S-50 Rack 14 1 
9 Operate S-50 Rack 13 1 
10 Operate S-50 Rack 12 1 
11 Operate S-50 Rack 11 1 
12 Operate S-50 Rack 10 1 
13 Operate S-50 Rack 9 1 
14 Operate S-50 Rack 8 1 
15 Operate S-50 Rack 7 1 
16 Operate S-50 Rack 6 1 
17 Operate S-50 Rack 5 1 
18 Operate S-50 Rack 4 1 
19 Operate S-50 Rack 3 1 
20 Operate S-50 Rack 2 1 
21 Operate S-50 Rack 1 1 
22 Build 1 Rack S-50 7 
23 Build S-50 Complex 97 
24 Decide for S-50 175 
25 Build Pilot LTD 196 
26 Design Pilot LTD 45 
27 Operate Lab LTD 367 
28 Build Lab LTD 137 
29 Design Lab LTD 163 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 .85 wt% Enriched U 0 20420 
2 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
3 S-50 Racks 0 0 
4 S-50 Complex 0 0 
5 S-50 Decision 0 0 
6 Pilot LTD Design 0 0 
7 Pilot LTD 0 0 
8 Lab LTD Facility 0 0 
9 Tested Lab LTD design 0 0 
10 LTD R&D 1 0 
11 Lab LTD Design 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T7 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Medium 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate S-50 Rack 21 1 
2 Operate S-50 Rack 20 1 
3 Operate S-50 Rack 19 1 
4 Operate S-50 Rack 18 1 
5 Operate S-50 Rack 17 1 
6 Operate S-50 Rack 16 1 
7 Operate S-50 Rack 15 1 
8 Operate S-50 Rack 14 1 
9 Operate S-50 Rack 13 1 
10 Operate S-50 Rack 12 1 
11 Operate S-50 Rack 11 1 
12 Operate S-50 Rack 10 1 
13 Operate S-50 Rack 9 1 
14 Operate S-50 Rack 8 1 
15 Operate S-50 Rack 7 1 
16 Operate S-50 Rack 6 1 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
17 Operate S-50 Rack 5 1 
18 Operate S-50 Rack 4 1 
19 Operate S-50 Rack 3 1 
20 Operate S-50 Rack 2 1 
21 Operate S-50 Rack 1 1 
22 Build 1 Rack S-50 7 
23 Build S-50 Complex 272 
24 Design Pilot LTD 412 
25 Build Lab LTD 300 
 
Number Places 
1 .85 wt% U 
2 Nat U 
3 S-50 Racks 
4 S-50 Complex 
5 Pilot LTD Design 
6 Lab LTD Facility 
7 LTD R&D 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
T1 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
 196 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
T17 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
T1 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T2 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T3 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T5 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T10 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T11 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T12 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T13 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T14 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T15 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T18 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T19 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T20 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T21 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Coarse 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate S-50 Rack 21 1 
2 Operate S-50 Rack 20 1 
3 Operate S-50 Rack 19 1 
4 Operate S-50 Rack 18 1 
5 Operate S-50 Rack 17 1 
6 Operate S-50 Rack 16 1 
7 Operate S-50 Rack 15 1 
8 Operate S-50 Rack 14 1 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
9 Operate S-50 Rack 13 1 
10 Operate S-50 Rack 12 1 
11 Operate S-50 Rack 11 1 
12 Operate S-50 Rack 10 1 
13 Operate S-50 Rack 9 1 
14 Operate S-50 Rack 8 1 
15 Operate S-50 Rack 7 1 
16 Operate S-50 Rack 6 1 
17 Operate S-50 Rack 5 1 
18 Operate S-50 Rack 4 1 
19 Operate S-50 Rack 3 1 
20 Operate S-50 Rack 2 1 
21 Operate S-50 Rack 1 1 
22 Build 1 Rack S-50 7 
23 Build S-50 Complex 984 
 
Number Places 
1 .85 wt% U 
2 Nat U 
3 S-50 Racks 
4 S-50 Complex 
5 LTD R&D 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
T1 0 8 1 0 0 
T2 0 8 1 0 0 
T3 0 8 1 0 0 
T4 0 8 1 0 0 
T5 0 8 1 0 0 
T6 0 8 1 0 0 
T7 0 8 1 0 0 
T8 0 8 1 0 0 
T9 0 8 1 0 0 
T10 0 8 1 0 0 
T11 0 8 1 0 0 
T12 0 8 1 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
T13 0 8 1 0 0 
T14 0 8 1 0 0 
T15 0 8 1 0 0 
T16 0 8 1 0 0 
T17 0 8 1 0 0 
T18 0 8 1 0 0 
T19 0 8 1 0 0 
T20 0 8 1 0 0 
T21 0 8 1 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
T1 5 0 1 0 0 
T2 5 0 1 0 0 
T3 5 0 1 0 0 
T4 5 0 1 0 0 
T5 5 0 1 0 0 
T6 5 0 1 0 0 
T7 5 0 1 0 0 
T8 5 0 1 0 0 
T9 5 0 1 0 0 
T10 5 0 1 0 0 
T11 5 0 1 0 0 
T12 5 0 1 0 0 
T13 5 0 1 0 0 
T14 5 0 1 0 0 
T15 5 0 1 0 0 
T16 5 0 1 0 0 
T17 5 0 1 0 0 
T18 5 0 1 0 0 
T19 5 0 1 0 0 
T20 5 0 1 0 0 
T21 5 0 1 0 0 
T22 0 0 1 1 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 21 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX C: U.S. K-25 GASEOUS DIFFUSION PETRI NET DATA  
Detailed 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate 5 linked K-25 Units for 80 wt% U-235 1 
2 Operate 5 linked K-25 units 1 
3 Link 4th & 5th K-25 Units to plant 22 
4 Operate 3 linked K-25 units 1 
5 Link 3 units of K-25 29 
6 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 2 1 
7 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 1 1 
8 Complete 1 K-25 Unit 31 
9 Install barriers, test, and train 51 
10 Build K-25 support facilities 91 
11 Build main K-25 buildings 488 
12 Produce Barriers 214 
13 Install new barrier process in full scale barrier plant 61 
14 Remove old barrier process from full scale barrier plant 60 
15 Decide to use new barrier 123 
16 Re-purpose Pilot barrier plant 60 
17 Build Full scale barrier plant 206 
18 Layout K-25 Site 93 
19 Finish K-25 Design 184 
20 Re-design barrier 304 
21 Build barrier pilot plant 181 
22 Decide to build full scale barrier plant 121 
23 Make K-25 Plot Plan 406 
24 Design Prototype Barrier 316 
 
Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 80 wt% U 0 0 
2 Full Plant K-25 Experience 0 0 
3 23 wt% U 0 0 
4 Operational K-25 Units 0 0 
5 # K-25 Units in operation (block 1 unit operation) 0 0 
6 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 0 0 
7 Operational linked K-25 Units  0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
8 .85 wt% U 1.00E+09 0 
9 7 wt% U 0 210 
10 1.1wt% U 0 0 
11 Tested Equipment in K-25 Buildings 0 0 
12 K-25 support facilities 0 0 
13 K-25 main buildings 0 0 
14 Barriers 0 0 
15 Operational Full scale barrier plant 0 0 
16 Stripped full scale barrier plant 0 0 
17 Decision to use new barrier 0 0 
18 Pilot barrier plant for new design 0 0 
19 Full scale barrier plant 0 0 
20 K-25 Site Layout 0 0 
21 K-25 Design 0 0 
22 Redesigned barrier design 0 0 
23 Pilot barrier plant 0 0 
24 Decision to build full scale barrier plant 0 0 
25 K-25 Plot Plan 0 0 
26 Prototype Barrier 0 0 
27 Diffusion R&D 2 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 1 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Medium 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate 5 linked K-25 Units for 80 wt% U-235 1 
2 Operate 5 linked K-25 units 1 
3 Link 4th & 5th K-25 Units to plant 22 
4 Operate 3 linked K-25 units 1 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
5 Link 3 units of K-25 29 
6 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 2 1 
7 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 1 1 
8 Complete 1 K-25 Unit 31 
9 Install barriers, test, and train 51 
10 Build K-25 support facilities 184 
11 Build main K-25 buildings 488 
12 Produce Barriers 214 
13 Install new barrier process in full scale barrier plant 61 
14 Remove old barrier process from full scale barrier plant 60 
15 Decide to use new barrier 427 
16 Re-purpose Pilot barrier plant 60 
17 Build Full scale barrier plant 327 
18 Finish K-25 Design 184 
19 Build barrier pilot plant 181 
20 Make K-25 Plot Plan 406 
21 Design Prototype Barrier 316 
 
Number Places 
1 80 wt% U 
2 Full Plant K-25 Experience 
3 23 wt% U 
4 Operational K-25 Units 
5 # K-25 Units in operation (block 1 unit operation) 
6 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 
7 Operational linked K-25 Units  
8 .85 wt% U 
9 7 wt% U 
10 1.1 wt% U 
11 Tested Equipment in K-25 Buildings 
12 K-25 support facilities 
13 K-25 main buildings 
14 Barriers 
15 Operational Full scale barrier plant 
16 Stripped full scale barrier plant 
17 Decision to use new barrier 
18 Pilot barrier plant for new design 
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Number Places 
19 Full scale barrier plant 
20 K-25 Design 
21 Pilot barrier plant 
22 K-25 Plot Plan 
23 Prototype Barrier 
24 Diffusion R&D 
 
 D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 126 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 126 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D-  P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D-  P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 1 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
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Coarse 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate 5 linked K-25 Units for 80 wt% U-235 1 
2 Operate 5 linked K-25 units 1 
3 Link 4th & 5th K-25 Units to plant 22 
4 Operate 3 linked K-25 units 1 
5 Link 3 units of K-25 29 
6 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 2 1 
7 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 1 1 
8 Complete 1 K-25 Unit 31 
9 Produce Barriers, build K-25, Install barriers, test, and train 1129 
 
Number Places 
1 80 wt% U 
2 Full Plant K-25 Experience 
3 23 wt% U 
4 Operational K-25 Units 
5 # K-25 Units in operation (block 1 unit operation) 
6 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 
7 Operational linked K-25 Units  
8 .85 wt% U 
9 7 wt% U 
10 1.1 wt% U 
11 Tested Equipment in K-25 Buildings 
12 Diffusion R&D 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 126 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 126 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 1 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 86 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX D: U.S. Y-12 EMIS PETRI NET DATA 
Detailed: Note Transitions 1-6 and Places 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 do not occur in the full 
network as they represent available products from other US materials production 
streams. 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate Linked K-25 1 
2 Enable Linked K-25 1238 
3 Operate K-25 1 
4 Enable K-25 1168 
5 Operate S-50 1 
6 Enable S-50 1092 
7 Operate Beta 6 5 
8 Operate Beta 5 5 
9 Operate Beta 4 5 
10 Operate Beta 3 5 
11 Complete Beta 6 821 
12 Complete Beta 5 791 
13 Complete Beta 4 761 
14 Complete Beta 3 731 
15 Build Lab Scale EMIS 41 
16 Design Calutron 153 
17 Operate Beta 2 5 
18 Operate Beta 1 5 
19 Operate 9 Alphas on 7wt% U 1 
20 Operate 9 Alphas on .85wt% U 1 
21 Operate 9 Alphas on Nat U 1 
22 Complete Beta 2 517 
23 Complete Beta 1 487 
24 Operate 9 Alphas on 1.1wt% U 1 
25 Design Beta 169 
26 Build & Test 9 Alphas 652 
27 Decide to Build Beta 27 
28 Design Alpha 201 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 Linked K-25 Work 1 0 
2 K-25 Work 1 0 
3 S-50 Work 1 0 
4 7 wt% U 0 0 
5 Linked K-25 Enabled 0 0 
6 1.1 wt% U 0 0 
7 K-25 Enabled 0 0 
8 .85 wt% U 0 0 
 
9 
S-50 Enabled 0 0 
10 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 0 0 
11 EMIS R&D 1 0 
12 Lab Scale EMIS 0 0 
13 80 wt% U 0 66 
14 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
15 Operational Betas 0 0 
16 10 wt% U 0 0 
17 Beta Design 0 0 
18 9 Operational Alphas 0 0 
19 Decision to build Beta 0 0 
20 Alpha Design 0 0 
21 Calutron Design 0 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 217 
 
D- P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 85 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 1 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T17 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 
T21 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T13 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Medium 
Number Transitions Ref Time 
1 Operate Linked K-25 1 
2 Enable Linked K-25 1238 
3 Operate K-25 1 
4 Enable K-25 1168 
5 Operate S-50 1 
6 Enable S-50 1092 
7 Operate Beta 6 5 
8 Operate Beta 5 5 
9 Operate Beta 4 5 
10 Operate Beta 3 5 
11 Complete Beta 6 821 
12 Complete Beta 5 791 
13 Complete Beta 4 761 
14 Complete Beta 3 731 
15 Design Calutron 194 
16 Operate Beta 2 5 
17 Operate Beta 1 5 
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Number Transitions Ref Time 
18 Operate 9 Alphas on 7wt% U 1 
19 Operate 9 Alphas on .85wt% U 1 
20 Operate 9 Alphas on Nat U 1 
21 Complete Beta 2 517 
22 Complete Beta 1 487 
23 Operate 9 Alphas on 1.1wt% U 1 
24 Design Beta 196 
25 Build & Test 9 Alphas 652 
26 Design Alpha 201 
 
Number Places 
1 Linked K-25 Work 
2 K-25 Work 
3 S-50 Work 
4 7 wt% U 
5 Linked K-25 Enabled 
6 1.1 wt% U 
7 K-25 Enabled 
8 .85 wt% U 
9 S-50 Enabled 
10 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 
11 EMIS R&D 
12 80 wt% U 
13 Nat U 
14 Operational Betas 
15 10 wt% U 
16 Beta Design 
17 9 Operational Alphas 
18 Alpha Design 
19 Calutron Design 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 85 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T19 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coarse 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate Linked K-25 1 
2 Enable Linked K-25 1238 
3 Operate K-25 1 
4 Enable K-25 1168 
5 Operate S-50 1 
6 Enable S-50 1092 
7 Operate Beta 6 5 
8 Operate Beta 5 5 
9 Operate Beta 4 5 
10 Operate Beta 3 5 
11 Complete Beta 6 821 
12 Complete Beta 5 791 
13 Complete Beta 4 761 
14 Complete Beta 3 731 
15 Operate Beta 2 5 
16 Operate Beta 1 5 
17 Operate 9 Alphas on 7wt% U 1 
18 Operate 9 Alphas on .85wt% U 1 
19 Operate 9 Alphas on Nat U 1 
20 Complete Beta 2 517 
21 Complete Beta 1 487 
22 Operate 9 Alphas on 1.1wt% U 1 
23 Design Beta 196 
24 Build & Test 9 Alphas 652 
25 Design Alpha 395 
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Number Places 
1 Linked K-25 Work 
2 K-25 Work 
3 S-50 Work 
4 7 wt% U 
5 Linked K-25 Enabled 
6 1.1 wt% U 
7 K-25 Enabled 
8 .85 wt% U 
9 S-50 Enabled 
10 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 
11 EMIS R&D 
12 80 wt% U 
13 Nat U 
14 Operational Betas 
15 10 wt% U 
16 Beta Design 
17 9 Operational Alphas 
18 Alpha Design 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 85 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 27 0 27 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX E: U.S. W & X PU PRODUCTION PETRI NET DATA 
Detailed 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Isolate Pu 5 
2 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 3 15 
3 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 2 15 
4 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 1 15 
5 Initiate normal process in 221 facility without testing 1 
6 Test process in 221 facility 55 
7 Install 221 facility equipment 47 
8 Finish building 221 facility 3 179 
9 Finish building 221 facility 1 179 
10 Finish building 221 facility 2 179 
11 Build preliminary 221 facility structures 90 
12 Build 231 W isolation facility 287 
13 Design 231 W isolation process 100 
14 Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 
15 Unload/Reload Pile 3 1 
16 Unload/Reload Pile 2 1 
17 Unload/Reload Pile 1 1 
18 Operate Pile 3 21 
19 Operate Pile 2 21 
20 Operate Pile 1 21 
21 Pile 3 is fully loaded 1 
22 Pile 2 is fully loaded 1 
23 Pile 1 is fully loaded 1 
24 Load 1 unit Pile 3 1 
25 Load 1 unit Pile 2 1 
26 Load 1 unit Pile 1 1 
27 Finish Building Pile 3 393 
28 Finish Building Pile 2 393 
29 Finish Building Pile 1 393 
30 Produce Hanford fuel slugs 1 
31 Install & Test canning process equipment in fuel slug fabrication facility 52 
32 Design Hanford Fuel slug canning process 157 
33 Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 245 
34 Build Preliminary Pile Structures 30 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
35 Finalize Design for Hanford Pile 192 
36 Operate X-10 31 
37 Load X-10 with fuel 1 
38 Produce canned X-10 fuel slugs 19 
39 Finish Building X-10 54 
40 Design X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 171 
41 Build Primary X-10 Structures 127 
42 Reprocess X-10 Slugs 25 
43 Build Preliminary Hanford Structures 30 
44 Decide to use Ph-Bi separation process 69 
45 Finish building pilot separation plant 78 
46 Build primary pilot separation plant structures 69 
47 Design preliminary pilot separation plant 45 
48 Design Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant 70 
49 Design X-10 96 
50 Build Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 84 
51 Produce X-10 Graphite 99 
52 Design Clinton/X-10 site 12 
53 Build X-10 Graphite Production Plant 61 
54 Design Graphite Production Plant for X-10 101 
55 Site Selection for Pilot & Production facilities 38 
56 Operate Lab Rx 12 
57 Build Lab Rx 15 
58 Design Pu Separation processes 412 
59 Design Lab Rx & Develop Materials Capability 301 
 
Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 Desired # of Build Preliminary Pile Structures 3 0 
2 Desired # Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 1 0 
3 Hanford Pile fresh fuel slugs 0 0 
4 Desired # of Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 0 
5 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
6 Pu 0 19 
7 231W isolation facility 0 0 
8 Reprocessed Pu 0 0 
9 221 facility testing experience 0 0 
10 Operational 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
11 Equipped 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
12 Unequipped untested 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
13 Preliminary 221 facility structures 0 0 
14 231W Isolation process design 0 0 
15 Validated Separation Design 0 0 
16 Initiated 221 facilities construction 0 0 
17 Hanford Spent fuel slugs 0 0 
18 Spent fueled Hanford Piles 0 0 
19 Fully loaded Hanford Piles 0 0 
20 Hanford Pile 3 loaded units 0 0 
21 Hanford Pile 1 loaded units 0 0 
22 Hanford Pile 2 loaded units 0 0 
23 Hanford Pile 3 unloaded units 0 0 
24 Hanford Pile 1 unloaded units 0 0 
25 Hanford Pile 2 unloaded units 0 0 
26 Operational Hanford fuel fabrication facility 0 0 
27 Unequipped Hanford Pile fuel slug fabrication facility 0 0 
28 Hanford Pile fuel slug canning process 0 0 
29 Preliminary Pile Structures 0 0 
30 Hanford Pile Design 0 0 
31 Spent X-10 Fuel Slugs 0 0 
32 Loaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
33 Canned X-10 fuel slugs 0 0 
34 X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 0 0 
35 X-10 Graphite 0 0 
36 Primary X-10 Structures 0 0 
37 X-10 Design to canning process 0 0 
38 X-10 Design 0 0 
39 Unloaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
40 Preliminary Hanford Structures 0 0 
41 Decision to use Ph-Bi separation process 0 0 
42 Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant Design 0 0 
43 Pilot separation plant 0 0 
44 Primary pilot separation plant structure 0 0 
45 Preliminary pilot separation plant design 0 0 
46 Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 0 0 
47 X-10 Graphite Production Plant 0 0 
48 Clinton/X-10 Site Design 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
49 X-10 Graphite Production Plant Design 0 0 
50 Lab Rx Experience 0 0 
51 Clinton/X-10 Site Plan 0 0 
52 Hanford site plan 0 0 
53 Lab Rx 0 0 
54 PhBi & Lanthanum Separation Processes 0 0 
55 Pu Separation R&D Program 1 0 
56 Lab Rx Design 0 0 
57 Rx R&D Program 1 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T15 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 2475 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T3 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 238 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 850 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 239 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 240 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T21 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 241 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 242 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 243 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 244 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 245 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 246 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 247 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 248 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Medium 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Isolate Pu 5 
2 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 3 15 
3 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 2 15 
4 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 1 15 
5 Initiate normal process in 221 facility without testing 1 
6 Test process in 221 facility 55 
7 Install 221 facility equipment 47 
8 Finish building 221 facility 3 179 
9 Finish building 221 facility 1 179 
10 Finish building 221 facility 2 179 
11 Build preliminary 221 facility structures 90 
12 Build 231 W isolation facility 287 
13 Design 231 W isolation process 100 
14 Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 
15 Unload/Reload Pile 3 1 
16 Unload/Reload Pile 2 1 
17 Unload/Reload Pile 1 1 
18 Operate Pile 3 21 
19 Operate Pile 2 21 
20 Operate Pile 1 21 
21 Pile 3 is fully loaded 1 
22 Pile 2 is fully loaded 1 
23 Pile 1 is fully loaded 1 
24 Load 1 unit Pile 3 1 
25 Load 1 unit Pile 2 1 
26 Load 1 unit Pile 1 1 
27 Finish Building Pile 3 393 
28 Finish Building Pile 2 393 
29 Finish Building Pile 1 393 
30 Produce Hanford fuel slugs 1 
31 Install & Test canning process equipment in fuel slug fabrication facility 52 
32 Design Hanford Fuel slug canning process 157 
33 Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 245 
34 Build Preliminary Pile Structures 30 
35 Finalize Design for Hanford Pile 192 
36 Operate X-10 32 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
37 Produce canned X-10 fuel slugs 19 
38 Finish Building X-10 54 
39 Design X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 171 
40 Build Primary X-10 Structures 127 
41 Reprocess X-10 Slugs 25 
42 Build Preliminary Hanford Structures 30 
43 Decide to use Ph-Bi separation process 481 
44 Finish building pilot separation plant 78 
45 Build primary pilot separation plant structures 114 
46 Design Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant 70 
47 Design X-10 96 
48 Build Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 96 
49 Produce X-10 Graphite 99 
50 Build X-10 Graphite Production Plant 162 
51 Site Selection for Pilot & Production facilities 38 
52 Operate Lab Rx 12 
53 Build Lab Rx 316 
 
Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 Desired # of Build Preliminary Pile Structures 3 0 
2 Desired # Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 1 0 
3 Hanford Pile fresh fuel slugs 0 0 
4 Desired # of Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 0 
5 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
6 Pu 0 19 
7 231W isolation facility 0 0 
8 Reprocessed Pu 0 0 
9 221 facility testing experience 0 0 
10 Operational 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
11 Equipped 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
12 Unequipped untested 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
13 Preliminary 221 facility structures 0 0 
14 231W Isolation process design 0 0 
15 Validated Separation Design 0 0 
16 Initiated 221 facilities construction 0 0 
17 Hanford Spent fuel slugs 0 0 
18 Spent fueled Hanford Piles 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
19 Fully loaded Hanford Piles 0 0 
20 Hanford Pile 3 loaded units 0 0 
21 Hanford Pile 1 loaded units 0 0 
22 Hanford Pile 2 loaded units 0 0 
23 Hanford Pile 3 unloaded units 0 0 
24 Hanford Pile 1 unloaded units 0 0 
25 Hanford Pile 2 unloaded units 0 0 
26 Operational Hanford fuel fabrication facility 0 0 
27 Unequipped Hanford Pile fuel slug fabrication facility 0 0 
28 Hanford Pile fuel slug canning process 0 0 
29 Preliminary Pile Structures 0 0 
30 Hanford Pile Design 0 0 
31 Spent X-10 Fuel Slugs 0 0 
32 Canned X-10 fuel slugs 0 0 
33 X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 0 0 
34 X-10 Graphite 0 0 
35 Primary X-10 Structures 0 0 
36 X-10 Design to canning process 0 0 
37 X-10 Design 0 0 
38 Unloaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
39 Preliminary Hanford Structures 0 0 
40 Decision to use Ph-Bi separation process 0 0 
41 Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant Design 0 0 
42 Pilot separation plant 0 0 
43 Primary pilot separation plant structure 0 0 
44 Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 0 0 
45 X-10 Graphite Production Plant 0 0 
46 Lab Rx Experience 0 0 
47 Clinton/X-10 Site Plan 0 0 
48 Hanford site plan 0 0 
49 Lab Rx 0 0 
50 Pu Separation R&D Program 1 0 
51 Rx R&D Program 1 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T15 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 2475 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T47 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 850 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 262 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T49 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 3 1 0 0 0 
T52 2 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Coarse 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Isolate Pu 5 
2 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 3 15 
3 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 2 15 
4 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 1 15 
5 Initiate normal process in 221 facility without testing 1 
6 Test process in 221 facility 55 
7 Install 221 facility equipment 47 
8 Finish building 221 facility 3 179 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
9 Finish building 221 facility 1 179 
10 Finish building 221 facility 2 179 
11 Build preliminary 221 facility structures 90 
12 Build 231 W isolation facility 287 
13 Design 231 W isolation process 100 
14 Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 
15 Unload/Reload Pile 3 1 
16 Unload/Reload Pile 2 1 
17 Unload/Reload Pile 1 1 
18 Operate Pile 3 21 
19 Operate Pile 2 21 
20 Operate Pile 1 21 
21 Pile 3 is fully loaded 1 
22 Pile 2 is fully loaded 1 
23 Pile 1 is fully loaded 1 
24 Load 1 unit Pile 3 1 
25 Load 1 unit Pile 2 1 
26 Load 1 unit Pile 1 1 
27 Finish Building Pile 3 393 
28 Finish Building Pile 2 393 
29 Finish Building Pile 1 393 
30 Produce Hanford fuel slugs 1 
31 Install & Test canning process equipment in fuel slug fabrication facility 52 
32 Design Hanford Fuel slug canning process 157 
33 Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 245 
34 Build Preliminary Pile Structures 30 
35 Finalize Design for Hanford Pile 262 
36 Operate X-10 32 
37 Produce canned X-10 fuel slugs 19 
38 Finish Building X-10 54 
39 Design X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 171 
40 Build Primary X-10 Structures 127 
41 Reprocess X-10 Slugs 25 
42 Build Preliminary Hanford Structures 100 
43 Decide to use Ph-Bi separation process 481 
44 Finish building pilot separation plant 78 
45 Build primary pilot separation plant structures 114 
46 Design X-10 96 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
47 Build Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 96 
48 Produce X-10 Graphite 261 
49 Site Selection for Pilot & Production facilities 38 
50 Operate Lab Rx 328 
 
Number Places M1 
DNW 
Mark 
1 Desired # of Build Preliminary Pile Structures 3 0 
2 Desired # Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 1 0 
3 Hanford Pile fresh fuel slugs 0 0 
4 Desired # of Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 0 
5 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
6 Pu 0 19 
7 231W isolation facility 0 0 
8 Reprocessed Pu 0 0 
9 221 facility testing experience 0 0 
10 Operational 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
11 Equipped 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
12 Unequipped untested 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
13 Preliminary 221 facility structures 0 0 
14 231W Isolation process design 0 0 
15 Validated Separation Design 0 0 
16 Initiated 221 facilities construction 0 0 
17 Hanford Spent fuel slugs 0 0 
18 Spent fueled Hanford Piles 0 0 
19 Fully loaded Hanford Piles 0 0 
20 Hanford Pile 3 loaded units 0 0 
21 Hanford Pile 1 loaded units 0 0 
22 Hanford Pile 2 loaded units 0 0 
23 Hanford Pile 3 unloaded units 0 0 
24 Hanford Pile 1 unloaded units 0 0 
25 Hanford Pile 2 unloaded units 0 0 
26 Operational Hanford fuel fabrication facility 0 0 
27 Unequipped Hanford Pile fuel slug fabrication facility 0 0 
28 Hanford Pile fuel slug canning process 0 0 
29 Preliminary Pile Structures 0 0 
30 Hanford Pile Design 0 0 
31 Spent X-10 Fuel Slugs 0 0 
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Number Places M1 
DNW 
Mark 
32 Canned X-10 fuel slugs 0 0 
33 X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 0 0 
34 X-10 Graphite 0 0 
35 Primary X-10 Structures 0 0 
36 X-10 Design to canning process 0 0 
37 X-10 Design 0 0 
38 Unloaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
39 Preliminary Hanford Structures 0 0 
40 Decision to use Ph-Bi separation process 0 0 
41 Pilot separation plant 0 0 
42 Primary pilot separation plant structure 0 0 
43 Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 0 0 
44 Lab Rx Experience 0 0 
45 Clinton/X-10 Site Plan 0 0 
46 Hanford site plan 0 0 
47 Pu Separation R&D Program 1 0 
48 Rx R&D Program 1 0 
 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T15 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 269 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T17 0 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 3692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 2475 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 270 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T2 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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D- P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T48 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 850 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 6000 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 276 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T39 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 279 
 
D+ P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 280 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 281 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 282 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 283 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 284 
 
H P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 285 
 
H P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 P46 P47 P48 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX F: U.S. WEAPONIZATION PETRI NET DATA 
Detailed 
Number Transitions 
Ref Time 
[d] 
1 Decide to research weapon design theory 163 
2 Design Initiator 722 
3 Deliver HEU to LA 2 
4 Delivery Pu to LA 2 
5 Possess Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 1 
6 Possess Deliverable Gun Weapon 1 
7 Make Core Mockup 1 
8 Process & fabricate Pu Pit 4 
9 Cold Test 1 
10 Fabricate Explosive Lenses 39 
11 Conduct Implosion Device Test 2 
12 Conduct Mock Test 1 
13 Prepare Nuclear Weapon Test Site 67 
14 Select a Test Site 61 
15 Decide to Test Implosion Explosive 296 
16 Test & Train with Delivery systems 212 
17 Process & Fabricate HEU Gun Pit Component 2 
18 Retrofit bombers & bomb system 571 
19 Design Gun Explosive 704 
20 Complete Lens/mold design 753 
21 Complete Implosion explosive design 54 
22 Create Preliminary Design 660 
23 Decision to split Gun and Implosion R&D 170 
24 LA Site Selection 37 
25 Gather luminaries 30 
26 Groves Decision to appoint Oppenheimer 76 
 
Number Places 
1 Decision to build a nuclear weapon 
2 Initiator Design 
3 Preliminary Design to Test Site 
4 80wt% U 
5 Pu 
 287 
 
Number Places 
6 Desired Number of Implosion Mockups 
7 Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 
8 Deliverable HEU Gun Weapon 
9 Cold Tested Design 
10 Implosion Core Mockup 
11 Pu Core 
12 Hanford Pu 
13 Pu Core Design 
14 Explosive lenses 
15 Explosive lens mold/design 
16 Tested Implosion Device Design 
17 Mock Tested & Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
18 Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
19 Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
20 Decision for a Test 
21 Tested & Trained Delivery systems 
22 Retrofitted bombers & bomb system 
23 Little Boy HEU Pit Components 
24 HEU 
25 Gun Explosive Design 
26 Delivery System R&D 
27 Gun R&D 
28 Preliminary Design 
29 Implosion R&D 
30 Centralized Weapons R&D 
31 Decision for theoretical weapons research 
32 Oppenheimer running Weapons R&D 
33 Weapons R&D program 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 288 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 289 
 
D- P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 P31 P32 P33 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Medium 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Design Initiator 722 
2 Deliver HEU to LA 2 
3 Delivery Pu to LA 2 
4 Possess Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 0 
5 Possess Deliverable Gun Weapon 0 
6 Make Core Mockup 1 
7 Process & fabricate Pu Pit 4 
8 Cold Test 1 
9 Fabricate Explosive Lenses 792 
10 Conduct Implosion Device Test 2 
11 Conduct Mock Test 1 
12 Prepare Nuclear Weapon Test Site 67 
13 Select a Test Site 357 
14 Test & Train with Delivery systems 783 
15 Process & Fabricate HEU Gun Pit Component 2 
16 Design Gun Explosive 704 
17 Complete Implosion explosive design 54 
18 Create Preliminary Design 660 
19 Decide to split Gun and Implosion R&D 170 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
20 LA Site Selection 113 
21 Gather luminaries 193 
 
Number Places 
1 Decision to build a nuclear weapon 
2 Initiator Design 
3 Preliminary Design to Test Site 
4 80 wt% U 
5 Pu 
6 Desired Number of Implosion Mockups 
7 Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 
8 Deliverable HEU Gun Weapon 
9 Cold Tested Design 
10 Implosion Core Mockup 
11 Pu Core 
12 Hanford Pu 
13 Pu Core Design 
14 Explosive lenses 
15 Tested Implosion Device Design 
16 Mock Tested & Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
17 Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
18 Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
19 Tested & Trained Delivery systems 
20 Little Boy HEU Pit Components 
21 HEU 
22 Gun Explosive Design 
23 Delivery System R&D 
24 Gun R&D 
25 Preliminary Design 
26 Implosion R&D 
27 Centralized Weapons R&D 
28 Weapons R&D program 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 294 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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D- P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
T18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Coarse 
Number Transitions 
Ref Time 
[d] 
1 Design Initiator 722 
2 Deliver HEU to LA 2 
3 Delivery Pu to LA 2 
4 Possess Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 0 
5 Possess Deliverable Gun Weapon 0 
6 Make Core Mockup 1 
7 Process & fabricate Pu Pit 4 
8 Cold Test 1 
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Number Transitions 
Ref Time 
[d] 
9 Design & Fabricate Explosive Lenses 792 
10 Conduct Implosion Device Test 2 
11 Conduct Mock Test 1 
12 Prepare Nuclear Weapon Test Site 67 
13 Decide to test & Select a Test Site 357 
14 Retrofit DS & Test & Train with Delivery systems 783 
15 Process & Fabricate HEU Gun Pit Component 2 
16 Design Gun Explosive 704 
17 Complete Implosion explosive design 54 
18 Create Preliminary Design 660 
19 Create LA & Decide to split Gun and Implosion R&D 476 
 
Number Places 
1 Decision to build a nuclear weapon 
2 Initiator Design 
3 Preliminary Design to Test Site 
4 80 wt% U 
5 Pu 
6 Desired Number of Implosion Mockups 
7 Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 
8 Deliverable HEU Gun Weapon 
9 Cold Tested Design 
10 Implosion Core Mockup 
11 Pu Core 
12 Hanford Pu 
13 Pu Core Design 
14 Explosive lenses 
15 Tested Implosion Device Design 
16 Mock Tested & Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
17 Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
18 Nuclear Weapon Test Site 
19 Tested & Trained Delivery systems 
20 Little Boy HEU Pit Components 
21 HEU 
22 Gun Explosive Design 
23 Delivery System R&D 
24 Gun R&D 
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Number Places 
25 Preliminary Design 
26 Implosion R&D 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 300 
 
D- P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
T12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
T18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX G: FULL U.S. PETRI NET DATA 
Detailed 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate S-50 Rack 21 1 
2 Operate S-50 Rack 20 1 
3 Operate S-50 Rack 19 1 
4 Operate S-50 Rack 18 1 
5 Operate S-50 Rack 17 1 
6 Operate S-50 Rack 16 1 
7 Operate S-50 Rack 15 1 
8 Operate S-50 Rack 14 1 
9 Operate S-50 Rack 13 1 
10 Operate S-50 Rack 12 1 
11 Operate S-50 Rack 11 1 
12 Operate S-50 Rack 10 1 
13 Operate S-50 Rack 9 1 
14 Operate S-50 Rack 8 1 
15 Operate S-50 Rack 7 1 
16 Operate S-50 Rack 6 1 
17 Operate S-50 Rack 5 1 
18 Operate S-50 Rack 4 1 
19 Operate S-50 Rack 3 1 
20 Operate S-50 Rack 2 1 
21 Operate S-50 Rack 1 1 
22 Build 1 Rack S-50 7 
23 Build S-50 Complex 97 
24 Decide for S-50 175 
25 Build Pilot LTD 196 
26 Design Pilot LTD 45 
27 Operate Lab LTD 367 
28 Build Lab LTD 137 
29 Design Lab LTD 163 
30 Operate 5 linked K-25 Units for 80 wt% U-235 1 
31 Operate 5 linked K-25 units 1 
32 Link 4th & 5th K-25 Units to plant 22 
33 Operate 3 linked K-25 units 1 
34 Link 3 units of K-25 29 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
35 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 2 1 
36 Operate 1 K-25 Unit 1 1 
37 Complete 1 K-25 Unit 31 
38 Install barriers, test, and train 51 
39 Build K-25 support facilities 91 
40 Build main K-25 buildings 488 
41 Produce Barriers 214 
42 Install new barrier process in full scale barrier plant 61 
43 Remove old barrier process from full scale barrier plant 60 
44 Decide to use new barrier 123 
45 Re-purpose Pilot barrier plant 60 
46 Build Full scale barrier plant 206 
47 Layout K-25 Site 93 
48 Finish K-25 Design 184 
49 Re-design barrier 304 
50 Build barrier pilot plant 181 
51 Decide to build full scale barrier plant 121 
52 Make K-25 Plot Plan 406 
53 Design Prototype Barrier 316 
54 Operate Beta 6 5 
55 Operate Beta 5 5 
56 Operate Beta 4 5 
57 Operate Beta 3 5 
58 Complete Beta 6 821 
59 Complete Beta 5 791 
60 Complete Beta 4 761 
61 Complete Beta 3 731 
62 Build Lab Scale EMIS 41 
63 Design Calutron 153 
64 Operate Beta 2 5 
65 Operate Beta 1 5 
66 Operate 9 Alphas on 7wt% U 1 
67 Operate 9 Alphas on .85wt% U 1 
68 Operate 9 Alphas on Nat U 1 
69 Complete Beta 2 517 
70 Complete Beta 1 487 
71 Operate 9 Alphas on 1.1wt% U 1 
72 Design Beta 169 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
73 Build & Test 9 Alphas 652 
74 Decide to Build Beta 27 
75 Design Alpha 201 
76 Isolate Pu 5 
77 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 3 15 
78 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 2 15 
79 Reprocess spent fuel in 221 facility 1 15 
80 Initiate normal process in 221 facility without testing 1 
81 Test process in 221 facility 55 
82 Install 221 facility equipment 47 
83 Finish building 221 facility 3 179 
84 Finish building 221 facility 1 179 
85 Finish building 221 facility 2 179 
86 Build preliminary 221 facility structures 90 
87 Build 231 W isolation facility 287 
88 Design 231 W isolation process 100 
89 Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 
90 Unload/Reload Pile 3 1 
91 Unload/Reload Pile 2 1 
92 Unload/Reload Pile 1 1 
93 Operate Pile 3 21 
94 Operate Pile 2 21 
95 Operate Pile 1 21 
96 Pile 3 is fully loaded 1 
97 Pile 2 is fully loaded 1 
98 Pile 1 is fully loaded 1 
99 Load 1 unit Pile 3 1 
100 Load 1 unit Pile 2 1 
101 Load 1 unit Pile 1 1 
102 Finish Building Pile 3 393 
103 Finish Building Pile 2 393 
104 Finish Building Pile 1 393 
105 Produce Hanford fuel slugs 1 
106 Install & Test canning process equipment in fuel slug fabrication facility 52 
107 Design Hanford Fuel slug canning process 157 
108 Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 245 
109 Build Preliminary Pile Structures 30 
110 Finalize Design for Hanford Pile 192 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
111 Operate X-10 31 
112 Load X-10 with fuel 1 
113 Produce canned X-10 fuel slugs 19 
114 Finish Building X-10 54 
115 Design X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 171 
116 Build Primary X-10 Structures 127 
117 Reprocess X-10 Slugs 25 
118 Build Preliminary Hanford Structures 30 
119 Decide to use Ph-Bi separation process 69 
120 Finish building pilot separation plant 78 
121 Build primary pilot separation plant structures 69 
122 Design preliminary pilot separation plant 45 
123 Design Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant 70 
124 Design X-10 96 
125 Build Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 84 
126 Produce X-10 Graphite 99 
127 Design Clinton/X-10 site 12 
128 Build X-10 Graphite Production Plant 61 
129 Design Graphite Production Plant for X-10 101 
130 Site Selection for Pilot & Production facilities 38 
131 Operate Lab Rx 12 
132 Build Lab Rx 15 
133 Design Pu Separation processes 412 
134 Design Lab Rx & Develop Materials Capability 301 
135 Decide to research weapon design theory 163 
136 Design Initiator 722 
137 Deliver HEU to LA 2 
138 Delivery Pu to LA 2 
139 Possess Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 0 
140 Possess Deliverable Gun Weapon 0 
141 Make Core Mockup 1 
142 Process & fabricate Pu Pit 4 
143 Cold Test 1 
144 Fabricate Explosive Lenses 39 
145 Conduct Implosion Device Test 2 
146 Conduct Mock Test 1 
147 Prepare Nuclear Weapon Test Site 67 
148 Select a Test Site 61 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
149 Decide to Test Implosion Explosive 296 
150 Test & Train with Delivery systems 212 
151 Process & Fabricate HEU Gun Pit Component 2 
152 Retrofit bombers & bomb system 571 
153 Design Gun Explosive 704 
154 Complete Lens/mold design 753 
155 Complete Implosion explosive design 54 
156 Create Preliminary Design 660 
157 Decide to split Gun and Implosion R&D 170 
158 LA Site Selection 37 
159 Gather luminaries 30 
160 Groves Decision to appoint Oppenheimer 76 
 
Sub-Net T-begin T-end Path 
LTD (S-50) 1 29 1 
Gas Diffusion (K-25) 30 53 1 
EMIS (Y-12) 54 75 2 
Hanford (W & X) 76 134 3 
Weaponization 135 160 1,2,3 
 
Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
1 .85 wt% U 0 0 
2 Nat U 1.00E+09 0 
3 S-50 Racks 0 0 
4 S-50 Complex 0 0 
5 S-50 Decision 0 0 
6 Pilot LTD Design 0 0 
7 Pilot LTD 0 0 
8 Lab LTD Facility 0 0 
9 Tested Lab LTD design 0 0 
10 LTD R&D 1 0 
11 Lab LTD Design 0 0 
12 80 wt% U 0 0 
13 Full Plant K-25 Experience 0 0 
14 23 wt% U 0 0 
15 Operational K-25 Units 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
16 # K-25 Units in operation (block 1 unit operation) 0 0 
17 Send all .85 wt% U to K-25 0 0 
18 Operational linked K-25 Units  0 0 
19 7 wt% U 0 0 
20 1.1 wt% U 0 0 
21 Tested Equipment in K-25 Buildings 0 0 
22 K-25 support facilities 0 0 
23 K-25 main buildings 0 0 
24 Barriers 0 0 
25 Operational Full scale barrier plant 0 0 
26 Stripped full scale barrier plant 0 0 
27 Decision to use new barrier 0 0 
28 Pilot barrier plant for new design 0 0 
29 Full scale barrier plant 0 0 
30 K-25 Site Layout 0 0 
31 K-25 Design 0 0 
32 Redesigned barrier design 0 0 
33 Pilot barrier plant 0 0 
34 Decision to build full scale barrier plant 0 0 
35 K-25 Plot Plan 0 0 
36 Prototype Barrier 0 0 
37 Diffusion R&D 2 0 
38 EMIS R&D 1 0 
39 Lab Scale EMIS 0 0 
40 Operational Betas 0 0 
41 10 wt% U 0 0 
42 Beta Design 0 0 
43 9 Operational Alphas 0 0 
44 Decision to build Beta 0 0 
45 Alpha Design 0 0 
46 Calutron Design 0 0 
47 Desired # of Build Preliminary Pile Structures 3 0 
48 Desired # Build Hanford fuel slug fabrication facility 1 0 
49 Hanford Pile fresh fuel slugs 0 0 
50 Desired # of Initiate 221 facilities construction 1 0 
51 Pu 0 0 
52 231W isolation facility 0 0 
53 Reprocessed Pu 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
54 221 facility testing experience 0 0 
55 Operational 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
56 Equipped 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
57 Unequipped untested 221 Separations Facilities 0 0 
58 Preliminary 221 facility structures 0 0 
59 231W Isolation process design 0 0 
60 Validated Separation Design 0 0 
61 Initiated 221 facilities construction 0 0 
62 Hanford Spent fuel slugs 0 0 
63 Spent fueled Hanford Piles 0 0 
64 Fully loaded Hanford Piles 0 0 
65 Hanford Pile 3 loaded units 0 0 
66 Hanford Pile 1 loaded units 0 0 
67 Hanford Pile 2 loaded units 0 0 
68 Hanford Pile 3 unloaded units 0 0 
69 Hanford Pile 1 unloaded units 0 0 
70 Hanford Pile 2 unloaded units 0 0 
71 Operational Hanford fuel fabrication facility 0 0 
72 Unequipped Hanford Pile fuel slug fabrication facility 0 0 
73 Hanford Pile fuel slug canning process 0 0 
74 Preliminary Pile Structures 0 0 
75 Hanford Pile Design 0 0 
76 Spent X-10 Fuel Slugs 0 0 
77 Loaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
78 Canned X-10 fuel slugs 0 0 
79 X-10 Fuel Slug canning process 0 0 
80 X-10 Graphite 0 0 
81 Primary X-10 Structures 0 0 
82 X-10 Design to canning process 0 0 
83 X-10 Design 0 0 
84 Unloaded X-10 Rx 0 0 
85 Preliminary Hanford Structures 0 0 
86 Decision to use Ph-Bi separation process 0 0 
87 Basic Hanford Pu Production Plant Design 0 0 
88 Pilot separation plant 0 0 
89 Primary pilot separation plant structure 0 0 
90 Preliminary pilot separation plant design 0 0 
91 Clinton/X-10 Support Facilities 0 0 
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Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
92 X-10 Graphite Production Plant 0 0 
93 Clinton/X-10 Site Design 0 0 
94 X-10 Graphite Production Plant Design 0 0 
95 Lab Rx Experience 0 0 
96 Clinton/X-10 Site Plan 0 0 
97 Hanford site plan 0 0 
98 Lab Rx 0 0 
99 PhBi & Lanthanum Separation Processes 0 0 
100 Pu Separation R&D Program 1 0 
101 Lab Rx Design 0 0 
102 Rx R&D Program 1 0 
103 Decision to build a nuclear weapon 1 0 
104 Initiator Design 0 0 
105 Preliminary Design to Test Site 0 0 
106 Desired Number of Implosion Mockups 1 0 
107 Deliverable Pu Implosion Weapon 0 1 
108 Deliverable HEU Gun Weapon 0 1 
109 Cold Tested Design 0 0 
110 Implosion Core Mockup 0 0 
111 Pu Core 0 0 
112 Hanford Pu 0 0 
113 Pu Core Design 0 0 
114 Explosive lenses 0 0 
115 Explosive lens mold/design 0 0 
116 Tested Implosion Device Design 0 0 
117 Mock Tested & Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 0 0 
118 Prepared Nuclear Weapon Test Site 0 0 
119 Nuclear Weapon Test Site 0 0 
120 Decision for a Test 0 0 
121 Tested & Trained Delivery systems 0 0 
122 Retrofitted bombers & bomb system 0 0 
123 Little Boy HEU Pit Components 0 0 
124 HEU 0 0 
125 Gun Explosive Design 0 0 
126 Delivery System R&D 0 0 
127 Gun R&D 0 0 
128 Preliminary Design 0 0 
129 Implosion R&D 0 0 
 311 
 
Number Places M1 DNW Mark 
130 Centralized Weapons R&D 0 0 
131 Decision for theoretical weapons research 0 0 
132 Oppenheimer running Weapons R&D 0 0 
133 Weapons R&D program 0 0 
 
D-, D+, H for full US case for each resolution level can be assembled from preceding 
component data. 
U1 NWPR: Facility Outflow [SQ/yr] 
U2 
C&S [.25/.5/.75 (Low/Med/High) for Facility 
Transitions 
U3 NDP (IAEA) 
U4 
R-NeDesign =.25/.5/.75 (Low/Med/High) for 
weapon transition  
U5 R-DS-Range 
U6 R-DS-Type 
U7 
Technical Challenge to Sustain facility 
[3=Significant,1=Moderate,0=No Challenge] 
U8 
Sustainability: U Inflow [kg/yr]  
(IGNORE USource) 
U9 Sus: facility lifetime 
 
Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 102.2 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 61320 2 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 2.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 45990 20 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 17.52 0 0 0 0 0 0 3504 20 
T66 10.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 9855 20 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T70 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T73 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T76 9.125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T95 6.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 869540 20 
T96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T104 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T105 90.34 0 0 0 0 0 0 903356 20 
T106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T131 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T142 91.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T145 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T148 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T151 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T152 0 0 0 0 5230 1 0 0 0 
T153 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
RF T30 T65 T95 
T30 0 1 1 
T65 1 0 1 
T95 1 1 0 
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Zero entries are omitted to conserve space. 
RCS T30 T65 
T30 0 1 
T65 1 0 
 
Prolifdata 
Range To Adversary Targets [km] 2368 2521 2531 
Adversary Defense Rank 3     
Uranium Data (reserves stocks) [MT] 1.00E+09 6.00E+06   
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APPENDIX H: NETWORK PATHWAY SENSITIVITY: Y-12 FEED 
VARIATION 
 
Network pathway sensitivity is tested using the Y-12 enrichment sub-case. The network 
pathway was altered by varying the enrichment of the available uranium feed to Y-12.  
During the Manhattan Project Y-12 experienced feeds of natural U, 0.85 wt. %, 1.1 wt. 
%, and 7 wt. % U-235 as S-50 and K-25 (in different functional levels) came online.  
The resulting Latency distribution and Latency statistics are shown in Fig. 58 and Fig. 
59 respectively.  Varying the availability of these feeds between simulations effectively 
eliminates S-50 and K-25 or adds a fully functional K-25 to start.  
 
 
Fig. 58. Impact of pathway variation on Y-12 Latency distribution. 
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Fig. 59. Impact of pathway variation on Y-12 Latency time statistics. 
 
 The results may show a marginal decrease in expected value from the historically 
accurate feed schedule consisting of natural, 0.85 wt. %, 1.1 wt. %, and 7 wt. % U-235 
feeds and using the 7 wt. % U-235 feed the whole time.  But both Fig. 58 and Fig. 59 
shows a clear drop off in performance when using only natural U feed.  This corresponds 
to a higher expected and minimum Latencies while the Latency distribution is shifted 
and spread to the right.  This may indicate that the difference for Y-12 was greater going 
from natural feed to .85 wt. % & 1.1 wt. % feeds than it was going from the latter to 7 
wt. % feed.  It should be noted that when developing the models average production 
rates based on final production quantities were used instead of theoretically engineered 
values due to the combination of limited production numbers and the knowledge that 
theoretical efficiency was rarely if ever achieved during the Manhattan Project. 
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APPENDIX I: PAKISTAN TIMELINE AND PETRI NET DATA 
Date Event Source 
1970 
pilot plant built for uranium ore concentration.  10,000 lbs/day 
capacity 
  
1/20/1972 
Multan Conference, Bhutto charges scientists with developing 
nuclear weapons, puts Munir Khan in charge of PAEC 
Khan p85 
3/20/1972 
"2 months after the scientific conference at Multan". Bhutto 
approves PAEC chair Munir Khan's plan for pursuit of complete 
nuclear fuel cycle to support building bomb 
Khan p104 
11/28/1972 Bhutto inaugurates KANUPP   
1972 Pakistan has initial talks with French SSGN for a reprocessing plant Khan p130 
Mar-73 Initial contract for basic design of reprocessing plant signed Khan p131 
Oct-73 IAEA report on Pakistan nuclear energy needs Khan p131 
1973 
Pakistan initiates PAKNUR project to replicate India's CIRUS Pu 
production rx.  Project is shelved 1 year later due to insufficient 
funds. It is later restarted as Khushab. 
Khan p192 
5/18/1974 Indian PNE Test Khan p117 
6/15/1974 
Bhutto meets with Defense Committee of Cabinet. "First formal 
institutional meeting to conclude that the only viable option for 
Pakistan was to develop a nuclear deterrent capability… the 
nuclear program had officially shifted from merely acquiring a 
nculear capability to decisively pursuing weapons." 
Khan p121-122 
7/6/1974 
Bhutto writes letter to PM Ghandi suggesting no assurance can 
secure Pakistan's security after Indian Nuclear test 
Khan p119 
summer 
1974 
summer of 1974 Bhutto directed PAEC to start search for nucelar 
test site 
Khan p182 
9/17/1974 
AQ Khan sends second letter to Bhutto about centrifuge 
enrichment 
Khan p140 
Sep-74 
Chagai site selected for Pakistan's nuclear testing. Search lasted 10 
days (I think) 
Khan p118 
10/18/1974 
signed contract for detailed design of reprocessing plant and 
construction with SGN 
Khan 131 
10/1/1974 
"October 1974" PAEC launches project 706 to develop centrifuge U 
enrichment 
Khan p142 
1974 Pakistan "shelved" Pu production project do to lack of funds Khan p192 
12/1/1974 
"December 1974" Bhutto gives interview and discloses that Iran 
and Arab countries had given Pakistan some $450 million in loans.  
Assume loans came in sometime before, use AQ Khan 2nd Letter 
date 
Khan p112 
2/15/1975 
Bhutto approves loans for centrifuge [project 706 p143] plant and 
uranium mine at Baghalchor in Dera Ghazi Kan (BC01) and the 
Chemical Proudction Complec (CPC) in DG Khan Some funding also 
sent to Wah Group (theoretical physics team working on nuclear 
weapons design) (??) 
Khan p112 
12/1/1975 "December 1975" AQ Khan leaves Holland Khan p147 
1975-76 
PAEC began work on Chemical Production Complex (CPC) 
(conversion facility: UO2 for KANUPP and UF6) current production 
estimated at 200 tons UF6/yr 
Khan p116 
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Date Event Source 
2/1/1976 
"first months of 1976" indigenous centrifuge production R&D 
begins 
Khan p153 
Feb-76 IAEA aproved french sale of reprocessing plant to pakistan khan p 131 
Apr-76 "April 1976" AQ Khan formally joins enrichment project Khan p147 
12/1/1976 
"December 1976" Canada cuts off all supplies: nuclear fue, heavy 
water, spare parts, and technical support for KANUPP 
  
Jun-76 "June 1976" first experimental centrifuges began to be tested Khan p153 
7/17/1976 AZ Khan placed in charge of Project 706 (enrichment) Khan p150 
1976 
Special Development works created under Chief of Army Staff, that 
would prepare test site 
Khan p118 
12/1/1977 "late 1977" Pakistan had developed P-1 centrifuge Khan p154 
1977 
"end of 1977" Pkaistan was confident machines at Sihala pilot plant 
would operate effectively 
Khan p154 
6/4/1978 
"At the Sihala plant … a centrifuge machine succeeded in 
separating U-235 from U-238" 
Khan p 155 
8/1/1978 
"by August 1978"SGN had transferred 95% of all the detailed 
engineering designs and drawings for building the reprocessing 
plant to PAEC 
Khan p132 
1978 Pakistan succeeds in enrichment Khan p150 
Late 1970s Pakistan acquired 110-150  tons of yellowcake from Niger Khan p114 
1978-1980 
Pakistan acquries 450 tons of unsafeguarded yellowcake from 
Niger via Libya 
Khan p114 
2/1/1979 
"February 1979" Sihala successfully running 54 machine test 
cascade 
Khan p156 
1980 
Nuclear Test sites complete 2 to 3 horizontal and vertical shft 
tunnels 
Khan p183 
1980 CPC UF6 production problems solved Khan p152 
1980 
by 1980 the Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex, the Baghalchur-1 
facility (BC-1) and CPC were ready and producting sufficient 
amounts of high purity yellow cake (BC-1), UF6, U metal, UO2 
(CPC), and nuclear fuel for KANUPP (from KNFC) 
Khan p 116 
1980 
Belgonuclearire builds 13 MT heavy water fcility in Multan. Not big 
enough to supply Khushab. 
Khan 201 
1980 
BC-1 begins full production (previous was just experimental) 
averaging 23 MTU per year 
Mian Fissile Material 
Production in Pakistan p 81 
1980 Pakistan began construction on New Labs 
IISS, Nuclear Black Markets: 
Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the 
Rise of Proliferation 
Networks (2007) via NTI 
1981 
"by 1981" Outer ring of Kahuta plant complete and centrifuge halls 
prepared for installment of centrifuges 
Khan p156 
9/1/1981 
"September 1981" earthquak destorys 4000 operating centrifuges 
at Kahuta 
khan p156 
1981 
after earthquake Lt. Gen Navi goes to China, recieveds ~50 kg HEU 
and the CHIC-4 weapon design 
khan p157 
1982 New Labs cold reprocessing experiments Khan p200 
3/11/1983 First successful Pakistani Cold Test (was also first cold test) Khan p185 
1983 
Pakistan restarts its Pu production program. President Zia-ul-Haq 
decision was clearly affected by fears of successful Israel strike at 
Osirak and massive destruction of centrifuges at Kahuta from an 
earthquake, both in 1981 
Khan p196 
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Date Event Source 
1983 
New Labs believed they were redy to begin reprocessing (did not 
yet) 
Khan p199 
1985 KRL produces enough WGHEU for 1 nuclear device Khan p159 
1987 New Labs hot tests occurred, New Labs preprared to reprocess fuel Khan p200 
1987 
Construction fo Khushab Chemical Plant-1 (KCP-1) heavy water 
production plant begins 
Khan p201 
1988 
Between 1988 and 1995 PAF & PAEC (NDC) conducted several cold 
test simulations of Air drop bombs 
Khan p186 
1992 
China transfers M-11 Missiles to Pakistan, these took "years" to re-
engineer to make them nuclear capable [Khan p240] 
Khan p238 
May-95 PAEC gets desired cold test air drop results Khan p186 
May-95 
R&D begins on solid fuel missile system (as result of positive cold 
test above) 
Khan p186 
1995 
by summer of 1995 Pakistan had a nuclear device deliverable by 
figheter aircraft 
Khan p186 
4/1/1998 "April of 1998" Pakistan began operating Khushab-1 albright/ISIS 
5/11/1998 India Tests Nuclear Explosives Khan p269 
5/16/1998 Pakistan decided to respond with its own nuclear tests Khan p278 
5/19/1998 
massive logistical operation began to tranport the men, equipment 
and devices to the Chagai site 
khan p279 
5/28/1998 Pakistan tests nuclear explosives at Chagai khan p280 
 
 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Divert Cooled KANUPP Spent Fuel 0 
2 Complete KANUPP 313 
3 Cool Khushab Spent Fuel 200 
4 Reprocess Cooled Spent Fuel at Chasma 21 
5 Operate KANUPP 365 
6 Cool KANUPP Spent Fuel 200 
7 Design & Build BC-1: Pu Path Option 881 
8 Fabricate Untested Pu Implosion Explosive 180 
9 Fabricate Untested HEU Implosion Explosive 180 
10 Fabricate Untested HEU Gun Explosive 180 
11 Generate Domestic Funds (Annual) 365 
12 Develop Centrifuge Technology Indigenously 7300 
13 Posses Deliverable Cold Tested Pu Implosion Nuclear Weapon 0 
14 Fabricate Hot Tested Pu Explosive 180 
15 Fabricate Cold Tested Pu Explosive 180 
16 Posses Deliverable Hot Tested Pu Implosion Nuclear Weapon 0 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
17 Produce U3O8 30 
18 Pursue Pu Production R&D 0 
19 Design & Build Uranium Metal Fuel Plant 3285 
20 Design & Build KCP-1 Heavy Water Production Plant 4745 
21 Produce Metal U Fuel 30 
22 Produce Heavy Water 365 
23 Operate Khushab for 1 Cycle and Unload/Reload Spent Fuel from Khushab-1 365 
24 Fuel & Load Khushab-1 30 
25 Posses Deliverable Hot Tested HEU Gun Nuclear Weapon 0 
26 Fabricate Hot Tested HEU Implosion Explosive 180 
27 Fabricate Hot Tested HEU Gun Explosive 180 
28 Posses Deliverable Hot Tested HEU Implosion Nuclear Weapon 0 
29 Prep Site and Hot Test HEU Implosion Device 12 
30 Prep Site and Hot Test HEU Gun Device 12 
31 Prep Site and Hot Test Pu Implosion Device 12 
32 Posses Deliverable Cold Tested HEU Gun Nuclear Weapon 0 
33 Fabricate Cold Tested HEU Implosion Explosive 180 
34 Fabricate Cold Tested HEU Gun Explosive 180 
35 Initiate Gun Weapons Design Program 256 
36 Approve plan for full fuel cycle 60 
37 Design Implosion Weapon 3752 
38 Conduct Cold Testing Campaign for Gun Design 4434 
39 Posses Deliverable Cold Tested HEU Implosion Nuclear Weapon 0 
40 Design Gun Weapon 3045 
41 Locate & Build Test Site 2190 
42 Conduct Cold Testing Campaign for Implosion Design 4434 
43 Produce HEUF6 in Kahuta 61 
44 Initiate Implosion Weapons Design Program 256 
45 Install Centrifuges and Bring Kahuta to Operation 1825 
46 Successfully Enrich with Centrifuge 185 
47 Decide for Hot Test Option After Indian Test 28 
48 Design Centrifuge 1020 
49 Design & Operate Centrifuge Cascade 242 
50 Design New Labs 730 
51 Produce Nat UF6 #2 30 
52 Transfer Reprocessing Design to Pakistan 1383 
53 Acquire Foreign Funds 971 
54 Reprocess Cooled Spent Fuel at New Labs 165 
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Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
55 Build New Labs Pilot Reprocessing Facility and Bring to Operation 2555 
56 Decide for Hot Test Option Independently 4008 
57 Establish Agreement with French SGN for Reprocessing Plant 1002 
58 Build Chasma Reprocessing Facility with SGN 1825 
59 Initiate Program to Copy Indian CIRUS Production Reactor 365 
60 Design & Build BC-1 Mine & Mill 730 
61 Bhutto Approves Centrifuge Enrichment Program 151 
62 Produce Nat UF6 #1 30 
63 Design Khushab Production Reactor 730 
64 Build Khushab-1 Production Reactor 4380 
65 AQ Khan contacts Bhutto 122 
66 Indians Test Nuclear Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Device 849 
67 Design and build CPC Conversion Plant 1460 
 
Path1 Path2 Path3 Path4 Path5 Path6 Path7 Path8 
Pu-
Imp-
Cold 
Pu-
Imp-
Hot 
Pu-Imp-
Cold-
DivKAN 
Pu-Imp-
Hot-
DivKAN 
HEU-
Imp-
Cold 
HEU-
Gun-
Cold 
HEU-
Imp-
Hot 
HEU-
Gun-
Hot 
T2 T2 T1 T1 T2 T2 T2 T2 
T3 T3 T2 T2 T5 T5 T5 T5 
T4 T4 T3 T3 T6 T6 T6 T6 
T5 T5 T4 T4 T11 T11 T9 T10 
T6 T6 T5 T5 T12 T12 T11 T11 
T7 T7 T6 T6 T17 T17 T12 T12 
T11 T8 T7 T7 T33 T32 T17 T17 
T13 T11 T11 T8 T36 T34 T26 T25 
T15 T13 T13 T11 T37 T35 T28 T27 
T17 T14 T15 T13 T39 T36 T29 T30 
T18 T16 T17 T14 T41 T38 T36 T35 
T19 T17 T18 T16 T42 T40 T37 T36 
T20 T18 T19 T17 T43 T41 T41 T40 
T21 T19 T20 T18 T44 T43 T43 T41 
T22 T20 T21 T19 T45 T45 T44 T43 
T23 T21 T22 T20 T46 T46 T45 T45 
T24 T22 T23 T21 T47 T47 T46 T46 
T36 T23 T24 T22 T48 T48 T47 T47 
T37 T24 T36 T23 T49 T49 T48 T48 
T41 T31 T37 T24 T51 T51 T49 T49 
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Path1 Path2 Path3 Path4 Path5 Path6 Path7 Path8 
T42 T36 T41 T31 T53 T53 T51 T51 
T44 T37 T42 T36 T56 T56 T53 T53 
T47 T41 T44 T37 T60 T60 T56 T56 
T50 T44 T47 T41 T61 T61 T60 T60 
T52 T47 T50 T44 T62 T62 T61 T61 
T53 T50 T52 T47 T65 T65 T62 T62 
T54 T52 T53 T50 T66 T66 T65 T65 
T55 T53 T54 T52 T67 T67 T66 T66 
T56 T54 T55 T53     T67 T67 
T57 T55 T56 T54         
T58 T56 T57 T55         
T59 T57 T58 T56         
T60 T58 T59 T57         
T63 T59 T60 T58         
T64 T60 T63 T59         
T65 T63 T64 T60         
T66 T64 T65 T63         
  T65 T66 T64         
 
Number Places M1 
M1 
No 
India 
Test 
M1 
Excess 
funds 
DNW 
Mark 
1 Full Fuel Cycle Supporting Weapons Plan for Weapons for Imp 0 0 0 0 
2 Untested Implosion Weapon Design for HEU Hot Test 0 0 0 0 
3 Untested Implosion Weapon Design for Pu Hot Test 0 0 0 0 
4 Untested Gun Weapon Design for Hot Test 0 0 0 0 
5 Cooled Spent Fuel 0 0 0 0 
6 Incomplete KANUPP 1 1 1 0 
7 Safeguarded Cooled Spent Fuel 0 0 0 0 
8 Hot KANUPP Spent Fuel 0 0 0 0 
9 Pu 0 0 0 0 
10 BC-1 U Mine & Mill 0 0 0 0 
11 Pu Production  R&D for BC-1 Development  0 0 0 0 
12 Initial Pu Production Research for New Labs 0 0 0 0 
13 HEUF6 (units = kg U) 0 0 0 0 
14 Nuclear Program Funds 0 0 100 0 
15 Reprocessing Facility Design for New Labs 0 0 0 0 
16 Full Fuel Cycle Supporting Weapons Plan for SGN  0 0 0 0 
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Number Places M1 
M1 
No 
India 
Test 
M1 
Excess 
funds 
DNW 
Mark 
17 Full Fuel Cycle Supporting Weapons Plan for Pu Production 0 0 0 0 
18 Full Fuel Cycle – Initial Enrichment Evaluation 0 0 0 0 
19 Indigenous Centrifuge Block 0 0 0 0 
20 U Production R&D 0 0 0 0 
21 Cold Tested Pu Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
22 Hot Tested Pu Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
23 Hot Tested Pu Implosion Design 0 0 0 0 
24 F-16 & Mirage Fighter/Bombers 10 10 10 0 
25 Cold Tested Implosion Design 0 0 0 0 
26 Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 0 0 1 
27 U3O8 (Units = kg U) 0 0 0 0 
28 SGN Built Chasma Reprocessing Plant 0 0 0 0 
29 Option for Developing Test Site 0 0 0 0 
30 Pu Production R&D for Metal Fuel 0 0 0 0 
31 Pu Production R&D for Heavy Water 0 0 0 0 
32 Hot Khushab Spent Fuel 0 0 0 0 
33 Fueled Khushab-1 0 0 0 0 
34 Hot Tested HEU Gun Explosive 0 0 0 0 
35 Hot Tested HEU Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
36 Hot Tested HEU Implosion Design 0 0 0 0 
37 Hot Tested HEU Gun Design 0 0 0 0 
38 Untested HEU Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
39 Test Site with Test Shafts 0 0 0 0 
40 Untested HEU Gun Explosive 0 0 0 0 
41 Untested Pu Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
42 Cold Tested HEU Gun Explosive 0 0 0 0 
43 Cold Tested HEU Implosion Explosive 0 0 0 0 
44 Untested Implosion Weapon Design 0 0 0 0 
45 Cold Tested Gun Weapon Design 0 0 0 0 
46 Untested Gun Weapon Design 0 0 0 0 
47 Decision For Hot Test Option 0 0 0 0 
48 Gun Nuclear Weapons R&D 0 0 0 0 
49 Indian Nuclear Test for Bhutto 0 0 0 0 
50 KANUPP Heavy Water Reactor 0 0 0 0 
51 Reprocessing Facility Design for Chasma 0 0 0 0 
52 SGN Agreement for Reprocessing Plant for Design 0 0 0 0 
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Number Places M1 
M1 
No 
India 
Test 
M1 
Excess 
funds 
DNW 
Mark 
53 Foreign Fundraising for Nuclear Program 0 0 0 0 
54 Operational Pilot Centrifuge & Cascade Design 0 0 0 0 
55 Khushab-1 Production Reactor Design 0 0 0 0 
56 New Labs Design 0 0 0 0 
57 Centrifuge Enrichment 0 0 0 0 
58 Centrifuge Design & Procurement Data from AQ Khan 0 0 0 0 
59 Indian Nuclear Weapons Program 1 0 1 0 
60 Full Fuel Cycle Supporting Weapons Plan for Weapons for Gun 0 0 0 0 
61 Operational Kahuta Centrifuge Plant 0 0 0 0 
62 Pu Production  R&D for Reactor  0 0 0 0 
63 Indian Nuclear Test for Inhibit 0 0 0 0 
64 Indian Nuclear Test for Khan 0 0 0 0 
65 CPC Uranium Conversion Plant 0 0 0 0 
66 Heavy Water 0 0 0 0 
67 Implosion Nuclear Weapons R&D 0 0 0 0 
68 SGN Agreement for Reprocessing Plant for Build 0 0 0 0 
69 Nat UF6 (units = kg U) 0 0 0 0 
70 Hot Test Option Blocker 0 0 0 0 
71 Uranium Metal Fuel Plant 0 0 0 0 
72 New Labs Reprocessing Facility 0 0 0 0 
73 KCP-1 Heavy Water Production Plant 0 0 0 0 
74 Centrifuge Design 0 0 0 0 
75 Khushab-1 0 0 0 0 
76 U Conversion R&D 0 0 0 0 
77 Centrifuge R&D Chaklala 0 0 0 0 
78 Metal Khushab-1 Fuel [1 MTU] 0 0 0 0 
79 Initial Pu Production Research 0 0 0 0 
80 Nuclear Research Program with Preliminary Weapons Decision (Multan) 1 1 1 0 
 
 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T57 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 333 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 334 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 335 
 
D- P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1425 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 336 
 
D- P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T65 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
D- P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 9 0 0 
T24 0 0 9 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 
 337 
 
D- P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 1 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 1 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 1 0 0 0 0 
 
 338 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 339 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 340 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T36 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 341 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 342 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 343 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 344 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 345 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
D+ P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 346 
 
D+ P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 347 
 
D+ P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 1 1 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 1 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 
 348 
 
D+ P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 1 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 1 1 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 
 349 
 
D+ P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 350 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 351 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 352 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 353 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 354 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 355 
 
H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P61 P62 P63 P64 P65 P66 P67 P68 P69 P70 P71 P72 P73 P74 P75 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 9 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 0 0 0 0 0 
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H P76 P77 P78 P79 P80 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T1 8 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0.5 1200 1 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0.75 1200 1 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0.75 1200 1 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0.75 1200 1 0 0 0 
T29 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T31 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0.75 1200 1 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0.5 1200 1 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 3 0 30 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T54 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T55 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T64 1 0.25 0 0 0 0 3 9000 30 
T65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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RF T1 T45 T64 
T1 0 1 1 
T45 1 0 1 
T64 1 1 0 
Zero entries are omitted to conserve space. 
Red-CS matrix is zero. 
ProlifData 
Range To Adversary Targets [km] 400 800 
Adversary Defense Rank 1   
Uranium Data (reserves stocks) [MT] 1.00E+03 110 
 
  
 363 
 
APPENDIX J: STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF INDIAN PNE ON 
PAKISTAN CASE 
 
 Fig. 60 shows the expected and minimum Latencies for Pakistani simulations 
with uniform transition pdfs with bounds +/- 50% of the activity reference times while 
varying the occurrence of the Indian PNE as well as the pathway selection interval.  Fig. 
60 begins on the left with the expected Latency for simulations with an Indian PNE and 
1 path selection, a path selection interval of 5 years, and a path selection interval of 1 
year.  The path selection interval sequence is repeated for expected Latencies from 
simulations without the Indian PNE.  The entire simulation set is repeated for the 
minimum Latencies.  Latency standard deviations appear in Fig. 60 as error bars and the 
actual Latency time is written as data labels. 
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Fig. 60. Impact of Indian nuclear test and path selection interval variation on Pakistani 
Latency times statistics. 
 
 This analysis had both expected and somewhat unexpected results.  The expected 
Latency times for the simulations without an Indian test are all higher than the ones with 
an Indian test.  This agrees with intuition.  The decrease in expected Latency time with 
decreasing path selection interval time is opposite that seen in the U.S. case in Section 
IV.D.  This can be explained by noting the large difference between relatively longer 
Pakistani Latency Standard times in Fig. 28.  A single path selection increases the 
frequency that a simulation gets locked into one of the longer time paths driving the 
expected value up.  Whereas with the shorter path selection intervals the simulation can 
switch to the shorter time paths.  This effect has a similar impact on the standard 
deviations.  The standard deviations also show the variance for the non-Indian test cases 
is higher.  This increased variance is further demonstrated by the minimum Latencies for 
all of the simulations without an Indian test are lower than those of the 5 and 1 year PSI 
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simulations with an Indian test.  Lower minimum latencies for non-Indian test cases are 
still surprising.   
 The unexpected minimum Latencies may also be a result of poor statistics.  
Pakistan had 8 independent paths.  As a result the Latency tool produced over 100 
combinatorial paths that could be chosen during path selection.  Many of these 
combinatorial paths were very similar, especially when considering the actual path 
transitions and noting most of the paths had very similar transitions.  The simulations 
were run with 1000 iterations.  While it is likely that the statistics were fine for the 
expected Latency, the extreme value minimum for each simulation may not have been 
reliably reached.  
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APPENDIX K: SOUTH AFRICA TIMELINE AND PETRI NET DATA 
 
Date Event Source 
1948 
Atomic Energy Act and creation of 
AEB 
Venter p55 
Nov-50 
US-UK & SA nuclear cooperation 
deal (begin mining process) 
Venter p56 
Oct-52 
1st Uranium production plant 
established at the West Rand 
Consolidated mine with assistance 
from USA and UK 
VanDerWalt p30 
1954-1958 
some research into nuclear 
military applications 
Venter p56 
1954 
National Institute for Defence 
Research (NIDR); eventual missile 
development 
Venter p115 
Mar-55 
16 mines authorised to produce 
uranium, CSIR designed cyclotron 
also brought into operation 
Venter p58, VanDerWalt p30 
Jul-57 
bilateral Atoms for Peace 
agreement with US for purchase 
of research reactor and training of 
South Africans in US 
Venter p58 
1958 
Roux's "explicit linkage of peaceful 
and military nuclear research 
applications" 
Venter p69 
1958 
Atomic Energy Board (AEB) 
established 1st nuclear Research 
program 
Venter p29 
1959 
Amended Atomic Energy Act 
provided for the research 
development and ulilzation of 
nuclear energy 
Venter p58 
9/5/1959 
Cabinet Approves of AEB's 
proposed nuclear research & 
development program Operation 
Kerktoring, Dr. A.J.A Roux 
appointed Research Director 
Venter p70, VanDerWalt p30 
Nov-61 
Gas diffusion & centrifuge 
processes used in Manhattan 
project discarde as being 
"impractical, out-dated, too 
expensive and possibly 
inappropriate for what was 
required" more prefered method 
was aerodynamic Becker process 
(Nov added to simplify math with 
subsequent dates) 
Venter p72 
1961 
work began at Pelindaba to build 
nuclear research center 
Venter p71 
1961 
Vortex tube aerodynamic 
separation process conceived by 
Dr. Wally Grant developed from 
Becker aerodynamic (nozzle) but 
more complex 
Venter p72 
1961 
Pilot U refinement plant produced 
SA's 1st ingot of refined uranium, 
Venter 93 
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Date Event Source 
"parallel research" covered UF6 
1962 
SA had evaluated British & French 
strategic bombers and attempted 
to purchase british Victor bombers 
Venter p70 
1962 
training and operational 
conversion of English Electric 
Canberra light bomber & purchase 
of buccaneer strike aircraft with 
pilot training with British pilots in 
Germany for nuclear delivery 
Venter p70-71, Spokane Daily Chronicle, Oct 11, 1962, p10 
1963 
Missile development program 
begun under direction of the 
Armaments Production Board 
Venter p116 
Mar-63 
1st buildings at Pelindaba 
occupied including AEB hq and 
some laboratories (guess march to 
simplify math with subsequent 
events) 
Venter p71 
1964 experiments involving UF6 began  Venter p71 
1964 
SA started an "independent 
nuclear option"-SA Soviet spy 
Navy Commodore Dieter Gerhardt 
Venter p61 
1964 
National Institute for Rocket 
Research (NIRR) established at the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research. 
Venter p115 
1964 
1st missile 'venture' initiated: 
short range SAM 
Venter p116 
end of 
1964 
X-plant completed at Pelindaba Venter p71 
early 1965 
Dr. Wally Grant claimed SA was 
technically capabable of 
developing nuclear weapons 
Venter p85 
1965 SAFARI-1 commissioned Venter p35 
Mar-65 SAFARI-1 goes critical Venter p86 
Aug-65 
At inauguration of SAFARI-1 PM 
Verwoerd said it was SA's duty to 
explore military uses (of nuclear 
energy) but also its peaceful uses 
Venter p85-86 
1965 
Dr. Andries Visser, member 
Atomic Energy Board, "the country 
… shouuld have such a bomb to 
prevent aggression from loud-
mouted Afro-Asiatic states … 
money is no problem" 
Venter p 87 
Nov-65 
Oct/Nov 1965:Uranium Isotope 
separation achieved, 2 years later 
'the feasibility of the vortex-tube 
enrichment method had been 
deonstrated on laboratory scale…' 
Venter p89 
1965 
buccaneer bombers enter service 
in South Africa 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/buccaneer.htm 
Nov-67 
(Oct/Nov maybe):  'the feasibility 
of the vortex-tube enrichment 
method had been deonstrated on 
laboratory scale…' 
Venter p89, Albright: Affordable bomb. P40 
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Date Event Source 
Nov-67 
SAFARI-2/Pelindaba-Zero 
(Pelinduna) goes critical.  SA's 1st 
indigenously designed & 
constructed reactor.  2% enriched, 
Heavy water, <1MW, lab scale.  
Fuel & D2O supplied by US.  Plans 
started for 30 MWt prototype 
Pelinduna Reactor for eventual 
300 MWt power reactor. 
Venter p89 
1967 
SA decided to drop Pelinduna 
activities due to cost and pursue 
light water technologies available, 
which would require enrichment, 
and thus continue pursuing XYZ 
enrichment development program 
Venter p89 
1968 
SA "revealed" interest in 
PNEs/doesn't sign NPT 
Venter p35 
Mar-68 
"1st Quarter 1968"SA appoints 
committee to evaluate use of 
vortex tube enrichment in large 
scale facility 
Venter p90 
1968 
Lake St Lucia missile test site 
developed, had its first successful 
launch in Dec 1968 
Venter p116 
1969 
AEB formed itnernal group to 
evaluate technical & economic 
aspects of PNEs (VanDerWalt p36 
says early 1970) 
Venter p35, Horton p17, Albright Affordable Bomb p41 
1969 
encouraging lab results from 
indigenous vortex tube U 
enrichment method prompted 
initiation of pilot plant validation 
process 
Venter p78 
Jan-69 
early 1969After external review of 
the process, the gov't decided to 
build a pilot plant 
Albright, Affordable Bomb, p40 
1969 SAFARI-1 Shutdown Venter p89 
mid/late 
1960s 
British gov't stored nuclear 
weapons at  Kaalpan military 
facility near Warrenton, SA 
venter p87 
1970 
PM Vorster revealed SA had 
developed a new U enrichment 
process 
Venter p35 
7/20/1970 
Decision to build pilot enrichment 
plant made, and PM Vorster 
announces to parliament that SA 
had developed unique enrichment 
process 
Venter p90, Reiss p7 
  
Concerned about disclosure of U 
extraction & enrichment secrets, 
an stated interest in PNE's, and 
the covert weapons program, SA 
decides to not sign NPT at this 
time 
Venter p90 
Aug-70 SA passes Uranium Enrichment Act Venter p93 
Nov-70 
Uranium Enrichment Coporation 
of South Africe Ltd (UCOR) 
established 
Venter p35 
1970 SAFARI-2 shutdown Venter p89 
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Date Event Source 
Jan-70 
AEC releases report identifying 
wide applications for nuclear 
explosives 
Horton p17 
Mar-71 
Minister of Mines approves 1970 
AEB proposal to develop gun, 
implosion, boosted, and thermo-
nuclear PNE designs (March from 
Hibbs PNEtoDeterrent) 
Libermann p50, Masiza p36, Horton p17, Albright Affordable 
Bomb p41 
Mar-71 
Construction of pilot enrichment 
plant (Y-Plant) begins, use March 
1971 Date (same as MinMines 
approval above), makes even 6 yrs 
to next task 
Venter p78, Stumpf p3 
1972 
AEB personnel with assistance 
from NIDR initiate work on PNE 
hardware at Somerset West 
propulsion laboratory (Kentron 
South also known as Somchem in 
Cape Province) propulsion 
laboratory 
Venter p96 
1972-1973 
small team of AEB personnel 
worked on nuclear weapons 
design at Somchem West 
propulsion laboratory (assume this 
is same place as above) 
Albright Affordable Bomb p41 
May-73 
Decision to prioritize gun type 
over implosion in 1973 (May 
added for math convenience) 
Venter p96, Horton p17 
1973 
yom Kippur war involvement of 
USSR, caused SA to change its 
deterrence goals to striking USSR 
Venter p96 
1973 
Establishement by NIDR of a 
Propulsion Division at Somerset 
West, outside Cape Town, and 
inititation of serious work on 
development of ballistic as well as 
aerodynamic missiles. 
Venter p119 
1973 Search for test site started VanDerWalt p39, IAEA-GC-35/1075-9/9/93 p5 
1973 
Lithium separation research 
started 
IAEA-1075 
Nov-74 
proposal to acquire ICBM 'on the 
table' 
Venter p97 
May-74 
Gun Type scale weapon design 
test with a projectile of non-
nuclear material at Somchem 
demonstrated feasibility of gun 
type design (may from albright) 
Venter p73, Albright Affordable Bomb p41 
Nov-74 
ISSA agreement with Israel to 
develop missiles: rocket project to 
launch recon satellites 
Venter p40-41 
1974 
PM Vorster authorizes funding for 
work/development on nuclear 
device and perparation of test site, 
Albright says this occurred after 
(as a result of) the successful non-
nuclear scale test Aff-Bomb p41 
Horton p17, Reiss p8, Albright Aff Bomb p41 
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Date Event Source 
1974 
Decision to build nuclear weapons 
by PM Vorster (assume this means 
device as in Reiss above) 
Venter p35 
1974 
SA gov't, concerned about USSR 
threat, decides to build 7 nucleaer 
fission devices, construction 
Kalahari nuclear test site begins 
(boreholes dug in mid 
1970s[Hibbs-SAPNEpt1-93]). 
Masiza p37 
End of 
1974 
First stages at lower end of 
cascade of Y-Plant were 
commissioned 
Venter p78, Albright, Affordable Bomb, p40 
1975 
Boreholes at Kalahari Desert test 
site are completed 
Masiza p37 
1975 
"Work on Kalahari shafts 
commenced" 
IAEA-35/1075-9/9/93-Annex1 
6/1975 
SA announces it has completedd 
pilot plant to produce UF6 at 
Valindaba 
Masiza p37 
May-76 
1976: Somchem group does gun 
type scale test with natural U 
projectile proving mechanical 
integrity of design (May added to 
simplify math in relation to 
subsequent/precedent tasks) 
Venter p74, Albright Affordable bomb p41 
  
Shortly after Somchem test 
additional facilities isolated from 
main site built at Pelindaba for 
weapon design research both gun-
type & implosion 
Venter p74 
  
Building 5000 contained a pulse 
reactor used in 1979 for a 'dragon 
tail tickling' experiment. Building 
5100 contained control room for 
5000 reactor, offices, R&D, and 
facilities for machining U.  Building 
5200: criticality facility for 
determining multiplication factors. 
5300: conventional explosives 
testing. 
Venter p74 
Apr-76 
PM Vorster visits Israel, may have 
finalized a missile collaboration 
deal with Israel 
Venter p98 
8/5-8/6/76 
SA Energy Supply Commission 
(ESCOM) and French Framatome 
sign contract to build Koeberg 
(units 1 & 2) nuclear power station 
Masiza p37 
10/15/1976 
SA & France formalize Koeberg 
agreemet with bilateral 
agreement 
Masiza p37 
11/1976 1st Vastrap test shaft completed IAEA-GC-35/1075-9/9/93 p5 
1976 or 
1977 
a few military scientists conducted 
feasibility study of delivering 
nuclear weapons 
Libermann Rise&Fall p52 
Mar-77 
Y-Plant full cascade operation 
initiated 
Venter p78 
Mar-77 
all activities moved from 
Somchem to Pelindaba in 1977, 
IAEA-Annex 2 p2 
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Date Event Source 
assume early 1977-guess 
Mid 1977 
Development work on gun type 
device completed and 'two greatly 
oversized "cold" instrumented 
devices satisfactorily tested' 
VanDerWalt p39 
Jun-77 
AEC finishes work on 1st tungsten 
gun device 
Masiza p38 from Hibbs 'SA secret Nprogram' (both) 1993 
Jun-77 
"Mid-1977". All preparations at 
test site were complete (2nd test 
shaft completed in 1977-IAEA-GC-
35/1075-9/9/93 p5, but must've 
been before this ) 
VanDerWalt p40 
Aug-77 
dummy test of test of test was 
prepared and about to be 
executed, but test site was 
discovered internationally and 
pressure applied to SA gov't 
(7/30/1977 1st Soviet satellite, 
8/6/1977 2nd satellite does "four 
more passes": Reiss p 10) 
VanDerWalt p40, Masiza p38 
8/6/1977 
USSR discovers preparations at 
Kalahari Test Site 
Masiza p38 
8/22/1977 
France warns of "grave 
consequences" if SA tested 
Albright Affordable Bomb p41 
  
"Soon after the Kalahari episode, 
Vorster ordered the AEB to cancel 
the PNE program, to close down 
the test site, and to develop a 
secret nuclear deterrent." 
Libermann p53 
1977 Vastrap test site established Venter p105 
by 1977 
AEC had assembled all the 
nonnuclear components of a 
nuclear device 
Reiss p10 
Dec-77 Y-plant goes into full operation Masiza p38 from Spector & Smith p288 
1977 
SA acquires 30 g of Tritium from 
Israel 
Libermann p52, Libermann Israel & SA Bomb p54 
1977-78 
SA trades 50 metric tons of 
yellowcake for almost 30 grams of 
tritium from Israel 
Albright "Slow but Steady" BAS-93 
Jan-78 
Y-plant produces 1st "high 
enriched UF6" 
Venter p36, Hibbs NFuel5-10-93, Albright Affordable Bomb p40 
Jan-78 
Y-plant produces 1st HEU, Y-plant 
has nominal capacity of 10-20 
MTswu 
Albright & Hibbs p 34 
Jan-78 
Preparations for a first fast 
deployment test (non-
instrumented hot test) were ready 
VanDerWalt p41 
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Date Event Source 
2/1978 
(estimated 
"just after") 
"Just after initial HEU production, 
a 2nd smaller device was built by 
AEC".  The claimed intention for 
this device was with a full uranium 
loading for rapid fully 
instrumentalized test at Kalahari 
test site if required: use date from 
Reiss below as completion date 
(more specific) 
Hibbs-SAsecNprog-PNEtoDet 1993 p5, Albright Affordable Bomb 
p42 
9/1978 
Botha forms Witvlei Committee on 
nuclear weapons policy 
Libermann p53, Reiss p9 
10/31/1978 
PM P.W. Botha and cabinet decide 
Armscor, The Defence Force and 
the AEB should work together on a 
nuclear weapons program, 
ARMSCOR given task of 
manufacturing weapons. NOTE: 
other references suggest decision 
was referred to Witvlei (action) 
committee, and decisions weren't 
made until committee 
recommendation in July 1979 
VanDerWalt p42, Masiza p38, Albright CuriousConversion 
10/1/1978 
Components of the 1st workable 
nuclear device are completed 
Reiss p34 
1978 
SA produced 4674 tons of 
uranium-oxide 
VanDerWalt p32 
Jul-79 
Decision to build 7 "deliverable 
nuclear weapons" by Witvlei 
Committee and put Armscor in 
charge of production 
Venter p64, Reiss p9 ref 13 p36 
7/1979 
Witvlei Committee recomends 
"building deliverable nuclea 
weapons to acquire a 'credible 
deterrent capability'" and putting 
Armscor in charge 
Libermann p53 
Aug-79 
Y-Plant shutdown due to "massive 
catalytic in-process gas reaction 
between feedstock and carrier 
gas, hydrogen" 
Venter p79, Hibbs92 p1 
Aug-79 
Y-Plant shutdown from massive 
chemical reaction contamination, 
resumed limited operation 8 
months later, but not until July 
1981 "was it capable of producing 
more" HEU 
Reiss p11 
9/22/1979 Vela Incident Venter p132 
Nov-79 
enough HEU for 1 fissie core 
NOTE: use Aug 79 shutdown as 
HEU completion date 
Venter p36 
Nov-79 
AEB completed 1st device, 55kg 
HEU (80%) 
Venter p36, Reiss p11, Albright Affordable Bomb p42 
Nov-79 
The '2nd device' was the 1st to be 
supplied with HEU  
Hibbs-SAsecNprog-PNEtoDet 1993 
1978-1979 
Y-Plant produces mostly 80% 
HEUF6 which was converted to 
metal HEU 
Venter p79 
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Date Event Source 
1980 
high security facility built at 
ARMSCOR for nuclear weapon 
production (melting, casting, and 
machinging), all other mechanical 
work, design & miniaturization, as 
well as reliability improvements 
and alternative triggers 
VanDerWalt p42 
1980 
Armscor begins construction of of 
Kentron Circle (later Advena) 
Masiza p38 from Stumpf, Albright Affordable Bomb p43 
1980 
Construction of tritium handling 
facility completed 
  
Apr-80 
Y-plant resumes operation after 9 
month shutdown, but not until 
7/1981 did HEU began to be 
produced again 
Stumpf p4 
Jul-81 
Y-plant resumes HEU production 
after accident & restart.  HEU 
production from this point to next 
device fabrication (4/1982) 
appears to have doubled from 
previous production rate. 
Hibbs-SAsecNprog-PNEtoDet 1993 
1981 
Amrscor completed 2 buildings at 
Kentron Circle, a main 
manufacturing building and an 
environmental test facility 
Albright-CuriousConversion-BAS1993 
1981 
Approval of Gouriqua reactor 
program for Pu & tritium 
production, final option involved 
construction of a 150MW 
pressurized water research & 
development reactor 
IAEA-1075 p6-16, annex 1 
Apr-82 
Advena manufactured its first 
nuclear device with HEU: a 'pre-
qualification' device.  Design 
refinements and final qulification 
took another 2-3 years at which 
point the design was 'frozen'.  At 
this point earlier models were 
upgraded to reflect subsequent 
design changes. Deliverable- "It 
could be kicked out the back of a 
plane."-Albright Affordable Bomb 
p43  ("bomber-deliverable" 
Libermann p54).  Albright-Curious 
Conversion-Design refinements for 
full qualification took another 2-3 
years after which final design was 
frozen. NOTE: take this as start of 
manufacture and IAEA date below 
as finish 
Albright-CuriousConversion-BAS1993, Hibbs 5-10-93, Reiss p11 
Dec-82 
Completion of "first protobype 
deliverable nuclear weapon" 
[IAEA]. "1st bomb built at the 
circle" [Venter] 
Venter p104, IAEA-GC-35/1075-9/9/93 p7 
1982 
by end of 1982 about 50 modules 
of semi-commercial enrichment 
plant will be installed.  Budget cuts 
delayed first planned operations 
Laufer-4-8-82 
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Date Event Source 
to late 1986/early1987 
2/27/1985 
SA AEC announces Valindaba 
semi-commerical UENR plant will 
not operate until 1987 
Masiza p41 
1985 
SA reexamines its nuclear startegy 
and deides nott to pursue 
hydrogen weapons. Limited 
production to 7 weapons 
Reiss p16, Albright Affordable Bomb p45 
9/1985 
SA decided to limited production 
to 7 weapons, cancel PU and 
tritium work, limited production of 
lithium-6, but implosion 
development and tehoretical work 
on more advvanced designs 
continued 
 Albright Affordable Bomb p46, IAEA-GC-35/1075-9/9/93 p7 
1986 
Israel tests ICBM missile 
developed 
Venter p41 
5/7/1986 
Scandiflash of Sweden sells SA a 
'roentgen absorber' for use with 
nuclear test 
Masiza p42 
Aug-87 
delivery of 1st qualified and 
inventory-certified device, this and 
subsequent weapons were 
versions of H2 guided glide bomb: 
Libermann p54 
Venter p104, Albright Affordable Bomb p44 
1987 Hot Cell facility comes online Masiza p 42, SIPRI country profile 
1987-1989 SA builds 4 more devices IAEA-1075 
1988 
10 new buildings built at 
Advena/Kentron to develop 
implosion in mid 1980s, 
"occupation" of new buildings 
started in 1988 and facilities were 
still being commissioned when the 
program was shut down 
Albright-SlowSteady-BAS-1993 
9-10/1988 
SA builds hanger over 1 Kalahari 
test shaft and inspects it in 2nd 
half of October 1988 
Pabian p8 
1988/1989 
2 all-terrain mobile launchers for 
ballistic missiles built nd tested at 
Advena 
Venter p124 
6/1/1989 
Single stage test vehicle (RSA-1) 
missile test 
Venter p111 
7/5/1989 
2 stage potential (RSA-2 type) 
missile test 
Venter p111 
Jul-89 
Flight test of SA missile from 
Overberg Test Range (same test as 
described in above entry) 
Venter p41 
1989 Gouriqua program cancelled IAEA-1075 
11/19/1991 2 stage missile test Venter p111 
1994 Successful flight test of missiles Venter p38 
 
Number Transitions Ref [d] 
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1971 1974 1977 
1 Generate Funds for Nuclear Program 365 - - 
2 Hot Test HEU Gun Device 12 - - 
3 Produce Converted HEU Metal with Operating Experience 5 - - 
4 H2 Gas Accident Shutdown-Re-Equilibriation Period 700 - - 
5 Build Prototype Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive 244 - - 
6 Posses Qualified Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 - - 
7 Posses Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 - - 
8 Build Qualified Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive 183 - - 
9 Qualify Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive Design 1768 - - 
10 Re-Design Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive 1005 - - 
11 Produce Converted HEU Metal 21 - - 
12 Initiate Y-Plant Operations and Bring to Equilibrium 275 - 101 
13 Load Un-HEU-loaded Device with HEU 92 - - 
14 Refine Design & Build 1st Device for HEU Loading 487 - 405 
15 Design & Build Advena/Kentron Circle Weapons Design & Assembly Facility 731 - - 
16 Redefine SA Nuclear Strategy/Goals 678 - - 
17 Prepare Test Site for Cold Instrumented Test 66 - - 
18 Build Tungsten Gun Type Device 92 - - 
19 Build Weapons Research Facilities at Pelindaba 365 - - 
20 Build Test Site 1127 - - 
21 Search for Test Site 365 - - 
22 Prioritize Gun Research over other PNE Research 792 - - 
23 Build Pilot Vortex Tube U-Enrichment Facility (Y-Plant) 2192 1035 - 
24 Test Gun Design with Scale Nat U 731 - - 
25 Design and Non-nuclear Scale Test Gun Nuclear Explosive Design 365 - - 
26 Initiate Lithium R&D 1 - - 
27 Produce Nat UF6 30 - - 
28 Site & Build Test Site 1492 - - 
29 Conduct Preliminary Implosion R&D 1825 - - 
30 Focus AEC on Implosion 0 - - 
31 Build Uranium Metal Fuel Plant 1825 - - 
32 Build SA Heavy Water Production Plant 3285 - - 
33 Produce Metal U Fuel 30 - - 
34 Produce Heavy Water 365 - - 
35 Operate SA for 1 Cycle and Unload/Reload Spent Fuel from SA 365 - - 
36 Fuel & Load SA Production Reactor 30 - - 
37 Design & Build SA Reprocessing Facility 2190 - - 
38 Cool & Reprocess Spent Fuel 365 - - 
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Number Transitions 
Ref [d] 
1971 1974 1977 
39 Approve Build of Facilities with Completed Designs for Pu Production Facilities 0 - - 
40 Build SA Production Reactor 4380 - - 
41 Possess Deliverable Pu Imp Weapon 0 - - 
42 Produce Tested Nuclear Pu Imp Explosive 180 - - 
43 Conduct Cold Testing Campaign of Pu Implosion Design 4434 - - 
44 Hot Test Pu Explosive Design 12 - - 
45 Conduct Preliminary Pu Production & Reprocessing R&D 1460 - - 
46 Design Implosion Weapon 3752 - - 
 
Paths Transitions 
Gun 
Cold 
1,3-27 
Gun 
Hot 
1-27 
Pu Cold 1,27,29-43,45-46 
Pu Hot 1,17,27-42,44-46 
 
Number Places M1 
M1-
XFNP 
M1-
NFXP 
M1-
XFXP 
DNW 
Mark 
1 AEC Resources & Personnel 10 1 100 100 0 
2 Nuclear Program Funds 1 1000 10 1000 0 
3 Hot Tested Gun Device 0 0 0 0 0 
4 HEU Gun Type Nuclear Explosive Device 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Cold Instrumented Test Prepared Test Site 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Nat UF6 0 0 0 0 0 
7 Equilibrated Operating Y-Plant with experience 0 0 0 0 0 
8 H2 Gas Issue 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Non-Nuclear Scale Tested Gun Nuclear Explosive Design for Test Site 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Prototype Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive Design for Design 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Plan for 7 Nuclear Weapons Produced by ARMSCOR for Circle 0 0 0 0 0 
12 PNE R&D 1 1 1 1 0 
13 Pilot Vortex Tube U-Enrichment Facility (Y-Plant) 0 0 0 0 0 
14 Pilot Vortex Tube U-Enrichment Facility (Y-Plant) Design 1 1 1 1 0 
15 Qualified Deliverable HEU Gun Nuclear Explosive 0 0 0 0 0 
16 Pelindaba Weapons Research Facilities  0 0 0 0 0 
17 Qualified Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive Design 0 0 0 0 0 
18 Un-HEU-loaded Gun Type Nuclear Explosive Device 0 0 0 0 0 
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Number Places M1 
M1-
XFNP 
M1-
NFXP 
M1-
XFXP 
DNW 
Mark 
19 Plan for 7 Nuclear Weapons Produced by ARMSCOR for Design 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Buccaneer Bombers 15 15 15 15 0 
21 Equilibrated Operating Y-Plant 0 0 0 0 0 
22 Kentron Circle/Advena Weapons Design and Assembly Facility 0 0 0 0 0 
23 Kalahari Test Site Location 0 0 0 0 0 
24 Nat U Scale Cold Tested Gun Design 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Lithium Separation Research 0 0 0 0 0 
26 Prototype Deliverable HEU Gun Nuclear Explosive 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Pilot U refinement Plant (U conversion) 1 1 1 1 0 
28 Cold Instrumented Test Prepared Test Site Detected 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Tungsten Gun Type Mock Nuclear Explosive Device 0 0 0 0 0 
30 Kalahari Vastrap Test Site 0 0 0 0 0 
31 HEU 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Refined AEC Gun Design 0 0 0 0 0 
33 Non-Nuclear Scale Tested Gun Nuclear Explosive Design for Weapon 0 0 0 0 0 
34 Boosting R&D 0 0 0 0 0 
35 Prototype Deliverable HEU Gun Explosive Design for Build 0 0 0 0 0 
36 Gun R&D 0 0 0 0 0 
37 Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 0 0 0 1 
38 Implosion & Thermonuclear R&D 0 0 0 0 0 
39 Qualified Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 0 0 0 1 
40 Test Site Planning 0 0 0 0 0 
41 U Mines 1 1 1 1 0 
42 Focused Implosion & Thermonuclear R&D for Test Site 0 0 0 0 0 
43 Reprocessing Facility R&D 0 0 0 0 0 
44 Metal Fuel Facility Design 0 0 0 0 0 
45 Heavy Water Facility Design 0 0 0 0 0 
46 SA Spent Fuel 0 0 0 0 0 
47 Fueled SA Production Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 
48 SA Production Reactor Design 0 0 0 0 0 
49 Preliminary Pu Production  R&D for Reactor & Support Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 
50 Pu [kg] 0 0 0 0 0 
51 Heavy Water 0 0 0 0 0 
52 Uranium Metal Fuel Plant 0 0 0 0 0 
53 SA Reprocessing Facility 0 0 0 0 0 
54 SA Heavy Water Production Plant 0 0 0 0 0 
55 Unloaded SA Production Reactor 0 0 0 0 0 
56 Metal SA Production Fuel [1 MTU] 0 0 0 0 0 
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Number Places M1 
M1-
XFNP 
M1-
NFXP 
M1-
XFXP 
DNW 
Mark 
57 Initial Pu Production R&D (Pelinduna/SAFARI-2) 1 1 1 1 0 
58 Tested Pu Imp Explosive Design 0 0 0 0 0 
59 Pu Explosive 0 0 0 0 0 
60 Untested Pu Implosion Explosive Design for Hot Testing 0 0 0 0 0 
61 Untested Pu Implosion Explosive Design for Cold Testing 0 0 0 0 0 
62 Focused Implosion & Thermonuclear R&D 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 380 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 760 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T23 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T30 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 55 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T8 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 383 
 
D- P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T35 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 384 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 7500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 385 
 
D+ P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 386 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 387 
 
D+ P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 388 
 
D+ P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 389 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 390 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 391 
 
H P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 P26 P27 P28 P29 P30 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 392 
 
H P31 P32 P33 P34 P35 P36 P37 P38 P39 P40 P41 P42 P43 P44 P45 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 393 
 
H P46 P47 P48 P49 P50 P51 P52 P53 P54 P55 P56 P57 P58 P59 P60 P61 P62 
T23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T2 0 0.25 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 3.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 20 
T6 0 0 0 0 3700 1 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 3700 1 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T23 2.92 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 27740 20 
T27 9.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T31 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 12167 20 
T32 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
T37 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 1 1000 20 
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Udata U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 
T38 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T40 0.9 0.25 0 0 0 0 3 9000 20 
T41 0 0 0 0 3700 1 0 0 0 
T42 2.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 20 
T43 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
T44 0 0.25 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Transitions with all zero value entries omitted. 
RF T23 T40 
T23 0 1 
T40 1 0 
 
Red-CS = 0. 
ProlifData 
Range To Adversary Targets [km] 450 1170 1000 2400 
Adversary Defense Rank 2       
Uranium Data (reserves stocks) [MT] 1.00E+09 300     
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APPENDIX L: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PATHWAY UTILITY 
ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTING SURVEY RESULTS 
TABLE L.1.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for All NWPPUAWS Results 
  
W(TTFW) W(NWPR) W(C&S) W(NDP) W(Rel) W(Sus) 
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std 
All Results 0.30 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 
Group 
Prolif 
Expert 
0.247 0.170 0.064 0.068 0.160 0.082 0.119 0.066 0.221 0.097 0.190 0.113 
Intell 
Analyst 
0.399 0.440 0.025 0.050 0.242 0.239 0.249 0.231 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.032 
Technical 
Nuclear 
0.431 0.247 0.102 0.088 0.150 0.074 0.145 0.078 0.081 0.014 0.090 0.048 
Nuclear 
Policy 
0.437 0.260 0.053 0.042   0.123 0.117 0.177 0.113 0.085 0.047 0.125 0.075 
MS NE 0.162 0.158 0.046 0.051 0.166 0.099 0.237 0.149 0.212 0.148 0.178 0.113 
PhD NE 0.215 0.188 0.060 0.051 0.128 0.103 0.165 0.154 0.214 0.170 0.218 0.181 
UG NE 0.055 - 0.010 - 0.175 - 0.175 - 0.351 - 0.234 - 
MS Pol 0.071 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.527 0.530 0.156 0.209 0.078 0.105 0.154 0.212 
not given 0.477 0.324 0.050 0.058 0.157 0.121 0.130 0.087 0.093 0.082 0.092 0.091 
Country 
Profile 
Reg 
Power 
0.235 0.223 0.061 0.066 0.179 0.130 0.201 0.141 0.168 0.144 0.157 0.119 
Reg 
Aspirant 
0.274 0.266 0.042 0.043 0.173 0.206 0.165 0.140 0.181 0.141 0.165 0.147 
not given 0.437 0.310 0.054 0.057 0.164 0.111 0.133 0.084 0.113 0.089 0.099 0.085 
Educ. 
Prof Deg 0.328 0.253 0.057 0.057 0.168 0.122 0.165 0.124 0.139 0.121 0.143 0.126 
Ugrad 0.197 0.226 0.044 0.051 0.195 0.200 0.213 0.150 0.186 0.145 0.164 0.118 
High 
School 
0.055 - 0.010 - 0.175 - 0.175 - 0.351 - 0.234 - 
not given 0.705 0.417 0.076 0.107 0.055 0.077 0.055 0.077 0.055 0.077 0.055 0.077 
Emp. 
Sector 
Academic 0.213 0.213 0.052 0.056 0.188 0.163 0.195 0.139 0.183 0.144 0.169 0.132 
Gov’t 0.487 0.272 0.060 0.062 0.124 0.095 0.103 0.074 0.112 0.084 0.114 0.083 
Industry 0.667 - 0.025 - 0.084 - 0.084 - 0.056 - 0.084 - 
Other 0.437 0.332 0.051 0.059 0.161 0.145 0.184 0.142 0.080 0.044 0.087 0.072 
Prof. 
Disc. 
Tech 
Sci/Eng 
0.255 0.227 0.054 0.056 0.164 0.106 0.192 0.136 0.172 0.138 0.163 0.122 
Social 
Science 
0.269 0.271 0.041 0.049 0.257 0.249 0.175 0.134 0.129 0.119 0.130 0.135 
Other 0.622 0.329 0.064 0.072 0.057 0.055 0.079 0.075 0.096 0.084 0.082 0.065 
Prof./ 
Stud 
Prof. 0.364 0.270 0.061 0.065 0.168 0.132 0.167 0.129 0.120 0.095 0.120 0.093 
Student 0.167 0.161 0.047 0.048 0.183 0.177 0.205 0.148 0.207 0.152 0.191 0.137 
not given 0.477 0.324 0.050 0.058 0.157 0.121 0.130 0.087 0.093 0.082 0.092 0.091 
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APPENDIX M: MAUA VERIFICATION NETWORK AND DATA 
Number Transitions Ref 
1 Posses Hot Tested Pu Implosion Missile Weapon 0 
2 Produce Hot Tested Pu Implosion Explosive Device 5 
3 Possess Deliverable HEU Gun Gravity Bomb Weapon 0 
4 Design & Build Missile Delivery System 40 
5 Possess Deliverable Cold Tested Pu Implosion Missile Weapon 0 
6 Produce Nat U 2 
7 Build U Mine 25 
8 Build Fuel Fab, Reactor, & Reprocessing Facility 50 
9 Build Enrichment Facility #2 30 
10 Allocate Resources to Nuclear Program 50 
11 Hot Test Pu Implosion Explosive 2 
12 Design & Build Gravity Bomb Delivery System 20 
13 Produce Cold Tested Pu Implosion Device 5 
14 Initiate Delivery System Design Program 1 
15 Produce Cold Tested HEU Gun Explosive 5 
16 Produce Pu 10 
17 Operate Enr Facility 2 8 
18 Operate Enr Facility 1 8 
19 Build Enrichment Facility #1 30 
 
Path 1: Cold Tested HEU Gun 
Gravity Bomb w/one ENR facility 
Path 2: Cold Tested HEU Gun 
Gravity Bomb w/two ENR facilities 
Path 3: Cold Tested 
Pu Implosion Missile 
Path 4: Hot Tested 
Pu Imp Missile 
3 3 4 1 
6 6 5 2 
7 7 6 4 
10 9 7 6 
12 10 8 7 
14 12 10 8 
15 14 13 10 
18 15 14 11 
19 17 16 13 
  18   14 
  19   16 
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Number Places M1 DNWMark 
1 Nuclear Program Resources: Delivery System 0 0 
2 Nuclear Program Resources: U Mine 0 0 
3 Gravity Bomb Delivery System 0 0 
4 Missile Delivery System 0 0 
5 Deliverable Nuclear Weapon 0 1 
6 Pu 0 0 
7 Missile R&D 0 0 
8 Hot Tested Pu Implosion Explosive 0 0 
9 Hot Tested Pu Implosion Explosive Design 0 0 
10 Cold Tested Pu Implosion Explosive 0 0 
11 Fuel Fab, Reactor, & Reprocessing Facilities 0 0 
12 Nat U 0 0 
13 Gravity Bomb R&D 0 0 
14 Cold Tested HEU Gun Nuclear Explosive 0 0 
15 U Mine 0 0 
16 HEU 0 0 
17 Delivery System R&D Block 0 0 
18 Enrichment Facilities 0 0 
19 Nuclear Program Resources 0 0 
 
D- 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
D+ 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
For Infinite Resources Change Allocate Resources to Nuclear Program from 1 to 50 for 
Nuclear Program Resources, T11 
H 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
 
MAUA Data 
  MAUA1 MAUA2 MAUA3 MAUA4 MAUA5 MAUA6 MAUA7 MAUA8 MAUA9 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 500 2 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 3 0.5 0.3 0 0 0 3 9000 20 
T9 2 0.75 0.2 0 0 0 1 11250 20 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 1000 1 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
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  MAUA1 MAUA2 MAUA3 MAUA4 MAUA5 MAUA6 MAUA7 MAUA8 MAUA9 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Red-Flow 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Red-CS 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Prolif Data 
Range To Adversary Targets [km] 250 900 
Adversary Defense Rank 1   
Uranium Data [MT] 2.00E+05 100 
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APPENDIX N: ROK PETRI NET DATA 
Pyro 
Number Transitions 
Ref Time 
[d] 
1 Acquire Pu Purification Chemicals 1 
2 Develop Pu Purification Chemical Acquisition Source 365 
3 Initiate Reprocessing & Actinide Chemistry R&D 1 
4 Operate Pu Purification Facility 5 
5 Build Pu Purification Facility 365 
6 Design Pu Purification Process 365 
7 Initiate Pyro Processing R&D 1 
8 Operate Pilot Pyro Facility 16 
9 Build Pilot Pyro Facility 730 
10 Design Pilot Pyro Facility 730 
11 Operate/Test Mock Pilot Pyro 365 
12 Build Mock Pilot Pyro Facility 365 
13 Design Mock Pilot Pyro Facility 1095 
14 Design Pyro Process 3650 
15 Possess Deliverable Pu Imp Weapon 0 
16 Produce Tested Nuclear Explosive 57 
17 Prepare and Conduct Subcrit Test Campaign of Pu Design 720 
18 Prepare and Conduct Nuclear Test of Pu Explosive with 4 reserve explosives 180 
19 Design Pu Explosive 858 
20 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
Number Places M1-P M1-C 
DNW 
Mark 
1 Pu Purification Chemical Knowledge 0 0 0 
2 Pu Purification Chemicals 0 0 0 
3 Pu Purification Chemical Acquisition Source 0 0 0 
4 Pyro R&D initiated 1 1 0 
5 Nuclear Program 1 1 0 
6 Pu Metal [kg] 0 0 0 
7 Pu Purification Facility 0 0 0 
8 Pu Purification Process Design 0 0 0 
9 Reprocessing & Actinide Chemistry R&D 1 1 0 
10 Spent Fuel Assemblies 12000 12000 0 
11 Separated TRU metal 6 kg Ingot (PU/U = 3) 0 0 0 
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Number Places M1-P M1-C 
DNW 
Mark 
12 Pilot Pyro Facility 0 1 0 
13 Pilot Pyro Facility Design 0 0 0 
14 Mock Tested Pilot Pyro Design 0 0 0 
15 Mock Pilot Pyro Facility 1 0 0 
16 Mock Pilot Pyro Facility Design 0 0 0 
17 Pyro Process Design 0 0 0 
18 Pyroprocessing R&D 0 0 0 
19 Tested Pu Explosive Design 0 0 0 
20 Deliverable Pu Imp Weapon 0 0 1 
21 Nuclear Capable Delivery System 1 1 0 
22 Nat U Metal [kg] 800 800 0 
23 Pu Explosive 0 0 0 
24 Untested Pu Explosive Design 0 0 0 
25 Weapons Design Program 0 0 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
T1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 404 
 
D- P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
T1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 406 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 P25 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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PUREX 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Acquire PUREX Chemicals 30 
2 Develop PUREX chemical acquisition source 90 
3 Initiate Reprocessing & Actinide Chemistry R&D 1 
4 Convert Pu Nitrate to Pu Metal 1 
5 Build Pu Conversion Facility 180 
6 Design Pu Metal Conversion Facility 180 
7 Initiate PUREX Processing R&D 1 
8 Operate Pilot PUREX Facility 15 
9 Build Pilot PUREX 1095 
10 Design PUREX Pilot Facility 365 
11 Possess Deliverable Pu Imp Weapon 0 
12 Produce Tested Nuclear Explosive 57 
13 Prepare and Conduct Subcrit Test Campaign of Pu Design 720 
14 Prepare and Conduct Nuclear Test of Pu Explosive with 4 reserve explosives 180 
15 Design Pu Explosive 858 
16 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
Number Places MP MC 
DNW 
Mark 
1 Pu Metal Conversion Designed 0 0 0 
2 PUREX R&D Initiated 0 1 0 
3 PUREX Chemicals 0 0 0 
4 PUREX Chemicals acquisition source 0 0 0 
5 Nuclear Program 1 1 0 
6 Pu Metal [kg] 0 0 0 
7 Pu Conversion Facility 0 0 0 
8 Pu Metal Conversion Facility Design 0 0 0 
9 Reprocessing & Actinide Chemistry R&D 2 2 0 
10 Spent Fuel 12000 12000 0 
11 Pu Nitrate 0 0 0 
12 Pilot PUREX Facility 0 1 0 
13 Pilot PUREX Design 0 0 0 
14 PUREX R&D 0 0 0 
15 Tested Pu Explosive Design 0 0 0 
16 Deliverable Pu Imp Weapon 0 0 1 
17 Nuclear Capable Delivery System 1 1 0 
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Number Places MP MC 
DNW 
Mark 
18 Nat U Metal [kg] 800 800 0 
19 Pu Explosive 0 0 0 
20 Untested Pu Explosive Design 0 0 0 
21 Weapons Design Program 0 0 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
T9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D- P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
T12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D- P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
T7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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D+ P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
H P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 411 
 
H P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 
T13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Centrifuge 
Number Transitions Ref Time [d] 
1 Operate U Metal Conversion Facility 1 
2 Build U Metal Conversion Facility 180 
3 Design U Metal Facility 180 
4 Operate Centrifuge WGU Plant 1 
5 Reconfigure LEU Plant for WGU production 60 
6 Build 3 MSWU Centrifuge LEU Plant 1385 
7 Design 3 MSWU Centrifuge LEU Plant 180 
8 Possess Deliverable U Gun Weapon 0 
9 Produce U Gun Explosive 1 
10 Design U Gun Explosive 365 
11 Initiate Weapons R&D 1 
 
Number Places MP MC 
DNW 
Mark 
1 WGU Metal 0 0 0 
2 U Metal Conversion Facility Design Completed 0 0 0 
3 3 MSWU Centrifuge LEU Plant Design Completed 0 1 0 
4 U Metal Conversion Facility 0 0 0 
5 U Metal Conversion Facility Design 0 0 0 
6 WGUF6 0 0 0 
7 3MSWU Centrifuge WGU Plant 0 1 0 
8 Nat UF6 1.00E+09 1.00E+09 0 
9 3 MSWU Centrifuge LEU Plant 0 0 0 
10 URENCO assistance 1 1 0 
11 Nuclear Program 3 3 0 
12 3 MSWU Centrifuge LEU Plant Design 0 0 0 
13 Deliverable U Gun Weapon 0 0 1 
14 Nuclear Capable Delivery System 1 1 0 
15 Weapons Design Program Initiated 0 0 0 
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Number Places MP MC 
DNW 
Mark 
16 U Gun Explosive 0 0 0 
17 U Gun Design 0 0 0 
18 Weapons Design Program 0 0 0 
 
D- P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 0 0 0 1 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
T9 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D+ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 413 
 
H P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 
T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
